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Abstract 
From the end of the Second World War historians have sought to answer one of its 
most intriguing questions: to what - and to whom - did the Wehrmacht owe its 
shocking initial operational successes? What was the nature of Gemían strategie and 
operational perceptions, and were they new — or even, as some researchers have 
suggested, 'revolutionary'? Was Germán post-1918 military culture conducive to a 
thorough investigation of past mistakes, a re-evaluation of traditional notions, and the 
pursuit of new ideas? 
In reality the Reichswehr offícer corps jealously defended its inlierited 
conceptual boundaries, retreated ever-deeper into a one-dimensional self-perception 
and strategie outlook, and offered conceptually ossified solutions to the Republic's 
pressing security problems. Gemían officers, convinced that their doctrine and 
military world-view were flawless, never challenged the axioms and values that had 
brought army and nation to catastrophe in 1918: extreme warfare, culminating in the 
most destructive and eventually self-destructive actions; extremes of risk-taking; the 
endless pursuit of annihilational battles that dictated the réduction of strategy to 
meticulous operational and tactical planning; the trust in 'spiritual superiority' to 
overcome enemy advantages in material and manpower; ruthlessness; and an 
exaggerated drive for action at ali costs. Idiosyncratic operational planning that was at 
times completely detached from strategie reality completed the picture of a military 
organisation unable to renew itself. 
No comprehensive analysis has yet convincingly explained this astonishing 
continuity, or linked it to the allegedly innovative operational theory and doctrine that 
evolved in the second half of the 1930s. The concept of military and organisational 
culture can however provide the necessary theoretical foundations for understanding 
both that continuity and the doctrinal shape that it assumed in the imminence of the 
Second World War. It can explain - as this thesis demonstrates - the disastrous and 
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Introduction 
The nature and dynamics of German military culture 
Modem German military history is a self-contradictory story of a Janus-faced 
military organisation. From the beginning of the First World War to the end of the 
Second, it offers some of the most enticing examples both of tactical brilliance and 
operational success and of strategie foolishness and blind extremism. It is a story that 
has captured and still captures the interest of historians and military practitioners 
alike: a story of a military organisation with an undying faith in the operational 
principles and military tenets that had seemingly guided it to a pinnacle of 
achievement despite unprecedented objective hardships. That military organisation in 
its différent incarnations - Imperial German Army, Reichswehr, and Wehrmacht — 
supposedly overcame the most daunting obstacles and limitations in order to achieve 
some of the most breath-taking operational successes in history - and the most 
catastrophic final outeomes. German military history thus présents the most intriguing 
question of ail: how and why did the army fail twice to translate its noteworthy 
brilliance and many accomplishments into lasting strategie victories? That question 
could be - and for many historians has indeed been - a genuine mystery. But the 
mystery persists only if we accept the fundamental assumptions of the narrative that is 
usually presented: that the German war machine prevailed when it did thanks to 
brilliant theory and effective practice, and failed when it did because of externally 
imposed limitations and setbacks, most if not all of which derived from forces -
politicai, ideological, or economic - outside the military domain. 
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This thesis suggests a novel explanation for the German army's success and 
failures. It examines not simply what German military thinkers and planners wrote, 
planned, and strove for, not merely their declared intentions, but also their 
fundamental hidden assumptions about their craft and its nature, assumptions that 
moulded their understanding and preferences for certain ways of action. These largely 
unspoken assumptions, more than anything else, determined the Gentian army world-
view and created a shared pool of precepts, shaped German military practitioners' 
thought, prescribed their goals, and rendered self-evident - to initiates — the best ways 
to achieve them. This thesis therefore seeks to analyse the set of guiding assumptions 
that seemed 'natural' or 'self-evident truths' to Germany's military leadership, to 
examine how German leaders created a pattern of strategic and operational planning 
and conduct, and most importantly why German militaiy culture repeatedly failed to 
change and evolve either with time or under the pressure of crises, traumas, and even 
victories.1 
1 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destination, Military Culture and the Practices of War in 
Imperial Germany (Ithaca and London, 2005); idem, 'Military culture, Wilhelm II, and the 
End of the Monarchy in the First World War', in Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist, eds., 
The Kaiser, New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, 2003). For 
a cultural analysis of French and British interwar strategic thinking, see Elizabeth Kier, 
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, NJ, 
1997). Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Militaiy Change, Culture, Politics, 
Technology (Boulder, CO, 2002) pp. 3-21, discuss culture as a tool for inducing change in 
military organisations; see also the general summary by Farrell, 'Culture and Military Power', 
Review of International Studies 24 (1998), pp. 407-416; John Lynn, Battle: A History of 
Combat and Culture (Boulder, CO, 2003), offers a different approach and interpretation of 
'military culture', and Peter H. Wilson discusses patterns and definitions of various aspects of 
military culture in 'Defining Military Culture', The Journal of Militaiy Histoiy 72:1 (2008), 
pp. 11-43. 
The field of Strategic Culture offers a broader analysis of the dynamics of change and 
continuity both in security perceptions and among a variety of agents involved in creating 
security policies; it has produced an extensive examination of the merits of cultural analysis as 
a causal explanation, and, in general, of the relationship between ideas and behaviour. See for 
example Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1999), pp. 129-151, and idem, 'Strategic 
Culture as Context. The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back'. Review of International 
Studies 25:1 (1999), pp. 49-69; Alistair I. Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', 
International Security 19:4 (1995), pp. 32-64, and idem, 'Strategic Culture Revisited: A Reply 
to Colin Gray', Review of International Studies 25:3 (1999), pp. 519-523; Ronald L. 
The widespread interest in twentieth-century German military history has so 
far resulted in a great deal of outstanding research, to which this thesis owes a very 
considerable debt. The extensive and detailed scholarship of Willielm Deist and 
Michael Geyer on the origins and development of Gemían interwar strategy, military 
concepts, planning, rearmament, and civil-military relations is indispensible, and will 
remain the foundation of any serious attempi to understand Gemían military concepts 
and practices.2 Williamson Murray, Robert Citino, and Karl-Heinz Frieser have 
offered insightful analyses of Gemían operational successes that emphasise the unique 
mixture of the traditional and the novel in German doctrine and war-fighting.3 Azar 
Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Nonns, Identity and Culture in 
National Security' in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics (New York, 1996), pp. 33-75; Christopher O. Meyer, The Ouest for 
a European Strategie Culture: Transformation and Persistence of National Security Cultures 
in the UK, Germany, France andPoland(Basingstoke, 2006), and idem, 'Convergence 
Towards a European Strategie Culture? A Constructive Framework for Explaining Changing 
Norms', European Journal of International Relations 11:4, (2005), pp. 523-549. 
2 Wilhelm Deist, 'The Road to Ideological War: Germany, 1918-1945', in Alvin 
Bernstein, MacGregor Knox, and Williamson Murray, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, 
States and War (Cambridge, 1994); idem, 'Strategy and Unlimited Warfare in Germany. 
Moltke, Falkenhayn and Ludendorff, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., Great War, 
Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2000), 
pp. 265-279; idem, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981); idem, ed., The 
German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington Spa, 1985); idem et al., Germany and 
the Second World War, vol. I, The Build-Up of German Aggression, trans. P. S. Falla, Dean S. 
McMurry, and Ewald Osers (Oxford, 1990); Michael Geyer, Aufiiistung oder Sicherheit: Die 
Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924-1939 (Wiesbaden, 1980); idem, 'The 
Dynamics of Military Revisionism in the Interwar Years. Military Politics between 
Rearmament and Diplomacy', in Deist, ed., The German Militaiy in the Age of Total War, pp. 
100-151; idem, 'German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945', in Peter 
Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford, 1986), 
pp. 527-596; and idem, 'Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levée en 
Masse in October 1918', The Journal of Modern Histoiy 73 (2001), pp. 527-559. 
3 Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness (Baltimore, 1992); idem, and 
Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York, 1996); Robert 
M. Citino, The Evolution of Blitzlaieg Tactics: Germany Defends Itself Against Poland, 1918-
1933 (New York, 1987); idem, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German 
Army 1920—1939 (London, 1999); idem, The German Way ofWar. From the Thirty Years 
War to the ThirdReich (Lawrence, KA, 2005); idem, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The 
Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence, 2004); Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzh'ieg-Legende. 
Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995). 
4 
Gat has contributed substantially on the many issues surrounding the origins and 
sources of conceptual influences on the development of German operational thought.4 
And in addition to the literature on the German case, the extensive general literature 
on change, transformation, and revolutions in military organisations and practices 
constitutes a rich and diverse array of scholarship that has added notably to our 
understanding of German operational and tactical conduct.5 
Yet while military historians have offered sound and often brilliant analyses of 
German doctrinal and operational development, they have left largely unexamined the 
mechanisms and dynamics that explain not just how but also why this particular 
development - regardless of whether it was groundbreaking or not - came about. In 
the existing literature the forces that shaped German individual and organisational 
decisions appear to derive in most cases from rational calculation, ideological 
commitments, and foreign doctrinal inspiration. Yet these factors can only partially 
account for the unique development of German military thought, and cannot explain 
what shaped the organisational world-views, the states of mind, and the perceptions of 
available choices of the German military planners and practitioners. Isabel Hull has 
4 Azar Gat, British Armour Theoiy and the Rise of the Panzer Arm (Oxford, 2000); 
idem, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War. Füller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists 
(Oxford, 1998); idem, The Origins of Militaiy Thoaght: From the Enlightenment to 
Clausewitz{ Oxford, 1989). 
5 To cite only the most salient examples, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson 
Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Militaiy Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge, 2001); Stephen 
Biddle, 'The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare', Security Studies 8:1 
(1998), pp. 1-74; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75:2 (1996), pp. 
37-54; Farrell and Terriff, eds., Sources of Militaiy Change; Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. 
Eliason, The Diffusion of Militaiy Technology andldeas (Stanford, 2003); Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National 
Interest 37 (1994), pp. 30-42; Lynn, Battie', idem, 'The Evolution of Army Style in the 
Modern West, 800-2000', The International Histoiy Review 18:3 (1996), pp. 507-545; 
Clifford J. Rogers, '"Military Revolutions" and "Revolutions in Military Affairs'", in Thierry 
Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., Toward a Revolution in Militaiy Affairs? Defense 
and Security at the Dawn of the 21 st Century (Westport, CT, 2000), pp. 21-35; William R, 
Thompson, 'A Test of a Theory of Co-Evolution in War. Lengthening the Western Eurasian 
Military Trajectory', The International Histoiy Review 28:3 (2006), pp. 473-503. 
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however largely filled this conceptual void through her analysis of imperial 
Germany's military culture, and has opened the way for further examination of the 
évolution of German military culture between the two World Wars.6 
This thesis thus seeks to broaden our understanding of the events, processes, 
motivations and dynamics that shaped German interwar military thought, planning, 
armaments, and eventually the conduci of war. And although the pursuit of that 
objective often entails criticism of previous analyses and competing narratives of the 
German army of the 1920s and 1930s, the thesis also owes a great deal both to the 
outstanding scholars already mentioned, and to many of the very accounts that it 
criticises. 
A 'health warning' is nevertheless in order with regard to method: any 
challenge to widely accepted claims of extensive change in German military thought 
and practice in the interwar era requires detail-oriented analysis of manuals, studies, 
and officiai and personal correspondence. Meticulous description and discussion of 
the raw materials that the German army produced as part of the never-ending effort to 
shape, re-shape, renew, adjust, and update its officiai doctrine is not merely a 
prerequisite for understanding the authors' basic assumptions regarding war, the 
preferable ways to conduci it, and shared organisational world-view and mindsets. 
Close scrutiny of what the Germans actually wrote is also essential precisely because 
the literature on German military history is pervaded with broad généralisations about 
the 'revolutionary,' 'extreme,' and strikingly innovative nature of individuals, 
operational concepts, and organisational practices. Yet examples or relevant 
quotations seldom back those généralisations, leaving the reader to wonder what in 
this or that concept was so exceptional, novel, or groundbreaking. This thesis thus 
6 Hull, Absolute Destinction. 
6 
often emphasises the words of German military thinkers and practitioners 
themselves, a method that demonstrates beyond easy contradiction the existence of a 
particular dynamic of continuity in ideas, and provides a multi-layered picture of its 
subject for the reader, who benefits not only from the analysis but can also savour the 
original - and often memorable and inimitable - words that inspired it. 
The fundamental premise of this thesis i s that the principal characteristic of 
German military thought and practice - or, more accurately, of German military 
culture - was endurance and continuity. Yet mere exploration of the perverse 
durability of supposedly well-tested, tactically successful, yet strategically 
catastrophic theories, concepts, and practices of warfare stretching over decades 
would be redundant, even though their ultimately disastrous conséquences are by no 
means agreed wisdom among scholars. Any such limited exercise could only show 
what happened to the German high command as it implemented its strategie, 
operational and tactical concepts - but not why those concepts endured and repeatedly 
prevailed in face of disconfirmation by the harshest of realities. An unreflective 
account would merely outline German military leaders"' understanding of their 
profession, and would offer a limited and narrow analysis, rather than providing 
answers to far more intriguing and challenging questions: what determined the 
Weltanschauung described, and why was it so immune to change while nevertheless 
appearing so flexible? What established the frame of mind, what guided German 
military theoreticians and practitioners when they came to assess military problems 
and to choose from the limited variety of solutions available to them? What 
constructed, defined, and limited this variety? In short: what can explain - beyond the 
seemingly rational explanations given by the actors themselves - the recurring choices 
they identified, the ways in which they perceived them, and the solutions that they 
habitually envisaged to these challenges? 
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As already suggested, scholars have used the concept of "military culture" 
and cultural and organisational theories to this end for a number of years. Yet 
inevitably the nature of culture and the ways in which it constructs and influences 
actions requires clarification. Culture, for the purpose of this thesis, is the publicly 
available symbolic forais through which individuals and groups experience and 
express meaning.7 By creating meaning, culture also constructs our actions as 
meaningful. Isabel V. Hull, in her brilliant exploration of German military culture up 
to 1918, defined cultures as historically created designs for living that exist at a given 
time as guides for behaviour.8 By their mere existence (since they are explicit and 
implicit, theoretical and practical at the same time), cultures narrow and reduce the 
number of ways in which individuals can perceive and understand situations, and 
affect decision-making and actions in a unifying way.9 That is, cultures channel both 
understanding of reality and reactions to that reality - out of an infinité array of 
possible explanations and reactions. 
But how exactly is it done? What is the vehicle through which culture affects -
or, to follow the claim above, narrows - the possible range of actions? One possible 
link between culture and actions is values. Values, immanent in ail social systems, 
explain why différent actors make différent choices; values direct human actions to 
some ends rather than others.10 The value of total victory shaped the German army's 
lasting aspiration to win its wars through a single climactic battle of annihilation 
[Vernichtungsschlacht] that would produce victory by physically eliminating the 
7 Roger Keesing, quoted in Ann Swidler, 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Stratégies', 
American SocioJogical Review 51:2 (1986), p. 273. 
8 'Historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and 
non-rational, that exist at any given time as potential guides for the behaviour of man': Clyde 
Kluckhohn, quoted in Hull, 'End of the Monarchy1, p. 239. 
9Ibid. 
10 Talcott Parsons, quoted by Swidler, 'Culture in Action', p. 274. 
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enemy's fighting forces. That value so thoroughly impregnateci German doctrine, 
planning, and expectations that it outlived ali the many failed attempts to realize it. 
Proclaimed values, however, do not always match actual actions and décisions. For 
example, the German high command, whose ostensible highest value and purpose was 
defending the Prusso-German monarchy and German sovereignty, consciously 
preferred a bloody end to both monarchy and sovereignty to safeguarding at least one 
of them by timely surrender in 1918." Human actions therefore cannot be understood 
as simple attempts at realizing a given set of values. 
If preserving the monarchy and state did not guide the German army in 1918, 
then the question is not what declared valves guided Paul von Hindenburg, Erich 
Ludendorff, and associâtes, but rather what unspoken asswnptions about the nature of 
reality and the preferred ways to react to and interact with it shaped their conduct. 
These are naturally not as easy to uncover as declared values, but they provide the 
foundation stones of the shared mental and intellectual system of Germany's militaiy 
leadership. One way to trace its tenets beneath the often contradictory and misleading 
declared values would be to examine it over time: how did it respond to changing 
realities? For the enduring features of the army's décisions were not their aims but the 
ways in which the army organised its actions to achieve those aims - persistent ways 
of ordering actions through time that incorporate habits, moods, sensibilities and 
views.12 Using culture as a causal explanation requires understanding it as a 'tool kit', 
a repertoire of symbols, rituals, and world-views, chosen seiectively to construct lines 
11 Hull, 'End of the Monarchy', pp. 245-258; see also below, pp. 63-67. 
12 'Stratégies of action', Swidler, 'Culture in Action', pp. 273, 276-282; Swidler uses 
the term 'strategy' to mean a general approach to organising action. 
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of action.13 In this elastic, multi-optional sense, cultures do regulate actions by 
defining what is 'possible', 'desirable', 'appropriate' and 'effective' 14 
Cultures thus provide identities, frameworks of thought for understanding the 
situation at hand and responding to it.15 But that suggestion is less deterministic than it 
may sound. Theories of military and organisational culture are flexible enough to 
suggest a unified theoretical explanation to processes without neglecting particular, 
often seemingly contradictory events and outcomes. Yet "culture" is also a tempting 
explanation - tempting enough to offer all-embracing, "self-evident" reasons for every 
décision, action, and phenomenon, which quite easily might ail seem to be 
"manifestations" of the organisation's inherited culture. To avoid that slippery slope -
a common difficulty with successful theories - it should be stressed that while military 
culture can convincingly explain the dynamics and mechanisms that narrow personal 
and organisational choices, it cannot in itself elucidate every possible décision, nor 
can it exempt individuals and organisations from responsibility for their actions - nor 
would it be at ali appropriate to absolve the German warlords of any of their heavy 
responsibilities. 
Yet another disclaimer is necessary. This thesis emphasises continuity in 
German military history and applies cultural theory to explain this continuity. Yet 
13 Ibid. 
14 See also Farrell and Terriff, Sources of Change, pp. 7-8, who use the term 'cultural 
norms* instead of 'culture'. 
15 Farrell, 'Culture and Military Power', pp. 410-411. It is important to note that the 
relations between 'reality' and any given organisational reaction to it are always mediated 
through organisational culture and are often difficult to understand otherwise. For a différent 
view, see Lynn''s diagram of 'the discourse and the reality of war', suggesting a direct and 
uninterrupted link between 'extreme reality' and 'alternative discourse of war'. While Lynn is 
aware of cultures as mental structures that can 'change or control reality to fît conception' a 
process he labels 'reformation', he also claims that 'through 'récognition', cultures may come 
to appreciate that conception does not suitably reflect reality, and 'adjust the discourse [of 
war]'. Lynn does not explain, however, why some realities produce 'reformation1 and others 
'récognition', but suggests that this différence in outcome might have more to do with cultural 
needs than with the pressures of reality (Lynn, Battle, pp. 331-341). 
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military and organisational culture can also account for change. Conscious, 
deliberate change in doctrine and operational art is a rare phenomenon, far rarer than 
doctrinal continuity or organisational résistance to change, even in face of new 
realities.16 But this thesis does not claim or assume that military organisations cannot 
change; rather it seeks to understand why in the particular case of the post-1918 
German army changes did not occur, despite dramatic and even revolutionary shifts in 
military technology, in German domestic politics, and in Germany's international and 
stratégie situation. 
For cultures are not rigid constructions that replicate the same responses over 
and over again, imposing obsolete pattems onto mindless subjects. They act more like 
membranes, able to process new inputs of knowledge and requirements and to renew 
their Outputs accordingly. They define the purpose and the possibilities of military 
change, but are not purely and inherently conservative factors; when culture does 
change, it can become a powerful engine for military change.17 Indeed if culture 
restricted actors1 possibilities and confined them to one unchanging limited set of 
options, paradigmatic shifts and changes could scarcely occur.18 Ann Swidler, author 
of one of the most insightful sociological treatments of the dynamics of culture, refers 
to two models of cultural influence: 'settled lives' and 'unsettled lives'' 
Under the condition of 'settled lives', as enjoyed in Germany in the 1871-1914 
era, culture and social structure are fused, existing models of organizing experience 
16 On the dynamics of change and lack thereof in military organisations and thought 
see Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, 'Thinking about Révolutions in Warfare', in 
MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-
2050 (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 1-14; Farrell, 'The Sources of Military Change', in Farrell and 
Terriff, Sources of Change, pp. 3-38; and Lynn, Battle, pp. 331-341. 
17 Farrell and Terriff, Sources of Change, pp. 7-8; see also Meyer, 'Convergence', pp. 
532-543, for an analysis of 'learning mechanisms' such as changing threat perceptions, the 
socialising effects of institutions, and crises, that can facilitate change in strategie norms. 
18 As Hull, Farrell and Terriff, and Kier suggest in their analyses. 
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exercise the undisputed authority of habit, 'normality', and 'common sense'. 
'Settled' cultures thus constrain the actions of individuai and organisations, by 
providing a limited set of resources from which to construct actions. Out of the 'tool 
kits' they supply, actors select certain cultural elements; publicly available meanings 
facilitate particular patterns of action, making them readily available while 
discouraging others - and it is in this way that the concept of culture can account for 
continuity.19 Periods of social transformation and unrest ('unsettled lives'), are by 
contrast usually marked by the emergence of new and competing cultural models for 
organising action. Revolutionary eras often involve the construction of new entities 
(such as new self-identities or organisational units), and shape new styles or forms of 
authority and of coopération.20 The First World War and especially the war's final, 
desperate, extreme, and radicalising stages could easily have become a forcing-house 
for new ideas. Germany's traumatic defeat might likewise have resulted in a complete 
break with 'truths' that had failed when tested and tested again to the point of 
destruction, or might at least have fostered the emergence of criticai voices calling for 
a thorough rethinking. 
After ali, as Hull suggests, organisations are learning units.21 Organisational 
culture can account for some or most of that continuity even in 'unsettled' periods -
as well as for change. Historical learning from and discourse with the environment in 
which an Organization operates can shape and systematize lessons and patterns of 
19 Swidler, 'Culture in Action', pp. 278-284. 
20 Swidler, 'Culture in Action', 278-80. It is important to note, however, that apparent 
or hidden continuities inevitably persist even during radical periods of change, since 'even the 
most fanatical ideological movement, which seeks to remake completely the cultural 
capacities of its members, will inevitably draw on many tacit assumptions from the existing 
culture' (ibid., p. 279). The term 'ideology' figures here as an example of an emerging culture 
- 'a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unifîed 
answer to problems of social action'. 
21 Hull, 'End of the Monarchy', p. 239. 
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learning, transforming assumptions into habits and undoubted 'obvious' tinths. And 
military organisations present an even clearer case of cultural influence than most 
organisations.22 For annies are highly systemised, formed, declaratively pattemed 
organisations. They strictly regulate actions through officiai doctrines that reflect and 
reproduce their intrinsic culturally "obvious5 truths, and derive the ir actions from those 
truths. Actual strategie and operational planning and behaviour offer additional 
evidence, and their careful scrutiny may disclose hidden cultural assumptions that 
doctrine may for some reason have failed to express or adhéré to. 
Yet the focal argument of this thesis, as already suggested, is that German 
military and organisational culture maintained a persistent continuity. The tenets and 
axioms of that culture were clear and remained essentially unaltered before, 
throughout, and even after the first World War: extreme warfare, aimed toward the 
most destructive, and eventually self-destructive, forms of war; extreme risk-taking 
elevated from the tactical and operational realms into domain of strategy; the endless 
pursuit of battles of annihilation that dictated the réduction of strategy to meticulous 
operational and tactical planning; trust in German fighting spirit - Geist - and 
'qualitative superiority' to overcome the adversary's advantage in matériel and 
manpower; a ruthlessness that subordinated everything to a self-constructed 'military 
necessity'; and an exaggerated drive for action.23 In grand strategy, German military 
leaders perceived war as the only way to solve politicai problems and to elevate the 
nation's - and the army's - prestige, and they accordingly placed the army, its 
interests and plans, above civilian interests and decision-makers. In ternis of 
operational method, German officers, restricted by geography and économies to 
22 See Kier, Imagining War, pp. 28-32, and Fluii, Absoìute Destmction, Ch. 4 and 'End 
of Monarchy', pp. 239-242. 
23 Hull, Absolut e Desini et ion, pp. 93-181, and 'End of the Monarchy', pp. 239-245. 
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envisaging short wars, always preferred decisive opérations involving movement, in 
which speed and extreme tactical risk-taking were mutually reinforcing.24 
Post-1919 Gennan military culture thus made change improbable while 
disguising conceptual stagnation as renewal and vigorous lesson-leaming. The 
doctrinal and operational patteras that it produced and adhered to are thus an 
especially puzzling case. German military thought and practice throughout and 
immediately after the First World War exhibit a radicalisation of existing patteras, 
rather than fundamental shifts in strategie and operational concepts and tenets. Düring 
the interwar era Gennan military thought seemingly revolutionised itself, with 
precepts and doctrine following a supposed outburst of ostensibly new but in reality 
fundamentally traditional ideas. The explanation of this stagnation-disguised-as-
transformation was a combination of profoundly autistic military conduci and a 
unique historical setting that allowed the elite of the Gennan army to pretend for years 
that reality and its constraints did not really bind it, and that it was free to recast past, 
present, and future as it wished. An immense crisis in self-conceptualisation of the 
kind that only defeat in total war could force might have truly changed Gennan 
military culture. The blow that the Versailles system delivered to the size and structure 
of the anny was designed and expected to facilitate such a paradigmatic shift. But that 
change did not occur, and the task of this thesis is to explain how and why it did not. 
24 See Gerhardt P. Gross, 'Das Dogma der Beweglichkeit. Überlegungen zur Genese 
der deutschen Heerestaktik im Zeitalter der Weltkrieg', in Bruno Thoss and Hans-Erich 
Volkmann, eds., Erster Weltkrieg, Zweiter Welth'ieg. Ein Vergleich (Paderborn, 2002), pp. 
143-166, and Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War. From the Thirty Years' War to the 
ThirdReich (Lawrence, KA, 2005), pp. xiii-xviii. Although Citino does not use the concept of 
military culture, he does claim that Bewegiingshieg in its many manifestations - some of 
which he argues were revolutionary - was an institutional characteristic of the German army 
from Frederick the Great onward. Citino explains in great detail the various manifestations of 
the 'war of movement' dogma, but does not investigate the institutional dynamics that first 
elevated and then maintained that form of war, with its unique set of operational requirements, 
as an institutional axiom. 
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What do these considérations mean for the reader struggling to understand 
the enigma of German military thought in the internar era, with its traditional catch-
phrases regarding the nature of the 'war of the future', its persistently unrealistic 
doctrine, its megalomaniacal rearmament demands, its often absurd operational 
planning, and the detached-from-reality military discourse upon which it fed? It means 
that affirming the continuity of German perceptions of warfare is but one part of the 
explanation of the choices that the Gei-man high command iliade in the 1920s and 
1930s. That continuity - that stubborn clinging to traditional ways of conceptualising 
the strategie quandaries, possible and preferable operational solutions and tactical 
methods, while suppressing inconvénient perceptions and interprétations, and 
eventually forcing their bearers out - was both an outeome and a motor of a process in 
which those values and traditions came to seem undeniable 'common sense'.25 What 
began with Clausewitz's conscious if often seemingly self-contradictory reflections on 
warfare became the principal source of persistently unselfconscious, unquestionable, 
and unquestioned assumptions that eventually formed a body of 'naturai' truths about 
warfare, and prescribed 'obvious' strategie and operational solutions, ampliiied to the 
point of institutional 'irrational rationality'. 
It seems imperative at this point to point out that the German high command 
did not in any conscious way aim irrationally at self-annihilation when it drafìted its 
plans before and during the two World Wars - however predictably self-destructive 
those plans might seem to us. Its leaders, general staff, and officer corps were 
planning and acting according to their best professional judgment in each situation, 
under the constraints imposed by Germany's limited military and economic 
25 Following Clifford Geertz, Swidler explains 'common sense' as the 'set of 
assumptions so unselfconscious as to seem a naturai, transparent, undeniable part of the 
structure of the world' ('Culture in Action', p. 279). 
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capabilities. However, their cultural norms determined their judgments, their 
understanding of their situation, and their perceived constraints. The cultural paradigm 
can thus help explain German choices, especially when they seem incompatible with 
strategic and operational realities and thus irrational, self-contradictory, and ultimately 
suicidal. 
Chapter 1 
German Military Culture: Founding Fatliers and Paradigm Boundaries 
What were the theoretical and doctrinal roots and background of the German Army's 
understanding of war, of its aims, and of the most efficient ways of achieving them -
from the era of Clausewitz to the end of the First World War? A meticulous and 
extensive examination of German traditional perceptions of war is required, since 
theories of war are the foundation of all military doctrines and of their expressions in 
fíeld service régulations and manuals. Theories of war (or rather, the most appealing 
among them) are eventually embodied in a more or less simple set of rules that 
conduct and reflect a given army's space of choices and actions. Understanding the 
logie and epistemology of these régulations and rules requires familiarity with the 
historical development of theory and doctrine. Clarifying that process will thus 
elucidate the manner in which the theories and assumptions of the 1920s and 1930s 
acquired the cognitive constraints and limitations so much in evidence, and the 
reasons why Gennan theories of war eventually gave birth to an uncommonly 
persistent and rigid doctrine. Analysis of the doctrinal roots and inherited operational 
patteras that turned into the Gennan 'trath* about warfighting will allow a 
comprehensive discussion and understanding of the faults and defects, as well as the 
excellence and tactical effectiveness of Gennan doctrine as it evolved over the 1919-
1938 period. 
The discussion that follows focuses on Clausewitz's theory of war and his 
successore' implementations of it - what they implemented and why; to what extent 
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they were his 'pupils'; how Moltke, and especially Schlieffen, found themselves 
facing a deadlock that resulted from the attempt to adapt Clausewitz's maxims to the 
modem battlefield; some outcomes of their efforts; and the Imperial Gemían Anny's 
reaction to the blatant failure of these promising pre-war concepts, its (alleged) effort 
to apply a strategy of attrition in the battle of Verdun.1 Finally, the chapter will 
examine the radicalisation of Gemían military practices, their extreme and eventually 
suicidai tendencies, and the frame of thought and conduct detached from reality that 
the Germán military leadership developed in the final phase of the First World War. 
I. Clausewitz: The Foundations 
Ali quests for the origins of modem Geiinan military thought must begin with 
Cari von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Clausewitz was indeed the 'military philosopher' 
who defined the paradigmatic space that henceforth confined Gemian military 
thought. Clausewitz created his cognitive tools from the Napoleonic empirical 
experience, an experience defined by the phenomenon of mass.2 That phenomenon, as 
will emerge, played a significant role in shaping Clausewitz's approach to the nature 
of war, the aims that were appropriate in the conduct of war, the definitions of the 
concepts of strategy and tactics, and the understanding of their mutuai relationships. 
Clausewitz's outlook, especially on that last issue, will also reveal why was it so easy, 
indeed almost naturai, for figures such as Helmuth von Moltke the elder, Alfred von 
1 Although a discussion of doctrinal evolution is imperative, what follows is merely a 
short survey that emphasizes above ali the persistence of certain ideas, rather providing than a 
comprehensive discussion of the theories and writings of Clausewitz and of his immediate 
Prusso-German successors. 
2 Azar Gat, The Origins o/Milita?y Thought (Oxford, 1989), pp. 162-208, and Shimon 
Naveh, In Pursitit of Militaiy Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theoiy (London, 
1997), p. 34. 
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Schlieffen, and Hans von Seeckt - all of them fimctioning at the practical levels of 
warfare - to draw their tactical formulas and prescriptions from Clausewitz's theory. 
'Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the 
manifold activities generally designated as war'.3 That sentence contains both the 
essence and the essential imperative of Clausewitz's theory of war. For fighting is not 
only the common denominato!' of all wars; acknowledging its fundamental role means 
accepting the dominance of combat as the determining element of the entire character 
of war, as well as the resulting insights:4 'Combat is the only effective force in war; its 
aim is to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to a further end . . . it follows that the 
destruction of the enemy 's force underlies all militaiy actions; all plans are ultimately 
based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment' 5 The aim is destruction in the 
most literal way; for Clausewitz clearly states that 'every engagement is a bloody and 
destructive test of physical and moral strength . . . the destruction of the enemy's 
physical force . . . is the real purpose of the engagement'6 
Yet the physical destruction of the enemy cannot be achieved without the 
continued exercise of forces other than the physical; according to Clausewitz, the 
moral factors play a decisive role in war - as decisive, or even more so, than mere 
military strength. The moral elements of war Konstitute the spirits [die Geister] that 
permeate war as a whole . . . they establish a close affinity with the will that moves 
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton, NJ, 1976), Book li, 1, p. 127. 
4 Gat, Origins, p. 203. 
5 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, 2, p. 97. 
6 Ibid., Book IV, 4, p. 231. For a further discussion of the Clausewitzian approach to 
bloodshed see Williamson Murray, German Militaiy Effectiveness (Baltimore, 1992), Chapter 
8. Murray identifies the German capability to think and act swiftly and effectively amid the 
terrifying realities of the battlefield - a vital component of German tactical excellence - as the 
outcome of German understanding of this ecology as inherently horrifying, chaotic, and 
violent. 
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and leads the whole mass of forces . . .'7 In its form as an 'iron will-power\ it is 
also the antidote, alongside combat experience, to the unavoidable effects of friction, 
which distinguishes the reality of war, with ail its unexpected obstacles and setbacks, 
from neatly detailed plans.8 The spiri t [Geist], is therefore a fundamental element that 
detemiines military success or failure - and, however intangible, it can be created, 
nourished, and if need be, revived and honed.9 
Clausewitz thus erected a simple paradigmatic structure in which each 
conclusion logically led to a subséquent one, and created a tightly coordinated set of 
unequi vocal maxims. The aim of ali wars is the total destruction of the enemy's ability 
to fight; no other goal can secure complete surrender. And each of the belligerents, 
following the same logie, will thus mobilise their forces to the utmost, and will aspire 
to engage in a single decisive battle - the integral battle of annihilation or 
Vern ichtimgsch lacht: 
No matter how a particular war is conducted and what aspects of its 
conduci we subsequently recognize as being essential, the very concept 
of war will permit us to make the following unequivocal statements: 1. 
Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war. 2. 
Such destruction of forces can usually be accomplished only by 
fighting. 3. Only major engagements involving ail forces lead to major 
success. 4. The greatest successes are obtained when ail engagements 
coalesce into one great battle.10 
7 Clausewitz, Oti War, Book III, 3, p. 185. 
8 Ibid, Book I, 7, 8, pp. 119, 122. 
9 Ibid, Book III, 5, pp. 188-189. 
10 Ibid., Book IV, 11, p. 258. Although it is true that 'every period has its own 
Clausewitz', his Book IV explains the extent to which he was rightfully recognized as the 
formulator of the nineteen century's belief in the dominance of the 'great battle'. For 
Clausewitz commentaries during the nineteenth Century, see Gat, Origins pp. 183-186; 
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Given these principles, and given Clausewitz's description of battle as ka 
slow process of mutuai attrition, that will reveal which side can first exhaust its 
opponent', the underlying prerequisite for success would appeal* to be the 
concentration of force on a scale and with a speed greater than the enemy's.11 These 
conclusions derive from a logicai pattern in which the essential concept is mass: 
In tactics, as in strategy, superiority of numbers is the most common 
element in victory . . . if we thus strip the engagement of ali the variables 
arising from its purpose and circumstances . . . we are left with the bare 
concept of the engagement, a shapeless battle in which the only 
distinguishing factor is the number of the troops on either side. These 
numbers, therefore will determine victory.12 
Clausewitz repeats the imperative of concentration on numerous occasions, thus 
stressing its importance. And of ali the forms the desired 'great battle' may take in 
delivering the desired outcome - the enemy's annihilation - the most promising yet 
hazardous is the battle of encirclement: 
Both in strategy and in tactics a convergent attack always holds out 
promise of increased results, for if it succeeds the enemy is not just 
beaten; he is virtually cut off. The convergent attack, then, is always the 
more promising; but since forces are divided and the theatre is enlarged, 
it also canies a greater risk. As with the attack and defence, the weaker 
form promises the greater success.13 
Antulio J. Echevarria, 'Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military 
Literature Before the Great War', War in Histoiy 3:3 (1996), pp. 272-292; and the analysis of 
Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London, 2002) of what Clausewitz actually said, and of 
what others believed he had said. 
11 Clausewitz, On War, Book IV, 9, p. 249. 
12 Ibid., Book III, 8, p. 194. 
13 Ibid., Book VIII, 9, p. 619. 
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Clausewitz underlines this point several times: encirclement ensures massive 
increases in enemy losses ('to their very l imit- to annihilation') and a more decisive 
defeat.14 
But what are the implications of such a formative concept and its logicai products, the 
imperatives of concentration and annihilation? The most significant is the enslavement 
of strategy to tactics, with grave conséquences for the systemic conduci of war. For if 
the Vermchtimgphnzìp constitutes both the end and the means at ali ìevels of war, 
tactical battle must now govern the operational as well as the strategie Ìevels. 
Systems are goal-oriented, and their goals ought to lie in the specifìed outeome 
of the dialogue between and given set of politicai requirements and operational 
circumstances. Yet by defining a fixed and universal aim for all wars, Clausewitz not 
only short-circuited the political-military dialogue, which must precede war and 
regulate the course of action (a basic mechanism of the systemic conduct of war15). He 
also emptied strategy of any substance of its own. Inevitably, in Clausewitz's system, 
"strategy' strives solely for the most favourable conditions for the single decisive 
battle of annihilation:16 'There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of 
I 7 
keeping one's forces concentrated' 
Clausewitz also - and with complete consistency - emphasised the gulf 
separating politics from the conduct of war in theory: 
If for the moment we consider the pure concept of war, we should have to 
say that politicai purpose of war had no connection with war itself; for if 
war is an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will its aims 
14 Ibid., Book IV, 4, p. 233. 
15 Naveh, In Pursirit, p. 42. 
16 Ibid., pp. 34-48. 
17 Clausewitz, On War, Book III, 11, p. 204. 
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would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disami him. 
That aim is derived from the theoretical concept of war . . . 1 8 
And this exclusion of the supreme politicai and strategie levels from setting the 
particular goals and aims, according to current understanding and needs, consequently 
opened the door for a highly problematic concept of the relationship between politics 
and war, a concept exemplified in the later absence of dialogue on war aims and the 
strategy for their realization between the Prusso-German chief of general staff and the 
German chancellor in the First World War era. 
However, not all scholars have aeeepted that annihilation was a primary 
component of Clausewitz's theory, and On War indeed contains other and very 
différent notions.19 As opposed to the inference, according to which the integral battle 
of annihilation is the sole founding element of victory, as explained above, Clausewitz 
mentions in the first book of On War a variety of means to subdue the will of the 
enemy: 
We can see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all 
involve the opponent's outright defeat. They range from the destiuction of 
the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary 
occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate politicai purpose, 
and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attack. Any one of these 
18 Ibid., Book I, 2, p. 90. 
19 See for example Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battie of Annihilation (London 
1986), pp. 16-18. Wallach, like other scholars of the Cold War era who saw Clausewitz 
mainly through the prism of his limited war concept, and strove to detach him from his other, 
less convenient ideas, goes so far to doubt altogether that Clausewitz was the 'prophet of 
annihilation'. He emphasizes as a counterargument the key role Clausewitz attributed to moral 
forces, mentioning that the enemy's intact forces will be dramatically affected, even 
paralyzed, by a decisive victory. Yet this argument cannot contradict the necessity, according 
to Clausewitz, of the decisive battle to create that outcome. And annihilation remains for 
Clausewitz the preferable means; the living may rally but the dead are no threat. 
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may be used to overcome the enemy's will: the choice depends on 
circumstances.20 
Extensive research on Clausewitz's writings in the Cold War era lias established that 
this duality (not to mention self-contradiction) can be explained in a major shift in 
1827 in his thought on the nature of war.21 Clausewitz had come to recognize that not 
all wars were total and annihilational, that the phenomenon of war is a diverse one, 
and that any theory that ignored that diversity would do violence to the historical 
record. Clausewitz needed to explain how war, with its inherently unlimited 
destructive nature (a theoretical concept that he did not abandon), had in general been 
limited in its historical manifestations.22 He therefore sought to revise his manuscript 
to incorporate two new concepts.23 
The first idea articulated a newfound récognition of the existence of two types 
of war: the first one (philosophically 'true' or 'absolute' war) aimed at completely 
overthrowing the enemy, and the second had limited objectives. Yet these two 
varieties were not in essence différent, the first was rather the ideal manifestation of 
war in the abstract realm of thought, and the second its incarnation in reality, which 
can never be as impeccable. The first type of war is a Kantian ideal type, 'the pure 
concept of war'. It exists in 'the field of abstract thought' in which the 'enquiring 
mind can . . . deal with an extreme: a clash of forces freely operating and obedient to 
no law but their own' 24 The second type occurs when 'the world of reality takes over 
from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical 
20 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, 2, p. 94. 
21 Gat, Origins, pp. 218-226. 
22 Ibid., pp. 217-218, 225. 
23 Clausewitz, On War, 'Note of 10 July 1827', p. 69. 
24 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, 1, p. 78 
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extremes . . . the interaction of the two sides tends to fall short of maximum 
effort'.25 Nevertheless war, as it takes shape in reality, can manifest itself in a manner 
that epitomizes its theoretical form: 'The more powerful and inspiring the motives for 
war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that 
precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept'.~ 
The later Clausewitz"'s second idea explains the variety of forms that war can 
take in reality: that politicai demands - needs, constraints and aims - determine the 
scale and extent of military opérations. Politics, a force alien and external to the nature 
of war, constrains war's trae essence, subjects it to its needs, and thus modifies its 
imperatives:27 
[War] cannot follow its own laws, but lias to be treated as a part of some 
other whole; the name of which is policy . . In making use of war, policy 
evades ali rigorous conclusions proceeding from the nature of war . . [It] 
converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere 
instrument.28 
These new ideas facilitated Clausewitz's most famous conceptualisation of war as a 
continuation of policy by other means. 
Yet it is important to emphasize that he never abandoned his concept that the 
'absolute' form was the only trae form of war, always superior to more limited forais. 
Even in Book I he emphasized that 'it is evident that the destruction of the enemy 
forces is always the superior, more effective means, with which others cannot 
25 Ibid., p. 79. 
26 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
27 Gat, Origins, pp. 220-225. 
28 Clausewitz, On War, Book Vili, 6, p. 606. 
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compete'29 And he also died before completing the revision of On War, leaving 
only the first and the eighth books in conformity with his new mode of thought. As a 
resuit, On War, in addition to its highly complex structure, also enunciates an 
ambiguous and even incoherent theoretical construct that binds together, with ali their 
implications, two mutually contradictory concepts of war. 
What conclusions applicable to the Prusso-German wars of the following 
century thus spring from Clausewitz's work? As Clausewitz readers have noticed, it is 
indeed easy to draw from his pages simple, allegedly universal truths, that apply - as 
the master claimed- to 'ali wars5, 'ali battles1 and for ali military leaders, from the 
rifle company to the commanding heights of the Generaìstab. Much has been written 
about Clausewitz's rejection of prescriptive theories, mainly because of his own 
frequently stated resistance to such theories: 'Theory should be study, not doctrine . . . 
theory need not be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action'.30 Yet Clausewitz 
nevertheless believed that a true theoiy of war must provide lessons for commanders 
to bear in mind and to translate into practice.31 
Clausewitz's ambiguities have baffled historians and analysts of military 
thought alike. What were practical soldiers to understand by and infer from his worlc? 
Bound to the day-to-day practice of war, they remained oblivious to the intricacies of 
theory; they required unambiguous frameworks constituted by rules and formulas, 
alongside and deriving from theoretical concepts and approaches. And as already 
suggested, it was easy to isolate the tactical imperative and the logie of mass from the 
other components of Clausewitz's theory, and to assume that the overriding aspiration 
of the soldier must be to attain the greatest concentration of force and to conduci an 
29 Ibid., Book I, 2, p. 97. 
30 Ibid., Book II, 2, p. 141. 
31 Gat, Origins, pp. 196-197, 210-211. 
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integral battle of annihilation that aimed at the physical destruction of the enemy 
state's ability to resist. The Gemían army's fundamental understanding of war, its 
Kriegsbild, thus embodied these perceptions in a lasting way, and the army articulated 
them again and again in every war that it fought, despite the explicit wamings of the 
later Clausewitz in his letters: 
We must not allow ourselves to be misled into regarding war as a pure act 
of force and of destruction, and from this simplistic concept logically 
deduce a string of conclusions that no longer have anything to do with the 
real world.32 
In the disputes over the true scope of Clausewitz's legacy and influence on the 
German army, scholars have tended to use the reading lists of the Kriegsakademie or 
the confessions of generáis and other offícers that they liad never read Vom Kriege to 
demónstrate that he was highly respected and well-known but little read.33 Others 
have strongly emphasized his writings as a primary doctrinal source for German army 
offícers.34 A third school has sought to detach Clausewitz from whatever may have 
been done in the name of his theory by assuming that Germany's highest-ranking 
officers could and did read him, but were incapable of understanding what they had 
•3 c 
read. Yet that approach cannot lead to better understanding the true influence and 
impact of Clausewitz on the Gemían army. It was not his theory, but rather what were 
32 Clausewitz, 'Two Letters on Strategy ', eds. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel 
Moran: Clausewitz to Roeder, 22 December 1827 
(http://www-cgsc.army.mi1/carl/resources/csi/Paret/paret.asp#4.C). 
33 See for example Peter Paret, 'The Influence of Clausewitz', in On War', p. 27; 
Klaus-Jürgen Müller, 'Clausewitz, Ludendorff and Beck: Some Remarks on Clausewitz's 
Influence on German Military Thinking in the 1930s and 1940s', The Journal of Strategie 
Studi es, 9:2-3 (1986), pp. 249-250; and Murray, German Militaiy Effectiveness, pp. 193-194. 
34 See Echevarría, 'Borrowing from the Master', pp. 275-277. 
35 See Wallach on Schlieffen; Wallach, Dogma, pp. 35-66, and Wallach, 
'Misperceptions of Clausewitz's On War by the German Military', The Journal of Strategie 
Studies, 9:2-3, (1986), pp. 211-239. 
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thought to be - and were broadly accepted as - his maxhns that were so profoundly 
and decisively influential. 
The question of whether Prusso-German offícers actually read Clausewitz or 
not is therefore irrelevant. One can quote Clausewitz's famous saying on the war as 
the continuation of politics by other means facilely without reading On War or even 
the relevant chapters, and without knowing how and why Clausewitz reached his 
conclusions. It is therefore easy to understand how the German Army could be 
Clausewitzian without necessarily reading Clausewitz. As we shall see, his perceived 
imperatives were embedded in the DNA of German military culture: in its thought, its 
field service régulations, and in its fighting methods. All German offícers, regardless 
of their appréciation of Clausewitz, had his legacy engraved on their minds.36 
II. From Moltke to Schlieffen 
The preceding theoretical background and analysis of the officiai mind of the 
Generalstab provides a basis for examination of Prussian doctrines and war plans: not 
only the extent to which they obeyed what they saw as Clausewitz's ostensible rules 
or prescriptions, but also the more interesting question of the extent to which they 
developed and adapted those perceived rules. Adaptation is naturally needed when 
armies must cope with politicai, economic, and technological change and with new 
demands, possibilities, and constraints - and the German army was no exception in 
that respect. Yet the essence of Clausewitz's maxims remained surprisingly unaltered 
36 The most famous German general to openly denounce his heritage was Ludendorff, 
who insisted that "ali theories of Clausewitz must be rejected' (Müller, 'Clausewitz, 
Ludendorff and Beck', p. 250). Yet Ludendorff himself followed most of Clausewitz's 
maxims, and was referring in the quotation above to Clausewitz's analysis of the relationship 
between politics and war, on which Ludendorffs explosive views are well known. 
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for many years, although of course gradually adapted to the new reality of gigantic 
mass armies and industriai technology. Moreover, the very two différent leading 
figures of the Prussian-German army - Moltke the elder and Schlieffen - shared those 
maxims, although they shared practically nothing else in their views of war planning, 
command-and-control, the capacity of technology to serve the needs of modem mass 
armies, and the relationship between politics and war. The immense différences 
between Moltke's and Schlieffen's perceptions have in effect obscured their common 
theoretical origin. 
While Moltke described himself as Clausewitz's disciple, and was always so 
perceived by his contemporaries as well as by later scholars, Schlieffen's similar 
avowals have met with scepticism. The scrutiny of Schlieffen's writings, studies and 
war plans in the following pages will therefore seek to establish the extent to which he 
did or did not follow Clausewitz, while analysing Moltke (who was free of any need 
to prove his conformity) as a mediating agent and as the necessary link between 
Clausewitz and Schlieffen. 
The two générais, who demonstrated a profound, even brilliant understanding 
of Germany 's military needs in their respective times, and designed their plans to 
answer those needs, obviously changed and adapted Clausewitzian concepts to the 
new realities of the modem battlefield, new politicai demands, and of course to their 
own interpretative principles. Yet they never challenged the fundamental concepts set 
forth by the man whom they both saw as their guide. They therefore represent, despite 
their very différent views and styles, a theoretical and conceptual continuum from the 
1820s to the twentieth century. 
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1. Moltke 
Helmuth Count von Moltke ('Moltke the elder'), chief of the Pmssian general staff 
from 1857 to 1888, attributed his ideas to Clausewitz and described himself as 
Clausewitz's disciple.37 His victories in Germany's wars of unification were in fact a 
major incentive for the Prussian army as well as other armies to study Clausewitz's 
IO , 
On War; his confonnity with Clausewitz was thus unquestioned. And Moltke's 
adhésion to the notion of annihilation was the first and foremost embodiment of that 
conformity. Hence his concept of strategie envelopment or encirclement (the 
Kesselschlacht) resulting in the grand decisive battle of annihilation 
( Vernichtungschlachi) that Clausewitz had recommended: 
We have been talking about a total victory - that is not simply a battle won, but 
the complete defeat of the enemy. Such a victory demands an enveloping attack, 
or a battle with reversed fronts, either of which will always make the resuit 
decisive. It is essential, then, that any plan of opération should provide for this.39 
To that purpose Moltke stressed, as did Clausewitz, the importance of 
concentration of force. Moltke developed the use of modem railroads for that purpose, 
facilitating an operational sequence entailing rapid concentration and deployment 
{Aufmarsch), followed by a concentric advance on enemy forces by the deployed 
armies to engage in a decisive battle.40 
Although not wholly sharing the manifold déductions about war's protean 
nature that the later Clausewitz had expressed in On War's first book, Moltke 
nevertheless confined the aim of total destruction within a given state's existing 
37 Gunter E. Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategie 
Envelopment', in Paret, ed., Makers of Modem Straîegy, p. 297. 
38 Howard, 'The influence of Clausewitz', On War, p. 30. 
39 Clausewitz, On War, book VIII, 9, p. 625. 
40 Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 300. 
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strategie capability and resources: ' Strategy cannot but always direct its efforts 
towards the highest goal attainable with the means at [one's] disposai'.41 By doing so 
he subordinated the imperative of annihilation to the limitations of reality. That 
realism enabled him to comprehend that in case of a war on two fronts, the destruction 
of both opponents would be beyond Germany's capabilities.42 Moltke was thus free to 
examine defensive-offensive opérations, a theoretical freedom that his successors 
failed to exploit. 
That is not to say that Moltke intended to subject the aims of war to 
statesmanship. While fully accepting Clausewitz's argument that the objective of war 
was a satisfactoiy politicai resolution, he also held that once the aimy had been 
committed to war, its direction belonged to the soldiers: 'politicai considérations can 
be taken into account only as long as they do not make demands that are mililarily 
improper or impossible'.43 It is important to emphasise these views of Moltke's on the 
appropriate relationship between politics and war, since, despite occasionai claims to 
the contrary, he did not completely subordinate the conduci of war to politics; for him 
strategy allegedly 
. . . serve[d] policy best and only work[ed] for the object of policy, but 
completely independent of policy in its actions . . . it is not the occupation 
of a slice of territory, or a capture of a fortress, but the destruction of the 
enemy that will decide the outeome of the war.44 
A différent and deeply influential insight that Moltke extracted from On War and used 
as the foundation of his concept of warfare and system of command was that the 
41 Quoted in Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford, 1983), p. 60. 
42 Naveh, In Pursuit, p. 75. 
43 Quoted in Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 298. 
44 Quoted in Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford, 1983), p. 60. 
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uncertainties of war rule out any attempt to impose general ru les or rigid systems, 
or even to create detailed plans: 'The unpredictable outcome of the first great decisive 
tactical engagement lays the foundations for further décisions; the plan of opérations 
thus cannot reach beyond the first decisive encounter with the main enemy force'.45 
That view led Moltke to adopt and assimilate into the army's officiai doctrine a 
decentralized system of command: the directive command or 'mission tactics' 
[Auftragstaktik'] system, which developed as a coherent theory during Moltke's tenure 
as chief of staff.46 It stipulated that the high command should limit itself to ìssuing 
general instructions, outlining overall objectives and specific missions, while leaving 
tactical conduct within the framework of those objectives and missions entirely to the 
discrétion of the operational and tactical Commanders.47 Directive command thus well 
suited Moltke's view of strategy as nothing more than a 'system of expedients' based 
on common sense.48 What Moltke failed to perceive was that strategie 'common 
sense' is not applicable to, and may sometimes even be irrelevant to, the tactical 
echelon. 
Directive command required that ali echelons and components of the army be 
thoroughly knowledgeable about and comply with the operational goal. It was a 
45 Moltke the elder, Moìtkes militärische Werke, 20 vols. (Berlin, 1892-1912), vol. 2, 
part 2, p. 291; similarly, *no plan of opérations can extend with any prospect of certainty 
beyond the first clash with the hostile main force. Only a layman can pretend to trace 
throughout the course of a campaign the prosecution of a rigid plan, arranged beforehand in 
ail its détails and adhered to to the last. All successive acts of war are therefore not pre-
meditated exécutions but spontaneous acts guided by military tact' (quoted in Wallach, 
Dogma, p. 54). 
46 However, Moltke never used this term, which was coined only after the First World 
War. 
47 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B. C. to the Présent 
(London, 1991) p. 170; Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 57-58; Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 
300. For further discussion of the German tradition of directive command, see Martin 
Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German 
Armies, 1888-1918 (London, 1995), pp. 7-33. 
48 Quoted in Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 299. 
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difficult requirement to fulfil for a variety of reasons. The first was the general 
s taffs initially low status and weak influence within the army. In 1864 it was still a 
minor advisory entity with no power of command; Moltke could only counsel 
commanders to follow his operational plan, and general staff members could only 
make their best efforts to persuade commanders to accept advice.49 By 1870-71 the 
general staff had gained a more authoritative position, yet commanders in contact with 
the enemy still repeatedly refused to accept the command authority of the general 
staff. 
Another cause of the army's failure to incorporate the directive command 
system harmoniously into its standard operating procedures was the tactical echelon's 
almost total obliviousness to operational aims, owing to a lack of coherent guidance 
from the commander-in-chief and to the deep-rootedness of the army's tactical 
patterns. Moltke's initial memorandum of 6 May 1870 to the chiefs of sections of the 
Great General Staff exemplified the ambiguous nature of his operational guidance. 
Moltke simply directed a generalized steady advance aimed at locating French forces 
and engaging them in battle.50 Had he possessed an operational plan as understood by, 
for instance, the first Napoleon, he would presumably have communicated it to his 
tactical commanders. The fact that Moltke's memorandum even failed clearly to 
specify encirclement as the operational aim - even though it was, indeed, his aim -
rendered him directly and personally responsible for his subordinates' notably poor 
compliance with that aim. For so long as the operational logic derived from the 
necessity of destruction, which could only be achieved through battle, the imperative 
49 Samuels, Command or Control?, p. 12. 
50 Moltke, Militaiy Coirespondence 1870-1871, ed. Spenser Wilkinson (London, 
1991), p. 172. 
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of annihilation was bound to supersede operational planning, uriless the high 
command vocally and continually demanded compliance. 
The other side of the operational coin was the effect on tactical patterns of the 
fïrmly established tactical imperatives in which the amiy had been indoctrinated for 
générations. Those patterns, which followed directly from the theoretical primacy of 
battle, determined that in any engagement - whether intended or unintended, planned 
or improvised - ali friendly units within marching distance, which might amount to a 
whole coips and sometimes an entire army, must 'follow the thunder of the guns', 
abandon their previous lines of advance, and pile on.51 In the e vent, once field 
Commanders smelt blood, the overpowering urge to destroy the enemy in front of 
them and the freedom conferred by Aufträgstaktik dominated rational calculation.52 
The battles of Spicheren, Wöxth and Colombey were all encounters of this kind 
initiated by tactical units. These and other random battles resulted in hon*endous 
losses, and sometimes, as at Gravelotte, thwarted Moltke's notably loose but 
nevertheless détectable operational intentions.53 
It is therefore understandable that Moltke, aware of these defects as well as of 
other diffïculties inherent in the command of modem mass armies, enthusiastically 
used the telegraph. This open-mindedness toward new communications technology 
was not part of Clausewitz's legacy; the master had indeed belittled the impact of 
technology: 'it is clear that weapons and equipment are not essential for the concept of 
51 Ibid, p. 82-84. 
52 Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 76-78. Naveh illustrates how the Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, Commander of German 3rd Army, missed an opportunity to complete the German 
operational encirclement simply because he was unaware of Moltke's plan. 
53 Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 304 and Naveh, In Pursuit, p. 84. Naveh points 
out that both operational and Strategie orders explicitly forbade tactical initiatives prior to 
those battles, yet despite those Orders entire armies were drawn into huge battles under 
unfavourable conditions. 
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fighting, since even wrestling is fighting of a kind\54 Moltke nevertheless 
employed the telegraph to outline the general concept of Coming opérations, to update 
his picture of the overall situation, and on occasion to transmit succinct Orders - but as 
a means of strategie direction, rather than of operational control.55 
Moltke's concept of strategie envelopment, his emphasis on concentration of 
force, his subordination of war aims to politicai needs and national capabilities, his 
récognition of the unchangeable rôle of chance, friction, and moral elements, his 
prudent and restricted employaient of technology, and his development of directive 
command make it easy to understand the nearly complete identity with Clausewitz's 
maxims later attributed to him. Yet Moltke did not hesitate to review and adapt his 
'Clausewitzian' concepts to changing realities when reconsideration seemed required. 
By the end of his tenure as chief of staff he had become one of very few Prusso-
German officers e ver to reject his own previous solution to Germany's two-front 
quandary; he acknowledged that a swift opération on interior lines to neutralize one 
front through a decisive battle of annihilation was no longer feasible.56 
Moltke imparted that flexibility and open-mindedness to Schlieffen.57 Yet his 
willingness to meet the challenges of an ever-changing reality never broke through the 
conceptual framework Consolidated by Clausewitz. As a resuit, his successors, and 
54 Clausewitz, On War, Book II, 1, p. 127. Clausewitz's theory can nevertheless 
accommodate change, although he primarily recognized politicai and social rather than 
technological changes. It is important to remember that Clausewitz lived in an era of relatively 
slow technological advanee by current standards, and naturally viewed the military-
technological environment as relatively static. As Handel has argued, had Clausewitz written 
On War fifty or a hundred years later, he could scarcely have ignored the forces released by 
the industrial/technological revolution, and would presumably have adapted his theory to a 
radically and rapidly changing material environment: 'Clausewitz in the Age of Technology', 
in Michael Handel, ed., Clausewitz and Modem Strategy (London, 1986), pp. 57-60. 
55 Naveh, In Pursuit, p. 57-58. 
56 Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', pp. 309-310. 
57 See Schlieffen's willingness to experiment with a variety of operational concepts: 
Terence Zuber, 'The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered', War in Histoiy 6:3 (1999), pp. 274-305. 
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especially Schlieffen, were perceived as rigid and naiTow-minded military thinkers 
although they had at their disposai a solid theoretical platform which enabled thera to 
confront the uncertainties and carnage of the battlefield while providing the security of 
a tightly formulated theory. Annihilation remained the motivating force of the Gemían 
army's concepts and doctrines. Moltke was in that respect the chronological and 
conceptual link through which Clausewitzian thought permeated the Gemían mass 
armies of the pre-1914 era. 
2. Schlieffen 
Alfred Count von Schlieffen, who in 1891 succeeded Moltke as chief of staff after a 
brief interim successor, exercised a deep and lasting influence over the Gemían army 
during a tenure that lasted until 1905 - and long thereafter. His most characteristic 
quality was an ability to provoke strong feelings: admiration and resentment in equal 
measure. Supporters and followers regarded him as a model, as a professional genius 
who had solved Gemiany's military quandary by deriving from high-level theories a 
simple (and some would admit, simplified and formalistic) doctrine. Critics spared no 
invective in drawing the portrait of a narrow-minded military technocrat who took no 
apparent interest in the politicai implications of those curious red lines on his maps, 
the ones denoting 'international border'. As always with intensely disputed figures, 
especially ones as unsociable and obstinate as Schlieffen, neither description probably 
corresponds to the truth.58 
Schlieffen was a 'typical product of the industrial revolution era' and was faced 
by the need to ans wer its challenges: enormous mass armies and their command-and-
control, increasing mechanization, and new and improved technology, especially in 
58 For some surprisingly humorous incidents that illuminate Schlieffen's character, see 
Walter Görlitz, The German Generai Staff, 1657-1945 (London, 1953), pp. 129-130. 
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the realm of firepower.39 His operational scheme can also be seen as inspired by the 
industriai era - a gigantic, mechanistic, and rigidly scheduled movement, an 
industrialised incarnation of Clausewitz's vision of Vernichtung. Yet the dispute over 
the extent to which the great chief of staff conformed to Clausewitz's theories has 
persisted from the création of Schlieffen's 'pian' onward, and has become even more 
vigorous after the two World Wars. 
A variety of reasons might have led Schlieffen's contemporaries to doubt that 
he was Clausewitz's disciple. For later scholars, Schlieffen's industrialized realization 
of Clausewitz's puiported maxims produced battlefield camage in a scale never before 
seen, a slaughter that left the nations" of Europe shocked and bewildered. Could that be 
the outcome of a theory that acknowledged the dominance of politics over war and 
accepted limited war as the most common form of the phenomenon? Schlieffen's link 
to Clausewitz thus has to be put to the test. 
3. New paradigm? Schlieffen as 'déviant': friction and command-and-control 
Schlieffen readily acknowledged his debt to the most obvious and naturai source of 
theoretical common knowledge - neither more nor less than was expected of a 
Prussian general who was Moltke the elder's successor: 
He who teaches us war does so, consciously or unconsciously, even today, 
by leaning more or less closely upon Clausewitz, and by drawing from his 
inexhaustible reservoir of thoughts.60 
Those were not the words of a man who was merely paying lip service to Clausewitz; 
Schlieffen indeed perceived himself as Clausewitz's and Moltke's disciple.61 And he 
59 Wallach, Dogma, pp. 33-34. 
60 Alfred von Schlieffen, 'Zur Einführung der fünften Auflage', Vom Kriege (Berlin, 
5th. edition, 1905), p. iv. 
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and others — both contemporary figures and later scholars - expressed that view on 
62 
numerous occasions. 
Accordingly, the German army thought of and taught Clausewitz and 
Schlieffen as complementary: whereas the first bequeathed a 'philosophical strategy', 
the second provided a much needed 'applied strategy' and practical outlook - to the 
great relief of most German officers.63 As Wilhelm Groener, one of Schlieffen's most 
fervent admirers, expressed it: 'In Count Schlieffen's writings you will never find 
spacious, theoretical discussions on strategy and tactics, nor scientific evolution of 
theories and maxims, but only life and reality'.64 
Yet many others among Schlieffen's adversaries, contemporaries, and later 
scholars saw Schlieffen's concepts and practice in a different light: Schlieffen's war 
plans purportedly revealed him less as a disciple than as a deviant who broke the 
continuity of general staff thought.65 Pre-1914 military authors, members of the 
Generalstab, and scholars have varied in their reasons for designating Schlieffen as 
the broken link, and some criticisms owed more to personal pique than to professional 
objectivity. Once the degree of conformity to Clausewitz became a measure of 
professional legitimacy for military writers such as Colmar von der Goltz, Sigismund 
von Schlichting, and Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, identifying someone as having 
fallen short of the 'military bible' constituted a kind of denunciation, a convenient 
61 Wallach, Dogma, pp. 36, 69-70. 
62 See for instance Waldemar Erfurth, Der Vernichtungssieg (Berlin, 1939), p. 56. 
63 Wallach, Dogma, p. 70; also Wallach, Misperceptions, p. 215. 
64 Quoted in Wallach, Dogma, p. 70. 
65 See Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen' p. 312. That Rothenberg used the very same 
quotation from Groener to establish his claim that Schlieffen was a 'heretic' with regard to 
Clausewitz's teachings demonstrates the shallowness of the entire argument. Groener did not 
depict contradictions, but rather stressed the complementarity of the two figures. Moreover, 
Schlieffen never expressed open criticisms of Clausewitz. 
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way of attacking an adversary.66 At the same time, the claim that Schlieffen had 
founded a new school of strategie thinking might have gained him an even more 
honourable position (which might be the reason for the fimi rejection by some 
scholars of the notion of'Schlieffen's new school of thought', on the grounds that 
even the general's 'ardent supporters . . . frankly den[ied] this').67 The motives as well 
as the arguments of the critics are thus important for a full understanding of 
Schlieffen's influence. 
Whatever the reason for raling Schlieffen out of the Clausewitz-Moltke camp, 
his perceived 'heresy' concerned two principal and interrelated issues on which, at 
first glance, he indeed seems to hold views dissimilar from those of the master - and 
somewhat revolutionary. Schlieffen simply ignored the factor of friction in his 
planning, and rejected Moltke's system of directive command - designed to cope with 
friction - in favour of a more restrictive and potentially invasive command-and-
control system. Schlieffen's famous war planning memorandum of 1905, which was 
probably written in early 1906, exemplified these two features of his thought.68 
Schlieffen produced several Denkschriften (studies) during his years as the 
chief of general staff, and several 'memoranda' or drafts in his years of retirement (the 
final one dated 28 December 1912), in his attempi to find an operational concept that 
would enable Geraiany to achieve the goal that Moltke, in his last years, had come to 
66 Echevarría, 'Borrowing', pp. 284-286. Yet the professional requirement to 'know 
your Clausewitz well' did not mean that the writers mentioned above held the entire content 
of On War applicable to their present-day context. According to Echevarría, new technology 
such as railroads, telegraphs and airships posed a gl'ave challenge in the eyes of Schlieffen's 
contemporaries to Clausewitz's writings on tactics and operations - the very same challenge 
that Schlieffen was attempting to face. 
67 Wallach, Dogma, p. 36. 
68 Hew Strachan, The First World War, voi. 1, To Arms (Oxford, 2001), p. 166. 
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consider impossible: total victory in a two-front war.69 The operational concept of 
Schlieffen's 1905 memorandum might look, at first sight, as an expansion of a simple 
idea: a gigantic wing manoeuvre or Fliigelschlacht (according to the 1905 
memorandum; the 1912 memorandum suggested instead a grand battle of 
encirclement using both wings, or Kesselschlacht):70 ' . the German anny will win 
its battle by an envelopment with the right wing. This will therefore be made as strong 
69 In recent years, newly discovered documentation that sheds light on German war 
planning prior to the First World War has permitted a re-evaluation of the evolution of 
Schlieffen's concepts, and has led to an intense dispute over Schlieffen's 1905 memorandum. 
At the heart of the dispute lies Terence Zuber's claim that the 1905 memorandum (Zuber 
repeatedly refers to it as ''Denkschrift') is actually not a war plan but rather a study designed to 
urge the German government to expand the army. The study was supposedly an abrupt 
departure from Schlieffen's earlier pattern as revealed in his Generalstabsreisen (general staff 
rides), war games, and other studies. Zuber Claims that the main feature of the 1905 
memorandum, the envelopment of Paris, was never seriously tested in any of Schlieffen's 
rides or war games. However, as Terence M. Holmes has pointed out, the march on Paris was 
not a dominant principle of the 1905 memorandum: the gui ding idea was the formation of a 
strong right wing, designed to envelop enemy forces wherever they might be encountered 
(and, if the French retreated to strong positions on the Marne or Seine and sought to hold out 
there, instead of 'doing the Germans a favour' by attacking them, the right wing would march 
around Paris in order to outflank them). Schlieffen's studies, rides, and war games (especially 
the summer 1897 study and 1904 ride) thus show the development of his concepts in the 
direction of the 1905 memorandum (Zuber, 'The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered', War in 
Histoiy 6:3 [1999], pp. 262-305, and Terence M. Holmes, 'The Reluctant March on Paris: A 
Replay to Terence Zuber's 'The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered', War in Histoiy 8:2 [2001], 
pp. 208-232). Zuber's argument also ignores the obvious question of why Schlieffen would 
choose such an indirect approach to promote a burning need - army expansion - long since 
recognized and demanded by the General Staff; a top secret study could not be circulated, and 
would hardly be effective for that purpose. Moreover, it seems as if Zuber, in order to 
establish the 1905 memorandum as rooted in Schlieffen's earlier thinking, assumes that all the 
staff rides, studies, and war games would have to be tests of a Single idea (a strong right wing 
marching on and around Paris), ignoring the natural systemic function of Kriegsspiele and 
staff rides: learning, deduction, and testing options. For further examination of these issues, 
see Terence Zuber, 'Der Mythos vom Schlieffenplan', in Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, 
and Gerhard P. Gross, Der Schlieffenplan. Analysen und Dokumente (Paderborn, 2006), pp. 
45-78; Annika Mombauer, 'Der Moltkeplan: Modifikation des Schlieffenplans bei gleichen 
Zielen?' ibid., pp. 79-100; Robert T. Foley, 'Der Schlieffenplan. Ein Aufmarschplan für den 
Krieg', ibid., pp. 101-116; and Gross, 'There was a Schlieffenplan. Neue Quellen', ibid., pp. 
117-160. 
70 It was probably the difference between the two memoranda, aside from Schlieffen's 
tendency to justify his ideas retrospectively, that generated continued confusion with regard to 
Schlieffen's operational logic. The 1905 memorandum can be related to Friedrich's Leuthen 
wing-manoeuvre (Fliigelschlacht), while the 1912 memorandum was modelled after 
Hannibal's Cannae battle of encirclement (Kesselschlacht), or its modern variant, the battle of 
Sedan (Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 92-96). We can thus conclude that Schlieffen's conceptual 
evolution, employing the mass encirclement method to its extreme, reached its climax not in 
the 1905 memorandum but rather in the 1912 one. 
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as possible.'71 In both cases, this fearsome right wing, to which Schlieffen assigned 
no fewer than 35.5 amiy corps, would swing across Belgium and north-eastern France 
and sweep the French army eastward against the Moselle fortresses, the Jura, and 
Switzerland, and there crush it to pieces.72 'The French army\ in Schlieffen's 
recurring demand, 'must be annihilated'.73 
The simple idea thus manifested itself in an enormous and highly complex 
plan. The successful execution of the scheine demanded accurate, detailed, 
coordinated, and carefully timed implementation by the numerous components of the 
German fighting system. It was essential that every single element of the gigantic 
machine act in synchronization, an exigency that was absolutely criticai. That was 
criticai — yet allegedly, according to the German army5s own longstanding battle-
tested theories - impossible to deliver. 
'Nothing is simple in war', wrote Clausewitz; 'the simplest thing is difficult'.74 
The element of friction, the factor that distinguishes 'real war' from the war of the 
planners, stood between Schlieffen's simple concept and his intended simple decisive 
victorious war. As the author of a preface to the ftfth édition of On War, Schlieffen 
surely knew well that 'countless minor incidents — the kind you can ne ver really 
foresee - combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls 
far short of the intended goal'.75 But the successful réalisation of his pian demanded 
precisely the abolition of all such 'countless minor incidents'. Schlieffen and his 
followers in the Generalstab, it seems, should have taken Clausewitz's words more 
71 Schlieffen's great 'memorandum' ofDecember 1905, in Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan 
(London, 1958), p. 138. 
72 Ibid., pp. 138,144-145. 
73 Ibid., p. 145. 
74 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, 7, p. 119. 
75 Ibid. 
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seriously, and have kept in mind that 'none o f . . . [the components of a military 
machine] is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, everyone of whom 
retains his potential of friction5 as they compiled and prepared to execute such a vast 
and complex war plan.76 
The dissonance that emerges when considering these quotations from On War 
while reading Schlieffen's plan, with its 'frictionless' assumptions and demands, has 
generated a range of responses, from the claim that Schlieffen had merely overlooked 
or disregarded the element of friction in his plan, to the suggestion that Schlieffen was 
77 • 
altogether the 'antithesis5 of Clausewitz and of his teachings. However, as will 
emerge in the pages that follow, Schlieffen created his operational concept in full 
accordance with all other basic rules found in On War. His overlooking of a 
fundamental obstacle such as friction thus requires a notable effort at explanation. 
Considering his absolute obedience to On War's other imperatives, any such effort 
leads to one of the following alternatives: either Clausewitz himself offered a solution 
to the friction problem, or Schlieffen devised one persuasive enough to meet the 
demands of his plan. It appears that the ans wer is a bit of both. 
Clausewitz's explanation of the "countless minor incidents5 that stand in the 
way of military success contains a second element, much less quoted than the first: 
'Iron will-power can overcome this friction; it pulverizes every obstacle, but of course 
it wears down the machine as w e l l . . . the proud spirit's firm will [derfeste Wille 
eines stolzen Geistes] dominâtes the art of war as an obelisk dominâtes the town 
square on which ail roads converge.'78 Metaphors aside, here lies the answer that 
76 Ibid. 
77 See for instance Wallach, Dogma, p. 75, and Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 
312. 
78 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, 7, p. 119. 
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Clausewitz himself provided for this distressing problem. He continues: 'To be 
sure, the best general is not the one who is most familiar with the idea of friction,79 
and who takes it most to hea r t . . . the good general must know friction in order to 
overcome it whenever possible . . .'80 
The reader of On War' s first book can therefore rightly conclude that the 
obstacles or challenge posed by the element of friction to every war plan can in fact be 
met. According to Clausewitz himself, 'iron will power1 is the remedy, although a 
dangerous one that will not always suffice. Schlieffen did not overlook, ignore or 
unintentionally exclude friction. He had the full intention of using the suggested 
remedy to its extreme, demanding: ' . . an aim-conscious leader, an iron character, 
with an obstinate will for victory and troops that clearly understand the issue at 
stake'81 
The supreme commander of 'iron character', be it Schlieffen or anyone else, 
would embody that will; yet in order to ensure that friction would indeed eventually 
succumb to willpower, the leader must maintain tight control over his massed troops, 
control of a kind never before possible. Fortimately, Schlieffen had at his disposai 
what was perceived as one of the major advantages of modem warfare, one that 
Clausewitz could not have taken into considération: modem means of communication 
- telegraph and téléphoné. 
Unlike Clausewitz yet like Moltke, Schlieffen's attitude toward technology was 
a highly positive one. In his striving to improve his forces' effectiveness, he increased 
the number of technical and support units, and promoted the adoption of innovations 
79 A familiarity that Clausewitz attributes only to the first-hand experience that 
Schlieffen never possessed, for he never commanded units of any size in battle. 
80 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, 7, p. 120. 
81 Alfred von Schlieffen, Dienstschriften des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee 
(Berlin, 1937-38), vol. 1, p. 243. 
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such as motor vehicles, mobile heavy artillery, and an embryonic air force 
(primarily airships and balloons, intended to free the cavalry from its reconnaissance 
missions).82 His 1905 memorandum urged 'advancing, digging in, advancing . . . 
using every means of modern science to dislodge the enemy behind his cover'.83 And 
he stressed that to make this rapid advance possible, even the Landsturm or reserve 
militia must be made mobile.84 
Yet one of Schlieffen^ biggest concems remained the daunting difficulties of 
commanding modern mass armies.85 Aides and ordnance officers alone would no 
longer do, especially when it came to executing fragile and intricate schemes of 
manoeuvre. For that purpose Schlieffen eagerly adopted whatever novelties 
technology had to offer. The 'modem Alexander', as Schlieffen saw it, could and 
should use 'telegraph, wireless, téléphonés . . . automobiles and motorcycles'.86 These 
were supposed to compensate for the loss of control caused by the asymptotic increase 
in army size and conséquent frontage. 
However, Schlieffen had yet another reason to encourage the assimilation and 
use ofmodern communications. As mentioned above, his plan demanded the utter 
subordination to the operational goal of each component of Germany's immense mass 
army. Nevertheless, Schlieffen was indeed a true pupil of Moltke the elder's, and as 
such he also drew lessons from his predecessor's experience. The most obvious one 
was probably that the army could never meet demands of the kind Schlieffen was 
82 Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', p. 313, and Wallach, Dogma, p. 53. 
83 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften, p. 144. 
84 Schlieffen's 'great memorandum' of December 1905, in Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 
p. 143. 
ss See for example this concern, as expressed (although dismissively) in a letter to his 
sister Marie, in Alfred Graf Schlieffen, Briefe, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Göttingen, 1958), p. 296. 
86 Quoted from Schlieffen's Gesammelte Schriften, in Rothenberg, 'Moltke, 
Schlieffen', p. 314. 
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making. The field commanders, who frequently faced the need to choose between 
conformity to the operational goal and immediate response to local threats or 
incidents, had time and again thwarted Moltke5 s efforts at control, while entangling 
themselves and neighbouring units in unplanned and futile combat.87 
Schlieffen could not jeopardise his plan by trusting his field commanders to 
restrain themselves and to ignore their training and instincts. He trusted instead 
modem means of communication to ensure that local initiatives would not disrupt his 
planned sequence of events; entangle in unplanned and unnecessary complications 
forces that would be unquestionably crucial later on in assuring superiority of mass in 
the battle of annihilation; or endanger the rapid advance of the right wing. Yet if 
telegraph and telephone indeed improved communications, communications do not 
necessarily mean control.88 Unlike Moltke, Schlieffen fell victim to the delusion that 
these new capabilities would allow him to maintain complete control to the very last 
detail.89 And in turn the illusion of control legitimised Schlieffen's imposition of his 
vision of tight and detailed command-and-control - which contradicted the very 
essence of Moltke's directive command system-upon the German army. 
Schlieffen thus constructed a plan of a grand encirclement designed, like a 
time-delayed or remote-controlled bomb, to unfold in an unstoppable sequence until 
its final stage led to the annihilation of the French army. But fighting forces, unlike 
bombs, cannot be left alone once primed: they may very well fail to follow their 
planned assignments strictly. Detailed planning helps, but even the most 
comprehensive plan cannot replace the necessary - yet unattainable for armies on the 
87 Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 83-86. 
88 Michael Handel's observation was as relevant in Schlieffen's era as it is in our own: 
'Today, almost all failures of command and control do not stem from a lack of adequate 
communication instruments or information but instead from human error and problems of 
perception': Handel, 'Clausewitz in the Age of Technology', p. 68. 
89 Ibid., pp. 63-65. 
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scale of 1914-18 - detailed control by the supreme commander. No assurance that 
each component would act as planned in complete coordination with the others, and 
lastingly attuned to their mutuai aim could possibly exist. 
Is it therefore justified to mark Schlieffen down as a 'déviation' from 
Clausewitz and Moltke? No evidence exists that he intended to challenge the 
traditions or theories of the Prussian-German army as he perceived them. And why 
would he? Clausewitz's maxims, as applied in Moltke's wars, had proven themselves 
well. The modera battlefield and the evolving military-political reality indeed posed 
new demands and threats. Schlieffen believed that by introducing a new command-
and-control system and the technology to implement it, he had overcome the trap of 
friction. Schlieffen's answers to the new challenges indeed altered and adjusted 
Clausewitz's and Moltke's maxims to the new reality. Yet these revisions were minor 
compared to Schlieffen's scrupulous loyalty to the remainder of Clausewitz's dieta 
and to Moltke's teachings. 
4. Old paradigm? Schlieffen as disciple: The fingerprints of Clausewitz and 
Moltke 
An examination of Schlieffen's views on warfare as well as his great memorandum of 
1905 in its various versions — in order to trace its theoretical foundations, roots, and 
links - reveals no other inconstancies with Schlieffen's predecessors, but rather the 
obvious influence of Clausewitz and Moltke on Schlieffen's concepts and planning:90 
The long-lasting value of the work On War lies, aside to its high ethical 
and psychological value, in its emphatic emphasis of the annihilation idea 
. . . [For Clausewitz]. . . . 'the destruction of the hostile forces is the most 
90 The relevant documents include the 1905 memorandum, seven drafts, and the 1912 
memorandum: Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, pp. 129-182. 
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commanding purpose among those which may be pursued by war'. This is the 
doctrine that led us to Königgrätz and Sedan . . .9l 
Schlieffen identifïed the goal of any war, and even more so - any opération, any 
battle, indeed any effort made by fighting forces at any level of warfare - as the 
physical annihilation of the enemy's military forces.92 The commander's task is 
therefore utter destruction or overthrow of his opponent, a goal best achieved by 
conducting the grand battle of annihilation.93 The Vernichtungschlacht is, therefore, 
'the only battle worth striving for' 94 
In accordance with the logie of the annihilation imperative, Schlieffen 
emphasised the importance of the concentration of forces, declaring in words very 
similar to those of Clausewitz that the essential element of the art of command was to 
be 'numerically strengest on the battlefield'.95 Indeed numerical superiority was one 
of Schlieffen's fundamental maxims: 'To achieve a victory you need the concentration 
of superior forces at one point'.. 'Ali the forces must be drawn into the battle . . ,'96 
Yet he also realized that Germany might not enjoy numerical superiority in 
future wars. And like Moltke before him, Schlieffen believed that Germany could not 
endure a prolonged war. The requirement for rapid and decisive victory indeed fîtted 
well with his preference for a decisive battle of annihilation. Schlieffen did not 
91 Schlieffen, 'Zur Einführung der fünften Auflage', pp. v-vi. 
92 D.V.E Nr. 53 - Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung vom 1. Januar 1910 
('Principles of Major Unit Command'), written underthe influence of Schlieffen's ideas, 
stressed that 'the utmost goal of every martial act is the annihilation of the enemy. That must 
always be striven for . . . (quoted in Wallach, Dogma, p. 78). 
93 Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, p. 51. 
94 Schlieffen, Briefe, p. 310: '. . .dass die Vernichtungschlacht die allein anzustrebende 
Schlacht ist' 
95 Ibid., p. 297; see for instance Clausewitz, On War, Book III, 8, p. 194 (which also 
asserts the identity of tactics and strategy in this regard), and Book 5; 3, p. 282; but the 'other 
Clausewitz' also addressed the issue in a more qualified way: Book II, 2, p. 135. 
96 Schlieffen's Cannae research, quoted in Wallach, Dogma, p. 48. 
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dismiss other forms of operation - such as initial strategic defence on both fronts -
but clearly carne to prefer the destruction of one of Germany's two enemies fírst. His 
exercise critiques of general staff ride Aufmarsch II (east) in 1900/1 and of the general 
staff ride in 1904 (west) exemplified that inclination. In both he emphasised the vital 
principie of massing against one enemy, and defeating it in a swift and decisive 
manner that would render it unable to pose a threat, before tuming on the other.97 
Those deductions were not new to Schlieffen: he had inherited them from 
Moltke. But while Moltke, based on his experience in 1870-1871, soon doubted the 
possibility of achieving a swift victory on one front, and no longer counted on 
decisive battles but rather on diplomacy to bring Germany's wars to a satisfactory end, 
Schlieffen continued to believe in annihilational victory.98 The key to its achievement 
was the identical form of battle that Clausewitz had recommended as the most 
rewarding and that Moltke used with great success in Geraiany's wars of unification, 
encirclement. Schlieffen made the idea of envelopment, flank attack and outflanking a 
"patent solution' as Ritter put it, or an 'unalterable law' in Schlieffen's own words, for 
any attack by a numerically inferior forcé.99 Other forms of attack would not do: 
frontal attack would provide only 'ordinary' results, not annihilation, while 
demanding overwhelming superiority, for under contemporary conditions 
breakthrough (Durchbruch) was possible only in special circumstances such as gaps 
97 Zuber, 'The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered', pp. 280-281, 289-291. 
98 Naveh, In Pursuit, p. 42; Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', pp. 306-311; Wallach, 
Dogma, p. 54. 
99 Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, p. 51. Schlieffen's words applied to the outflanking 
manoeuvre: Dienstschriften, vol. 1, p. 87. Even Zuber Js radical reconsideration of Schlieffen's 
concepts concedes that all of Schlieffen's exercises, studies and war games since 1896 
examined, in one way or another, some form of flank assault (whether in the west or in the 
east, limited or massive in scale, offensive or counteroffensive), and designed to annihilate the 
enemy army (Zuber, 'Hie Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered', pp. 276-296). 
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in the enemy's front.100 In his letter to Freytag-Loringhoven of August 1912, 
Schlieffen stressed that although '"Cannae" (his perfect historical example of a 
complete encirclement battle) is not always possible . . . the attack against the flank is 
. . . necessary. The attack against the flank is the central [and] most vital essence of 
the whole history of war'.101 
The ans wer to Germany's military challenge, as Schlieffen saw it, thus had to 
be flank attack. And in Order to ensure its full effect, it had to be combined with 
frontal assault, in order to tie down large numbers of the enemy, as always based on 
the Cannae example: 'In strategy as well as in tactics the same rule obtains: he who 
strives for encirclement must firmly attack in front, prevent all enemy movement there 
and thus render possible the effect of the encircling wing'.102 
The goals, assumptions and formulae of the Schlieffen Plan thus suggest 
Schlieffen's radical conformity with Clausewitz's imperatives. The plan embodied 
most of Clausewitz's demands in a moderaised manner suited to the mass armies of 
Schlieffen's era: a striving to annihilate the enemy's army in a decisive 
Vernichîungschlacht achieved by flank attack and facilitated by concentration of 
forces on an enormous scale. It carried the stamp of Clausewitz's paradigm, and 
cannot be dismissed as a violation of Clausewitz's precepts. 
And likewise its faults: for the crucial defects in the plan lay not only in rigid 
impractical demands on units, command-and-control, and logistics. The plan's crucial 
defects stemmed from its basic logie, a logie that it shared with the Clausewitzian 
100 Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, p. 50. 
101 Schlieffen, Briefe, p. 317: . . der wesentlichste Inhalt der ganzen 
Kriegsgeschichte'; for the relatively late development of Schlieffen's obsession with Cannae, 
see Terence M. Holmes, 'Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen's 
Cannae Programme', The Journal of Militaiy Histoiy 67:3 (2003), pp. 745-71. 
102 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften, vol. 1, p. 108. See also Schlieffen's critique of his final 
war game, in 1905, which stressed the same lesson: Zuber, 'The Schlieffen Plan 
Reconsidered', p. 294. 
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paradigmi, and that subordinated strategie and operational planning to tactical 
patterns. For, as Moltke's experience taught, if only tactical success leads directly to 
the strategie goal through successive battles, and preferably through a single great 
battle leading to annihilation of the enemy, then strategie planning was bound 
inextricably to the déterminants that tactics established.103 
It was that outlook that enabled Schlieffen to create a 'tacticized' operational 
pian and to believe that 'the battle of annihilation may be conducted today in 
accordance with the same pian Hannibal had contrived . . . ' l 04 even though in his 1912 
memorandum Schlieffen literally copied - as if with a pantograph - the small-scale 
pattern of the battle of Cannae into a context that was a hundred times wider in space 
and more than two hundred times larger in numbers, thus creating fragile linear 
structures that were virtually impossible to manoeuvre and command.105 
Schlieffen's mechanical réduction of strategie manoeuvre to scaled-up tactics 
would have been impossible without the complete identity between the patterns of 
strategie and tactical conduci that Clausewitz had already posited: 
Both in strategy and in tactics a convergent attack always holds out 
promise of increased results . . , l 0 6 'The main factors in strategie 
effectiveness are the following: 1. The advantage of terrain. 2. Surprise -
either by actual assault or by deploying unexpected strength at certain 
points. 3. Concentric attack {all three as in tactics).. .l0? 
Even Schlieffen's avoidance of any engagement with politics, with its grave 
conséquences, was an outeome of strict compliance with Clausewitz's - and Moltke's 
103 Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 80-86. 
104 Schlieffen's Cannae research, quoted in Wallach, Dogma, p. 43. 
105 Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 82-83. 
106 Clausewitz, On War, Book Vili, 9, p. 619 (my emphasis). 
107 Ibid., Book VI, 3, p. 363 (my emphasis). 
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- logie. Schlieffen has been blamed for failing to serve Germany's politicai goals, 
or even to take them into considération, thus ignoring Clausewitz's clear hierarchy 
according to which Politik must dominate war. 1t was supposedly that blind spot that 
allowed him to create a pian that carried immense politicai implications, such as the 
violation of Belgiiim's neutrality and thus Britain's virtually inevitable entry into the 
war, without Consulting, much less seeking the approvai of, the politicai leadership.108 
But Schlieffen was not ignoring Clausewitz in that respect: he had followed 
Clausewitz closely. For, as suggested earlier, setting one fixed and universal goal to 
ali wars - and Schlieffen, as we saw, never doubted annihilation to be that goal - had 
made politico-military planning altogether redundant.109 It is therefore likely that 
Schlieffen never felt any need or obligation to share his views over his operational 
goals with the politicai agencies, since he had nothing to share: he aimed at 
annihilating the French army in accordance with the most well-known and deeply 
rooted doctrines of the Prussian-Gennan anny. And the détails were obviously his 
commanderas prerogative and his professional domain. Schlieffen was indeed 'the 
prototype of a new kind of un-political soldier',110 and neither he nor Germany's 
politicai leaders foresaw the slippery slope that led from an artificial and complete 
108 Schlieffen's alleged indifférence to the strategie conséquences of a German 
violation of Belgium's neutrality can be explained by his expectation, expressed in his 1904 
exercise critique, that France would attempi to counterattack Germany through Belgium and 
Luxembourg, after a direct German attack against its fortress line on the Franco-German 
border. The war would therefore spili over into Belgium in any case: Zuber, 'The Schlieffen 
Pian Reconsidered', p. 286. 
109 Clausewitz, as mentioned earlier, set forth two contradictory notions of the 
objectives of war: annihilation as a universal objective, and politicai goals as determining 
military objectives that suited their needs. Yet the fact remains that Schlieffen, following 
Clausewitz, perceived annihilation as war's only appropriate goal and the quintessential 
expression of its nature, and that his view was both a legitimate interprétation of Clausewitz's 
unfinished discussion on that subject, and the interprétation prevalent in the Prusso-German 
army. 
110 Wallach, Dogma, p. 71. 
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disconnection between military planning and political needs to the subordination of 
politics to military requirements. 
Schlieffen and his famous plan thus in no sense represented a new paradigm or 
concept of warfare. Schlieffen himself persistently ascribed to Clausewitz and Moltke 
the dominant influence over ail German military thought, including his own. Yet 
Schlieffen's own avowals cannot suffice in deciding whether he followed 
Clausewitz's theory and to what extent, Individuals can be startlingly innocent about 
what actually influences their thinking; and the temptation to introduce innovations 
under a cloak of bogus consistency is ever-present, especially when challenging views 
as deeply rooted and traditional as the Prusso-German theory of warfare. 
The answer must therefore be extracted from Schlieffen's planning and other 
writings. His Dienstschriften, his historical researches, the fîeld service régulations of 
his time, and most of ail, his war plan in ail its many versions illustrate that Schlieffen 
did not suggest a new path for the German anny. Schlieffen's thinking and planning 
contains nothing revolutionary: it represented a sensible adaptation of Clausewitz's 
most prescriptive rules of warfare to the modem reality of immense mass annies and 
electrical and electronic communications and machine-based mobility, processes that 
had begun during the era of Moltke the elder.111 
Yet Schlieffen was no mere pale version of his predecessors. In terms oflong-
lasting influence his teachings were as significant as Clausewitz's and Moltke's. And 
his legacy, although time and again criticized by a variety of military thinkers, was 
perhaps even more profound in its effects.112 That legacy entailed inherent fallacies: 
111 Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen', pp. 296-311. 
112 Basil H. Liddell Hart reported that Field Marshai Ewald von Kleist said to him after 
the Second World War that 'his (Clausewitz's) phrases were quoted, but his books were not 
closely studied . . . the writings of Schlieffen received much greater attention. They seemed 
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the 'tactization' of strategic planning; the striving to fínd an ultímate solution to 
Germany's military predicament, a universally and timeless formula of applied tactics 
that would free offícers and troops from the need to think, leaving them only with the 
need to follow pre-planned and doubtfully relevant instructions; and finally, a fatal 
faith in technology as the answer to all theoretical and doctrinal paradoxes and 
inconsistencies. All these faults were the outcome of Schlieffen's reasonable 
adaptation, if not mere continuation, of Clausewitz's maxims and of Moltke's 
experience. They manifested themselves repeatedly in the Germán army's doctrines, 
planning, and combat practices in the years that foliowed Schlieffen's tenure as chief 
of staff. 
Schlieffen's memorándum and its inner logic set forth both the fundamental 
understanding of war and of warfare that he bequeathed to the Germán army, and its 
inherent shortcomings. He constructed an immense and ambitious operational plan 
based on the delusional notion that tactical-scale combat and formulae could be 
duplicated and inflated in space and numbers while still remaining controlled and 
effective thanks to new command-and-control technologies. Thus Schlieffen, and with 
him his successors, became victims of their own efforts to master the conditions of 
Germany's military-political requirements and limits through the restrictive concepts 
they inherited and practiced as members of the Prussian general staff. 
That same pattera persisted throughout the 1920s and culminated in Gennan 
armour theory during the 1930s and the Second World War. The theoretical construct 
that Clausewitz had established, utilised by Moltke and subjected to massive 
quantitative inflation by Schlieffen, continued to serve the Prusso-German army 
more practical': Liddell Hart, The OtherSicie of the Hill (London, 1956), p. 214; see also 
Wallach, 'Misperceptions', pp. 215-218. 
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throughout its remaining existence. The irony of history reveals itself in 
Schlieffen's words regarding retrograde movement, in his critique of the 1897 field 
exercises: 
This method of occupying and breaking off combat may suit a 
detachment, a division, in some cases"an army corps, but cannot be 
applied to an army, consisting of four to five army corps, which cannot be 
observed adequately from one point. The commander-in-chief will hardly 
succeed in recognizing the crucial moment for retreat, even less so, in 
despatching the opportune marching orders to the troops and in ordering 
the latter to march off in due time.113 
It was the German army's tragedy that Schlieffen could neither turn this critique into 
self-critique nor recognize its prophetic force, as a foretelling of the defeat on the 
Mame of his immediate successor, Helmuth von Moltke the younger, in September 
1914. 
III. Beyond Schlieffen: challenging annihilation? Erich von Falkenhayn and the 
strategy of attrition 
The shock of the Mame, compounded by the disastrous November 1914 breakthrough 
attempts in Flanders by Moltke the younger's successor as chief of general staff, Erich 
von Falkenhayn, might have resulted in a turning point. But German military thought 
obstinately refused to turn. Falkenhayn's next major project nevertheless has given 
rise to the claim that a 'school' that competed with annihilation-centred military 
thought, a school of attrition that ostensibly contested the primacy of Schlieffen's 
113 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften, vol. 1, p. 45. 
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heritage in German military thought and its complete identification with the core 
perception of warfare in the eyes of most of its bearers. That members of the German 
general staff entertained various versions of Ermattungsstrategie on a variety of 
occasions seems reasonable enough. But did a 'school' of attrition exist? What did 
Gennan officers mean by attrition strategy, and what were they trying to achieve by 
it? 114 In what ways did attrition, on its face value a notion contradictory to 
annihilation, correspond with, and even reflect, the Gennan traditional dictum of 
annihilation? 
1. Contending schools? 
In order to understand just how isolated and rare were the voices that promoted 
attrition as a viable Gennan strategy, it is useful to remember that their main 
proponent, Hans Delbrück, was a distinguished military historian but no member of 
the general staff. However popular he may have been as a military historian, he could 
never have represented a military trend, and his writings do not constitute a military 
'school' 115 Accordingly, no prominent military figure other than Falkenhayn can be 
identified with the concept of attrition. And claims of the existence of an 'attrition 
school' competing with the anny's traditional strategy of annihilation are accordingly 
114 As Hew Strachan explains in his analysis of Falkenhayn's intentions, the exact 
meaning of the English term 'attrition1 is notably amorphous. In his memorandum Falkenhayn 
used verbluten (to bleed out) at the tactical level, and Erschöpfungsb'ieg in relation to the 
strategy of economic exhaustion. Delbrück had used the verb ermatten in the pre-war debates, 
and zermürben during the war. All these are referred to here using the English word 'attrition', 
which does not differentiate between tactical, operational, and Strategie or even grand-
strategic Ievels (see Strachan, 'German Strategy in the First World War', in Wolfgang Elz und 
Sönke Neitzel, eds., Internationale Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert [Paderborn, 
2003], p. 141). 
115 For an analysis of Delbrück's arguments and of the hostility with which the 
majority of German officers reeeived them, see Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the 
Path to Verdun. Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition (Cambridge, 2005), 
pp. 38-55. For Delbrück's understanding of attrition or exhaustion strategy as deriving from 
Clausewitz's teachings, see Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pp. 108-112. 
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notably restrictive: 'due to the weakness in Germany's strategic decision-making 
structure and to the opposition to this new concept of warfare before the war, 
Falkenhayn was left to develop from scratch the methods by which it could be 
implemented . . . in the face of opposition from within his own government and 
army' 116 
Delbrück received a fierce answer to his post-war assertions from a diehard 
Schlieffen supporter, the First Quartermaster General (deputy chief of the general 
staff) from October 1918 to September 1919, Wilhelm Groener.117 Groener did not 
find it difficult to rebuff Delbrück's theory of attrition, and his explanation 
exemplified well the inherent meaning of annihilation as the categorical imperative of 
war, simultaneously embodying its political, economic, and military rationales, goals, 
and motivations, all wrapped in and reduced to a single decisive super-battle. The 
mainstream perception of war of the Prasso-German military elite held beyond doubt 
that annihilation was the requisite means as well as the sole possible goal: 
Delbrück reproaches in the German general staff a dogmatic orthodoxy 
that refused to acknowledge any strategy not based upon the 
116 Foley, Path to Verdun, p. 7. Foley, however, claims that an 'attrition school' did 
indeed exist; he painstakingly describes the various ways in which Falkenhayn's ideas were 
'distorted' or, in most cases, 'overlooked'. Yet his meticulous analysis destroys his own 
argument: if attrition strategy was overlooked, that was clearly because it was so hugely 
unpopular that its supposed supporters could not even clearly explain its merits, let alone 
convince the rest of German officer corps. Foley concludes his discussion by suggesting that 
even those who agreed with Delbrück's interpretation of Clausewitz refused to associate 
themselves with the professor's strategic ideas (ibid., p. 53). 
117 See pages 76-92. On Zuber's claim that a large-scale conspiracy (of which Groener 
was supposedly a prominent member) of failed generals sought to forge a 'Schlieffen school' 
and a 'Schlieffen Plan' in order to justify their own wartime decisions, see page 76, note 13. 
Groener, however, like many of his colleagues, hid no shameful secrets: after the war, as 
before it, he and many others honestly held Schlieffen's original operational designs to be 
flawless, and had no reason, hidden or transparent, to lie regarding Falkenhayn's conduct, 
since it could not dramatically affect judgments on his own wartime strategic choices. 
Groener's words therefore stand as an authentic expression of general staff mainstream 
perceptions, and of the way that mainstream understood war and operational objectives long 
after the Schlieffen era. 
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destruction [Niederwerfung] of the enemy. The answer to that claim is that 
the simplesî strategy was probably to trounce the French thoroughly 
and then leave it to politicai ingenuity [to find] the most advantageous 
manner of exploiting the resulting situation . . . So long as the French 
army had not been absolutely destroyed [vernichtendgeschlagen], 
French policy would unquestionably have never given up the aim of 
reconquering the provinces lost in 1870-71.'18 
2. Germany's Verdun concept: Attrition? 
Despite passionate and widely held belief in the sovereign efficacy of annihilation, the 
German army under Falkenhayn nevertheless launched one of its greatest offensive 
battles of the First World War as a battle of attrition: Verdun. How did Falkenhayn 
come to rely on a concept so foreign to German military thought, what was he trying 
to achieve on the fireswept hills above the city on the Meuse, and how did he try to 
resolve the inescapable tensions between the established framework of Prusso-
German military though and his operational concept? 
Falkenhayn5 s role was the most unfortunate and painful of ali: he was the first 
chief of staff to face the prospect that his entire perception of reality, most basic 
assumptions, and fundamental tiiiths about war - and the operational solutions 
stemming from those truths - were wholly irrelevant or inappropriate to the 
118 Groener, undated, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (henceforth 
BA-MA), N46-79, pp. 10-11 (emphasis in original). See also Groener's explanation of 
Schlieffen's rejection of attrition strategy, in which he again argued that the physical 
annihilation of armies was the path to the annihilation' of their governments' will to fight, p. 
88. For Groener's post-war analysis of Falkenhayn and of the Verdun battle, see BA-MA 
N46-41, N46-51. 
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situation.119 As Groener recalled, Falkenhayn's initial operational preferences had 
been wholly orthodox: 
Already around Christmas and New Year's Day 1914/1915 and then 
again after the winter battle in Masuria [in February 1915], I had 
spoken frequently with Falkenhayn about the prospect of a decisive 
blow in west or east, and had worked extensively on the problems 
involved in a breakthrough [battle] in the west, toward which 
Falkenhayn initially showed a certain inclination.120 
That Falkenhayn's first and natural choice of strategy was the continuation of 
Schlieffen's and the younger Moltke's strategie line is well known;121 so is the route 
he conceptualised and prepared for the all-encompassing, total mobilisation of 
German society by his successors, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and for their extreme 
one-blow risk-taking.122 Yet how do his thought and actions coincide with an alleged 
radical departure from the most fundamental essence of German military 
interprétations of the 'requirements' of'reality'? To win the war, as orthodoxy taught, 
Germany must achieve décision through a single integrated battle of annihilation. And 
that was precisely what Falkenhayn tried to achieve at Verdun. 
Contrary to the claim that he had developed an unorthodox operational concept, 
Falkenhayn's true display of'outside the box' thinking was not strictly operational but 
119 Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich 
(Munich, 1996), pp. 179-197, 198-210 and 259-265; idem, 'Planning Total War? Falkenhayn 
and the Battle of Verdun, 1916', in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., Great War, Total 
War: Combat and Mobilisation on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 118-
119; Foley, Path to Verdun, pp. 105-108; Wilhelm Deist, 'Strategy and Unlimited Warfare in 
Germany: Moltke, Falkenhayn, and Ludendorff, in Chickering and Förster, Great War, pp. 
271-272; and Hull, Absolute Destruction, pp. 215-217. 
120 Groener memorandum, November 1927, BA-MA, N46-41, p. 141. 
121 See for instance Deist, 'Unlimited Warfare', pp. 271-272. 
122 Hull, Absolute Destmction, pp. 218-225. 
58 
Strategie: his acknowledgement that Germany could not win the war militarily 
against all its enemies, and the réalisation that his role had now been transformed: 
instead of total victory he needed to provide a military success that would remove one 
of Germany's enemies by diplomatie means. Many possible explanations exist for 
Falkenhayn's failure to develop his impressive and honest analysis, which in all 
likelihood ran counter everything his professional experience told him, into a 
coordinated German strategy. The most convincing one is the almost complete lack of 
coopération of the chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg.123 Germany's massive and ever-
increasing sacrifices of lives and treasure made Bethmann and the rest of the German 
civil goveinment abidingly unwilling to offer a peace agreement that either France or 
Russia could aeeept.124 
There is nevertheless reason to examine whether Falkenhayn himself managed 
to translate his understanding of Germany's limited strategie possibilities into a new 
and coherent operational concept that would pro vide the reluctant Bethmann with 
room for diplomatie manoeuvre. But despite his ability to re-examine Germany's 
strategie situation coldly and to promote unexpectedly sober solutions, Falkenhayn 
failed to produce an operational design free of traditional constraints, assumptions and 
measurements of 'success'. And since the strategically limited goals and the 
correspondingly limited means of his operational plan for the battle of Verdun clashed 
123 Afflerbach, 'Falkenhayn and the Battle of Verdun', pp. 118-119; Deist, 'Unlimited 
Warfare', pp. 272-275; and Hull, Absolute Destn/ction, p. 218. However valid this argument 
may be, Groener's 1935 observation on this failure of the military and politicai echelons to 
coordinate their strategie plans highlights the alacrity with which the army dropped every 
strategie failure on the government's doorstep: 'The hope that politicai resources might come 
to the aid of strategy becomes ever more deceptive as the hatred of [our] enemies and the 
productivity of their sources of [economic] strength increases. The strategy of attrition 
requires a great statesman even more than it does a great commander. [And] since in the 
[World] War we lacked either one, we achieved an acceptable outeome neither with the 
strategy of destruction nor with the strategy of attrition' (BA-MA N46-51, p. 89). 
124 See the durable analysis of Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War 
(New York, 1967). 
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with his - and the army's - conceptual axioms of unlimited annihilation, the plan 
was virtually destined to fail miserably.125 Falkenhayn sought to knock France out of 
the war, and was extraordinarily Willing to follow a rationale différent from 'décision 
through annihilation', yet he could not in effect plan and execute anything but a battle 
of annihilation.126 
More than any conceptual shortcomings, Falkenhayn's fault lay in his inability 
to disseminate his unusual operational thoughts and to follow his concept through to 
the necessary stage of tactical planning. Falkenhayn's notion of what must be 
achieved at Verdun was, quite naturally, interpreted by his subordinates first and 
foremost through the traditional framework of breakthrough leading to physical 
annihilation of as many enemy soldiers as possible, an interprétation Falkenhayn 
himself helped to reinforce by failing - like Moltke before him - to define with any 
clarity his operational goals before and during the battle.127 And if Falkenhayn 
managed to break out of the boundaries of the 'Schlieffen School' - which in practice 
was the 'German school' - he did not transform that vision into a relevant operational 
plan. Presenting Falkenhayn as the champion of an altogether new framework for 
German military thought also ignores the operational aim he proposed to pursue 
through attrition: in place of a rapid and decisive annihilation battle, he planned a slow 
grinding decisive annihilation process on the largest scale that German resources 
would allow. In the end, Falkenhayn was trying to achieve the same goal that 
125 For Crown Prince Rupprecht's unease about Falkenhayn's lack of faith in the 
plausibility of decisive victory ('How is the war supposed to end for us under these 
circumstances?'), see Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 216. 
126 See also Strachaus analysis, according to which Falkenhayn did not intend or 
indeed plan Verdun as a battle of attrition: 'attrition was a rationalisation of failure. The 
purpose of the battle had beeil adapted to what had happened on the ground . . . by April it had 
become commonplace to describe the offensive on terms of attrition, and gradually even 
Falkenhayn himself came to explain the battle in the terms which he would later use in his 
memoirs' (Strachan, 'German Strategy' p. 143). 
127 Ibid., p. 221. 
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Schlieffen had attempted, to knock France out of the war, by the same means, 
decisive assault to bring about an enlarged annihilation battle - this time multiplied in 
time rather than space - and without challenging any of the Generalslab's axioms 
about the 'only' way to win wars. 
Falkenhayn's subordinates, facing the task of creating a tactical plan based on 
his operational design, misunderstood his Verdun plan in accordance with the 
normative, Clausewitzian interprétation of operational goals: Verdun was to be an 
offensive that sought decisive annihilational results. Discussion of the sought-for 
breakthrough, not the goal and rationale of attrition, correspondingly played the major 
role in post-war reports and analysis by members of the German military elite such as 
Groener:128 
February [1916]. Gen[eral] von Falkenhayn takes the view that any 
[strategie] décision must come in the west, and [that] the first step in 
that direction will be the attack on Verdun. 
March [1916]. The defensive is and remains the stronger forni of 
combat, and it therefore follows that frontal attacks can only be 
decisive if superior fìrepower on a broad front can shatter the defence 
both morally and physically, rather than [merely] seeking to push the 
defenders back here and there . . . If we are not strong enough to 
achieve powerful fire effeets on a broad front then we must abstain 
from frontal attack on positions as well fortified [as these].129 
Falkenhayn failed to impart the logie of his plan to its executers, in ail likelihood 
because he himself had reconciled that logie with the common operational knowledge 
128 See also Afflerbach's analysis of the broad-front attack argument with 
Knobelsdorf: Afflerbach, 'Falkenhayn and the Battle of Verdun', pp. 122-124. 
129 'Aufzeichnungen General Groeners an die Historische Abteilung des 
Reichsarchiv', September 1933, BA-MAN46-41, pp. 212-215 (emphasis in original). 
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that he shared with his fellow officers - and to which he succumbed to in the light 
of the success of the initial attacks. Thus, for instance, Falkenhayn's plans left the 
question of taking the fortress of Verdun - a central operational goal, heavily affecting 
planning - unclear. That omission in turn, unfolded into operational confusion with 
grave results, for German 5th Army almost inevitably continued to consider the taking 
of the fortress a principal planning objective, with Falkenhayn himself seemingly 
supporting that aim when the opportunity appeared to present itself.130 The 
discrepancy between Falkenhayn''s intentions and those of his subordinates resulted in 
a plan in which only a large number of French casualties was accepted by all as the 
operational goal; a plan carried out despite its futility; and most of all a plan 
unstoppable simply because it delivered on its objectives - if at an unbearably high 
price. 
The extent of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the costs, benefits, and 
optimally efficient application of attrition emerges from post-war German efforts to 
assess its overall potentiality. Germany's wartime military leadership could 
conceptualise operational goals in fixed, narrow terms, and try and realise them with 
even less intellectual flexibility. Yet a plan that demanded new concepts, calculations, 
and operational and tactical conduct demanded something they could not deliver. 
Falkenhayn had gambled that a single daring, desperate battle would break the entire 
strategic stalemate, had committed a large part of Germany's dwindling fighting 
manpower, and in the end had held nothing back in case the gamble failed. That was 
not a new pattern; Falkenhayn had put his trust in mass and annihilation. And while he 
understood that Germany's plight called for a radically different operational concept 
and had sought to design his plan with non-traditional goals in mind, he failed to 
130 Foley, Path to Verdun, pp. 197,211-212; see also Hull, Absolute Destruction, pp. 
220-221. 
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create sufficiently clear guidelines, or see to it that the officers responsible for the 
execution of the attack would comprehend concepts and pursue goals inherently 
different from those their understanding of warfighting allowed them to pursue. As 
Groener summed up the conventional wisdom in retrospect: 
The purpose and aim - breakout from [our] ring of enemies - could never 
have been achieved through less than decisive successes, but only through 
a total victory [vollen Sieg] in 1914. In the later years of the war no chance 
of a total victory in the west was at hand. Neither Falkenhayn's battle 
aimed at bleeding [France] white at Verdun nor the breakthrough attempt 
of 1918, undertaken with insufficient forces, were suitable to 
overthrowing the enemy or at least making him inclined toward peace.131 
The Imperial German Army - if at preposterous cost - showed itself the most 
efficient of the armies of the First World War in learning tactical lessons. It produced 
what is justifiably regarded today as a tactical revolution in military affairs, the 
combined armed assault by small parties of storm troops, the basis of modem infantry 
tactics.132 Why then did the military leadership fail so thoroughly in its attempt to 
realise a lesser change in the army's operational and strategic planning, a change that 
required new precepts, but not new methods, arms, or resources? The discrepancy 
between the flexibility of German tactical practice and the rigidity of German 
operational and strategic thought illustrates the extent to which tactically-centred 
perceptions of warfare dominated German military culture. If tactics is all that matters 
on the way to victory, and if it does not produce the desired outcome, then the 
131 Groener, 1935, BA-MA N46-51, p. 91. 
132 Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical 
Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, 1981), and, for the relevant 
regulations, Erich Ludendorff, Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 
1916/18 (Berlin, 1920), 641-72. 
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problem is clear and the need for change is undeniable. Failures of strategy, 
however, are far more difficult to identify, accept, explain, or remedy. If the focus and 
centre of attention is somewhere eise to begin with, as was the case with the German 
army, then mere acknowledgment that Gennan strategie and operational assumptions 
might be flawed could ahnost by définition never gain traction. Indeed, once 
Falkenhayn's gamble at Verdun failed, the continued primaey of traditional 
operational concepts, emphases, and drives was assured. The door was now open for 
Hindenburg's and Ludendorffs radical interprétation of German military culture: their 
boundless application of the principle of 'military necessity', their limited interest in 
strategie planning and even in opérations, and their unwavering faith in 'pure military 
, 133 
victory 
3. Endkampf 1918: radicalisation and heroic suicide 
As the war drew to an end and Germany's predicament mutated into a rapidly 
spiralling military disaster, the army leadership, unable to resolve the dissonance 
between its conception of war, the unimaginable efforts Germany had put into that 
war, and the looming - and resulting - total defeat, plunged into increasingly radical 
interprétations of reality, and of the options that reality left to the Gennan armed 
forces. The radical phase ended abruptly with Germany's 'shameful' collapse and 
surrender in November 1918. But that event and its impact on the hearts and minds of 
133 Hull, Absolute Destniction, pp. 291-292. For a discussion of Ludendorff s 
complete subjugation of strategy and Operations to tactical imperatives in Operation 
MICHAEL, March 1918, see Holger H. Herwig, The First World War. Germany and Austria-
Hungaiy 1914-1918 (London, 1997), Chapter 10; Ludendorff himself commented that 'I 
forbid the word "operation". We hack a hole in them. The rest will take care of itself [das 
Weitere findet sich]': Rupprecht, Kronprinz von Bayern, Mein Kriegstagebuch, ed. Eugen von 
Frauenholz (Munich, 1929), 2:372 note. For discussion of the high command's trust in 1918 
that a 'decisive' tactical victory would change the course of the entire war, see Hans Meier-
Welcker, 'Die deutsche Führung an der Westfront im Frühsommer 1918', Die Welt Als 
Geschichte!! (1961), pp. 165-168. 
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the military leadership shaped both German military thought and the emotional and 
theoretical climate in which it developed over the following twenty years. The radicai 
phase of 1917-18 heavily affected ali aspects of military thought and practice; aspects 
that shaped the boundaries and pattems of thought even more than the actual content 
of strategie and operational practices, as described in Chapters 2 and 3. The most 
salient 'lessons' the Prusso-German offìcer corps 'leamed' had to do with 'truths' 
about politi es and military strategy, tmths that emerged in 1918-1919: who is serving 
whom, what is the ultimate goal of war, and what are the indispensable characteristics 
required to achieve it? 
The issues surrounding the military and politicai conduct of war had a two-fold 
implication for the army's future world-view and assumptions: who was to determine 
the goals of war and thus, the limitations, if any, placed upon a given military effort, 
and whose interests - the army's or that of the civilian leadership - came first in time 
of war, when ali strategie décisions must allegedly lie in the hands of Germany's 
military leadership. Here as elsewhere the experience of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff 
high command, especially toward the end of the war, conveniently allowed the army 
to hold the stick from both ends. The army was to have the final word in every 
politicai matter in which it chose to intervene, but final responsibility for subséquent 
failure would fall upon the civilian echelon. The army in conséquence contemptuously 
rejected 'politics' — ali aspects of state-craft that the army leadership could not clearly 
define as 'strategie' or as affecting operational questions - and left it to the civilians. 
At the same time, the déniai of any possibility of a categorical split between 'politics' 
and military goals - since, conveniently, the army conceptualised military goals and 
requirements as 'national' ones - paved the way for the complete subjugation of 
'politics" to the requirements of 'military necessity\ That reasoning proved to be the 
foundation the army's post-1918 world-view, and dictated the army's future 
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expectations of the civilian echelon throughout the years to come. As Ludendorffs 
former western front opérations chief, Georg Wetzell, retrospectively explained: 
The Reich govemment indeed had the Kaiser confîrm in spring [19] 18 
that it bore sole responsibility for politicai leadership! General 
Ludendorff had [thus] consciously imposed on himself the greatest 
reserve in politicai matters vis-à-vis the Reich govemment. From the 
turn of the year [19] 17/18 onward he was in any case absorbed in the 
military préparation of the western offensive to such an extent that the 
politicai aspects could only play a secondary role!134 
That hierarchy also corresponded perfectly to the fact that the civil authority 
itself, be it Kaiser, civilian govemment, or the veiy sovereignty of Germany they 
embodied, were in the eyes of the officer corps expendable in the effort to observe and 
preserve the army's institutional values, as clearly demonstrated in the army's late 
1918 suggestion of a death-ride by the Kaiser and a final annihilational national 
Endkampf. The 'final battle' was to take place after a few weeks of armistice, and 
involved desperate defensive fighting and a scorched-earth retreat that would destroy 
northern France, Belgium, and possibly Germany itself. Germany would thus force its 
enemy to offer an 'honourable peace' or - in the not unlikely event of defeat - would 
secure the 'honourable ending' offered by a final act of uncontrolled destruction and 
134 Generalmajor Wetzell, 'Stellungnahme zu dem Entwurf einer Resolution des 4. 
Untersuchungsausschusses über die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 
1918', undated, BA-MA, RH61-134. For the most radical (and obsessive) expression of the 
domination of war over politics see Erich Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik (Berlin, 
1922), and Der totale Krieg (Munich, 1935); for analysis, Roger Chickering, 'Sore Loser. 
Ludendorffs Total War', in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., The Shadows of Total 
War: Europe, EastAsia and the United States, 1919-1939 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 161-163. 
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self-destruction.135 As a subordinate, recalling a conversation with Ludendorff at 
the end of September 1918, described it: 
. . . deeply shaken, I directed to him the question, 'Excellency, if, as we 
must expect, unbearable [peace] conditions are imposed upon us, might 
your Excellency then hope along with me that a furor teutonicus like that I 
saw in August 1914 would be unleashed throughout the land, and would 
allow us to fight on even into utter destruction [bis zum Untergänge]!' His 
eyes blazed and he answered steadfastly and confidently, 'I count on this, 
and most certainly [ganz bestimmt] hope for it!'136 
The death-ride project, suggested by members of the general staff in October-
November 1918, involved a suicidai charge by the monarch and entourage into Allied 
135 Hull, Absolute Destinction, pp. 309-320, and 'End of the Monarchy', pp. 250-252. 
For civilian projects for an Endkampf that called for an all-out 'people's war' in September-
October 1918, see Michel Geyer, 'Insurrectionary Warfare, p. 488. For a different analysis of 
the officer corps' perceptions of and commitment to the Kaiser see Johannes Hürter, Hitlers 
Heerführer. Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941-42. 
(Munich, 2006), pp. 60-61. In examining the 'ethos and politics' of a group of young officers 
who later became the leaders of Hitler's eastem armies, Hürter accepts at face value 
declarations such as Erich von Manstein's fond evocation of £de[r] Begriff des "Königlichen 
Dienstes'". But that interpretation fails to explain the gap between the declared value of total 
loyalty to the Kaiser and actual behaviour - the project of 'expending' the Kaiser in a death 
ride, as an example to the German people. Hürter later links the centrality of the civil-military 
leader, as previously embodied in loyalty to the Kaiser, to the persistent Cooperation and 
personal loyalty of the officer corps to Hitler. 
Alan Krämer offers an altogether different analysis, and a critique of Hull's thesis that 
German destructiveness stands out; he Claims that Germany was not unique in treating 
soldiers and civilians alike as expendable during the First World War (Alan Krämer, Dynamic 
of Destinction. Culture and Mass Itilling in the First World War [Oxford, 2007], pp. 114-158). 
However, Kramer's methodology, which for instance leads him to compare German actions 
favourably with the efforts of the Turkish authorities to exterminate the Armenian minority, is 
flawed. Kramer fails to take into account the very different levels of socio-economic 
development of the two societies (German atrocities were committed by a modern, Western, 
and supposedly civilised nation-in-arms, not a despotic Middle Eastern empire, and thus 
demonstrate German uniqueness among modern states), to confront the German advisory role 
in the Armenian genocide (which Hull explores in detail), and above all to recognise that the 
most unique feature of German Performance in 1914-18 was se/^destruction; in terms of self-
destructive spirit, planning, and dedication, no other national entity in Europe approached 
Germany's Performance in the first half of the twentieth Century. 
136 Emst von Eisenhart Rothe, Im Banne der Persönlichkeit. Aus den 
Lebenserinnerungen des Generals der Infanterie a.D. E. v. Eisenhart Rothe (Berlin, 1931), 
pp. 122-123; the author dates the conversation to 29 September 1918. 
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artillery and machine-gun fire - an outcome that would offer an inspiring example 
to the German troops and public and would rid Germany of its Kaiser without the 
need for an embarrassing abdication process.137 That concept was the ultimate 
expression of the extremes of which Gemían military culture was capable: self-
annihilation if annihilation of the enemy proved impossible; the belief that a final 
sacrificial gesture would break Germany's run of defeat - victory or death. But the 
death-ride idea also demonstrated the army's basic assumption regarding who was 
serving whom: the Kaiser - the symbol of Gemían sovereignty - was to sacrifice 
himself on behalf of military values, and not the other way around. 
Both the notion of Endkampf and of the Kaiser's death-ride thus illustrate the 
Imperial German Army's conceptual framework in the final months of the war; 
pressed to the wall, the officer corps expressed with mthless clarity its fundamental 
beliefs and hiérarchies of values. Nothing was more important than upholding military 
honour, which the army equated with national honour, even if that entailed destroying 
the German people and state in a scorched-earth battle of national suicide, or 
sacrificing Germany's monarch, its symbol of sovereignty - or ali three. Those 
convictions evolved further in the future; although circumstances had prevented its 
réalisation, the concept of Endkampf and other initiatives bom from the desperation 
and radicalisation of the final phases of the war and from the imperative to salvage 
German honour 'profoundly changed the German military's outlook on war and 
warfare . . . [and] opened new horizons'.138 
137 Hull, 'End of the Monarchy, pp. 253-258. 
138 Geyer, 'Insurrectionary Warfare', p. 488. 
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Conclusion 
New horizons indeed soon presented themselves. But other assumptions regarding war 
- the reasons for Germany's failure in the World War, and the salient factor that must 
be carefully nurtured to prevent similar future failures - were not new at ail. That 
factor conveniently served both as explanation of military disaster while relieving the 
army of any responsibility, and offered the promise of future success: German Geist. 
The spirit of the people ought to transcend and compensate for any and ali inferiorities 
in matériel; for as Germany's situation deteriorated its military leadership's faith in 
the omnipotent power of Geist had grown: 
Even in 1918 the German army high command believed that it could 
bring to bear the German spiritual superiority [geistige Überlegenheit] of 
the instrument entrusted to i t . . . The high command counterposed the 
rigid, artificially organised materiel-breakthrough-attack of the enemy to 
the attack of German troops and leaders thinking and acting on their 
own initiative, in other words: with Geist over materiell139 
Alongside operational perceptions and practices developed before and during the 
First World War, the state of mind of Germany's military leadership in the final, 
extreme phases of the war, a state of mind that revealed the most fundamental 
assumptions of the officer corps regarding strategy, warfighting, and war aims, had 
eventually stripped Germany's military machine of any goals or motivations but the 
will to fìght to the end. That proved a powerful and enduring legacy to German 
interwar military thought. 
Accepted wisdom quite naturally assumes that the experience of the World 
War provided the mental framework that henceforth determined the German army's 
139 Wetzeil, 'Stellungnahme', BA-MA, RH61-134 (emphasis in originai). 
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conduci, its assumptions about internal politics, international affairs, économies, 
military power, effective doctrine, effective operational concepts, optimum force 
structures and all other facets of theory and conduci within the scope of interest of 
military organisations.140 The assumption that the war had deep and comprehensive 
effeets is of course correct. Yet a more useful question regarding the effeets of the 
World War on the German army would be to ask what kind of 'lessons1 did the army 
draw from the war in the light of what its leaders held to be the 'truth ' about the war 
and its aftermath? How did the army explain to itself the events and outeomes of the 
war, and how did those perceptions lead to conceptual change, if indeed change took 
place? 
140 See for example Deist's assertion that 'For the Reichswehr, the First World War 
and its results, the treaty of Versailles, were the points of reference for all actions and 
planning': Deist, 'Reichswehr1, p. 375. 
Chapter 2 
The 1920s: The road most travelled 
In the turbulent and even chaotic reality that surrounded the Reichswehr immediately 
after the end of the war, powerful self-deception inflicted daunting difficulties on its 
leadership. The alternative, imagined history it told itself, the politicians, and the 
German nation about the reasons for its defeat, and the unbridgeable discrepancy 
between its self-perception and the Treaty "dwarf-army" that it had become, hampered 
and ultimately prevented effective analysis of the errors that had produced the disaster 
of the World War. At the same time Germany's mounting security problems called for 
rapid response. The amiy was required to produce the best answer it could to 
unknown challenges while suffering from unprecedented weakness. Unsettled eras 
and tectonic transitions often force organisations to transform their cultural nouns, 
abandoning assumptions that have become irrelevant and patterns rendered obsolete 
by new realities.1 Nevertheless, the Reichswehr''s attempts to address the new 
challenges it faced indicated a strong persistence of the army's traditional ways of 
thinking, despite their incompatibility both with external realities and with the army's 
conscious and reflective efforts to amend and renew its organisational framework and 
doctrine. 
The very raison d'être of the Reichswehr was put to the test in the post-
Versailles years. Could the German armed forces find ways to defend Germany? What 
had caused failure in the World War - and should therefore be avoided or changed? 
] Swidler, 'Culture in Action', pp. 278-284. 
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Contrary to previous analyses, the strategic and military solutions debated in 
Germany throughout the 1920s suggest that very little had changed in the army's 
operational thinking, in its self-perception, in its basic goals, and in its perceived role. 
They all earned the unmistakable trademarks of the Imperial German Army: the 
traditional, simplistic set of assumptions regarding the nature of Germany's security 
challenges, and the 'proven', 'effective', and 'pragmatic' ways to tackle them. 
Tragically, the Reichswehr's unchanged organisational response to new realities was 
veiled by its best intentions of renewal and regeneration; so deeply embedded was this 
self-deception that some of the contending groups are still described as nothing less 
than 'revisionists'.2 
Three allegedly distinct perceptions of war emerged within military circles 
during the 1920s.3 One evolved around the Reich defence minister, Wilhelm 
Groener;4 another around Joachim von Stiilpnagel, chief of the operations department 
(Tl) of the camouflaged general staff or Truppenamt,5 and a third, probably the most 
popular and widely accepted among the members of the officer corps, centred on the 
first chief of the Tmppenamt (army chief of staff) and commander-in-chief of the 
army (Chef der Heeresleitung) Hans von Seeclct.6 All three strove to alter Germany's 
strategic position radically, and ultimately offered a military path as the only viable 
2 Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 76-97. 
3 Ibid., p. 228. Geyer identifies them as tliree successive trends of thought; see also 
Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler 's High Command (Lawrence, 2000), pp. 14-15. 
4 See Johannes Hürter, Wilhelm Groener, Reichswehrminister am Ende der Weimarer 
Republik 1928-1932 (Munich 1993), and Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinneningen, Jagend, 
Generalstab, Welthieg (Göttingen, 1957). 
5 Wilhelm Deist, 'The Rearmament of the Wehrmacht: the Reichswehr and National 
Defence', Germany and the Second World War, vol. 1 (Oxford, New York, 1990), p. 377. For 
the strueture of the German High Command 1920-1935 see Megargee, High Command, p. 4. 
6 Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Friedrich von Rabenau, 
Hans von Seeckt. Aus seinem Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig, 1941); and Hans von Seeckt, 
Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin, 1929). 
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way for Germany to recover from its humiliating defeat. All tried to answer the 
same alleged threats: a weak, disarmed Germany, exposed and vulnerable to a Polish 
or Franco-Polish attack.7 All three ranged within a shared terrain of strategie logie and 
assumptions. And all three, despite what might seem radically différent and even 
antithetical operational reasoning, ultimately abided by the rooted tendencies long 
displayed, and tested to destruction in 1914—18, by the Imperial German Anny. 
These included the perception of war as the only way to solve politicai 
Problems and to maintain or elevate national prestige; a deterministic approach to 
future scénarios; a strategie short-sightedness that imposed upon ail décisions an 
operational and tactical rather than strategie fraine of thought, and that pitilessly 
subordinated all facets of civilian life to 'military necessity'; extreme risk-taking 
coupled with the concentration of ail forces on a single decisive effort, an approach 
incamated in the long-held ideal of the battle of annihilation; and a willingness to 
sacrifice everything, including the very goverament that they served, for the sake of 
an 'honourable' - if potentially suicidai - outeome.8 Above ali, the three military 
figures discussed demonstrated a shared, rooted and even conscious pattern of 
detachment from reality, in their assessments of military capabilities, in their strategie 
and operational planning, and in their projection of future politicai and strategie 
possibili ties. 
The conscious efforts of Groener, Seeckt, and Stiilpnagel to break with 
traditional patterns - for all declared these patterns irrelevant to Germany's current 
predicament - thus bore little fruit. The three approaches discussed in this chapter 
7 This analysis of security threats indicates, more than anything else, the state of mind 
of its authors. A hostile France, so the Germans assumed, would always fall back on military 
methods, since diplomatie and politicai means - the Versailles 'Diktat' - could not 
conceivably satisfy its allegedly rapacious goals. 
8 For these characteristics of the Wilhelmine army see Hull, Military Culture, pp. 257-
258. 
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demonstrate the pervasive effect and uncanny longevity of German military 
organisational cultui'e. Ail three were seemingly radically différent from one other and 
brilliantly groundbreaking. But underneath the modem, revolutionary wording and 
intentions lay the operational logie, imperatives, and values of the 'old army\ The 
planners and thinkers of the Reichswehr thus proved unable to distance themselves 
from the pattems they had inherited, and were strikingly unaware of their failure -
remaining convinced that they were engaged in a successful effort to reshape, and for 
some, to revolutionise, the army's intellectual and doctrinal framework. 
The three military visions this chapter offers are not discussed in their order of 
appearance in the 1920s, but rather in reverse order: first Groener, allegedly the 
thinker who represents the greatest challenge to any claims of continuity and rigidity; 
then Stülpnagel, a supposedly uniquely radical practitioner; and finally Seeckt, who is 
considered by scholars as a traditionalist, and is discussed here as the officer who 
dominated the refounded army's thought and conduct, and shared in its most basic 
cultural characteristics. That order of présentation corresponds to the cognitive 
évolution of German military thought: not a linear one of 'sédimentation1 or 
'incrementai' évolution, in which every step necessarily sprang from a previous, less-
developed theoretical foundation, but a 'branching' évolution, in which the three 
theories, although naturally influenced and to some extent triggered by each other, ail 
sprang independently and directly from the same body of knowledge and set of shared 
assumptions, as responses to differing perceptions of reality and of its requirements. 
This chapter will examine the salient ideas of the three schools through 
studies, officiai documents and military manuals. Among the parameters discussed 
will be the perception of the desired relations between politics and strategy, as 
expressed directly and indirectly through operational proposais; the reasoning about 
and understanding of past failures and successes; and the operational and strategie 
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lessons drawn from these experiences. The discussion will also include an 
examination of the three schools' analyses of Germany's current threats and of 
possible or appropriate ways of facing them; the shape of the future army they 
advocated, and of its possible tasks; and other ideas that reveal unspoken assumptions 
and adherence to, or breaks with, inherited operational patterns. 
I. Wilhelm Groener 
Wilhelm Groener served as the First Quartermaster General (deputy chief of the 
general staff) from October 1918 to September 1919, transport minister from 1920 to 
1923, and defence minister from 1928 to 1932. Groener's ideas, plans and concepts as 
defence minister have singled him out in the eyes of scholars as a 'strategist', a 
moderate and sober military planner. He is often described as the leader in a 
pioneering leaming process within the army that subordinated strategy (and thus 
operational planning) to politicai requirements.9 Scholars have gone so far as to 
identify a "circle' that shared his views, usually linking him with Schleicher10 and the 
9 Megargee, High Command, pp. 12-16; Murray, German Militaiy Effect iveness, pp. 
1-38; Wilhelm Deist, 'Rearmament of the Wehrmacht', pp. 375-404; idem, 'The Road to 
Ideological War: Germany 1918-1945' in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin 
Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy (Cambridge, 1994) pp. 352-392; idem, '"Blitzkrieg" 
or Total War? War Preparations in Nazi Germany' in Chickering and Förster, eds., Skadows 
of Total War, pp. 271-284; Michael Geyer, 'German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare 
1914-1945', in Paret, ed., Mähers of Modein Strategy, pp. 527-579; idem, 'The Dynamics of 
Military Revisionism in the Interwar Years. Military Politics between Rearmament and 
Diplomacy' in Deist, ed., The German Militaiy in the Age of Total War, pp. 100-151; idem, 
Auflistung oder Sicherheit, pp. 76-112, 189-228. See also Games Post, The Civil-Militaiy 
Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1973), and Harold J. Gordon, The Reichswehr 
and the German Republic, 1919-1926 (Princeton 1957). 
10 Groener was Schleicher's patron and personal friend; the two had shared interests, if 
not always world-views, until the rift in their relationship in November 1932. For their 
correspondence, see BA-MA N46-145. 
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Ministeraml, the Reichswehr's political office.11 As defence minister, Groener 
strove for international agreement over arms control as means of circumventing 
Germany's security quandary, and of achieving a new comprehensive military-
political design based on the stabilisation of Em-ope. He stressed that strategy served 
politics, and placed economic factors at the core of strategic planning.12 Such views 
were indeed foreign to German military traditions, and were thus understandably 
branded as new and even revolutionary. 
Nevertheless, a realistic assessment of the influence that Groener's allegedly 
ground-breaking concepts had on interwar German military perceptions and conduct 
should clarify a number of fundamental issues. The first is the precise nature of 
Groener's military vision and objectives before he became a member of the 
government, that is, before his primarily civilian duties redefined his frame of thought; 
the second is the nature and extent of his influence over military thinking and planning 
within the army during his tenure as defence minister. A sober look at Groener's 
prolific writings reveals his thoroughgoing concurrence with traditional notions. And 
careful analysis of the studies, plans, and doctrinal documents produced within the 
army during his tenure reveals how very few of them seem to bear his (and 
Schleicher's) fingerprints. There is therefore room to doubt not only the novelty of his 
ideas but also their overall effect on the development of military thought in the 
Reichswehr in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
n The Reichswehr's political office was not part of the general staff, which adds to the 
difficulty of assessing the extent to which the majority of general staff officers shared or 
supported any of the views Groener sought to promote. 
12 Geyer, 'Dynamics of Military Revisionism', pp. 104-116, and 'German Strategy', 
pp. 560-565. 
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1. Groener the Soldier: 1919-1928 
A natural departure point for any discussion on Groener's military Weltanschauung is 
his understanding and explanation of the army's defeat in the First World War - a 
defeat that placed in question the army's self-image and réputation. His reasoning is 
particularly revealing since it exposes the beliefs, assumptions, and frameworks that 
determined the core of his future strategy and provided the guidelines for ensuring that 
Germany's past mistakes would not be repeated. Groener wrote extensively about the 
war and was a self-declared 'enthusiastic supporter of the teachings of Count 
Schlieffen',13 of whom he wrote unguardedly that 'When you read Schlieffen's 1905 
Denkschrift, it is enough to make you cry out of rage and shame over our stupidity in 
1914. If the leadership had not memorised it, they needed only to have put this 
breviary for victory in their pocket and then pull it out! ' 14 
13 Groener, "Die Entwicklung des Operativen Gedankens im Zweifrontenkrieg von 
1871 bis 1914', October 1919, BA-MA N46/41, translated and quoted in Terence Zuber, 
German War Planning, 1891-1914, Sources and Interprétations, (Woodbridge, Rochester 
2004) pp. 246-257. In this otherwise usefül resource book, Zuber postulâtes the existence of a 
large-scale conspiracy of high-ranking officers from the 'Schlieffen school' committed to 
altering and distorting the history of the war. Their efforts were supposedly two-fold: to prove 
their teacher and his alleged Plan right, and to make sure that his name would not be linked 
with offensive failure in France. The shared cultural assumptions of the entire army elite make 
Zuber's exercise redundant. No 'Schlieffen school' could have existed - for no other 'school' 
competed with its widely held operational views. Most criticai voices in the army attacked not 
Schlieffen's operational rationale, but rather the manner in which it had been implemented -
not because they were trying to hide some shameful secret, but because they truly believed in 
the principles that the plan had expressed. Furthermore, Groener could have simply avoid 
referring to the matter altogether, as he successfully did with regard to his role in the 
abdication of the Kaiser; see for instance his letter to Stülpnagel from November 1925, 
explaining the events of 29-30 October 1918 and suggesting: 'It would now be best if 
humanity could finally put its mind to rest over all these past matters, and leave them to future 
historical specialists [zünftigen Geschichtsforschern].' BA-MA N46-79. The factthat Groener 
dedicated most of his studies and writings after the war to the Plan suggests that he believed in 
its value, as part of his overall military world-view. For more on Zuber, see Chapter 1, note 
117. 
14 Quoted in Zuber, War Planning, p. 253. 
77 
Groener was personally linked to the 1914 warplan and was among those 
responsible for its execution.13 As the head of the Rail Section in the General Staff in 
1914 he possessed detailed knowledge of the Schlieffen plan and a vast understanding 
of its operational concept. According to Groener's own testimony, his unitplayed an 
important rôle in planning 'rail opérations' 16 Moreover, the fact that Groener - highly 
articulate and always happy to explain the logie of his thinking - felt no need to 
explain Schlieffen's operational thought in his studies indicates that he assumed the 
essence of the Plan to be well known to his readers. 
Groener had, of course, many personal reasons to present himself as a loyal 
follower of Schlieffen, and overriding professional ones, shared throughout the offîcer 
coips, for shielding the army from blâme and responsibility for the catastrophe that it 
had inflicted on Germany.17 However, regardless of whether he might have gained 
politicai advantage by presenting the war as a huge déviation from Schlieffen's plan, 
Groener was clearly a true believer in the military value of the Plan, and in the 
strategie and operational rationale that it embodied. He was devoted to the offîcer 
corps, to the values for which it stood, and to their préservation. And he was adamant 
on the need to serve and maintain them.18 As he elaborated in his memoirs, he spared 
no effort during the summer of 1919 to prevent the destruction of the power and 
15 Groener was also familiar with the Planes earlier versions (1905, 1912); see for 
instance BA-MA N46-40 and BA-MA N46-50. Zuber's claim in German War Planning that 
Groener's understanding of the actual plan and of its concept was weak is therefore 
questionable. 
16 Ibid., p. 253. 
17 Groener, as First Quartemiaster General, was the de facto head of the German army 
in October 1918; he played a decisive role both in the Kaiser's abdication and in the army's 
attempts to maintain its political position within the new regime. 
18 In a meeting in January 1919 on ways that the officer corps might \ . . commit its 
entire energy . .. to building up army and Fatherland anew', Groener told Stülpnagel 'If they 
take my epaulettes away, I shall depart - and retum, in another uniform entirely, after the 
[constituent] National Assembly': Heinz Hürten, ed., Zwischen Revolution undKapp-Putsch 
(Düsseldorf, 1977), p. 48. 
78 
valúes of the Generalstab: 'The most important point of all was that the spirií 
[Geist] that had dominated it, and the work that it had accomplished, should be 
preserved'.19 
Groener never abandoned basic Wilhelmine operational logic ñor the view that 
the officer corps stood above political restraints and at the centre of political decisión-
making." It was Groener who attempted to establish teams of 'mobile war 
commissars' of low- and mid-ranking officers to supervise crisis management and to 
function as district commissars for 'the civilian population', who, especially among 
the young, had experienced a 'reawakening of military spirit and soldierly sentiment', 
as well as for the purpose of 'practical exercise'.21 Typically, Groener was never able 
to acknowledge the evident shortcomings of these notions.22 
For all his later careful conjunction of strategy with political considerations, 
even Groener absentmindedly confused this supposedly equal relationship when 
analysing the World War. In an attempt to defend his great teacher's operational 
decisions he challenged the assumptions of a critical study of the Plan, submitted to 
himin 1919: 
'what intent is the Denkschrift pursuing? Is it merely to establish the cold 
historical basis of how the operational concept developed, or should it 
19 Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 516. 
20 In that spirit, he took the liberty of urging Ebert - in a memorandum of January 
1919 - that the opportunity 'to realize the German vision of a powerful Reich with a strong 
central authority embracing all the German tribes, of a sort that had not existed since 
Charlemagne, must under all circumstances be exploited. The German [constituent] National 
Assembly must in this regard compel the individual federal states to do its will' (Groener to 
Ebert, 27 January 1919, in Hürten, Zwischen Revolution und Kapp-Putsch, p. 53). 
21 Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 516. 
22 In his bid to explain what went so horribly wrong in 1914, Groener warned that 'due 
to lack of healthy scepticism in the Oberste Heeresleitung, self-deception crept even more 
easily into their heads and increased the danger [of ablurred operational concept]' (quoted in 
Zuber, War Planning, p. 247). But Groener himselfwas unable to show much scepticism 
when examining truths so transparently obvious. 
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demonstrate the military necessity of marching through Belgium as the 
prerequisite for victory in a two-front war? . . . After . . [the] Chancellor 
failed here, the most important thing was solely to break the ring that has 
been created politically through military means, at a time that was the 
most favourable for us . . ,23 
As for the corrélation between politicai ends and military means, even more 
revealing is Groener's comment on the assumption that Moltke the younger had 
altered Schlieffen's planning, since he had thought that the plan was suitable only for 
a one-front war: 'The politicai situation could have been anything you like: there was 
no other way to conduci the offensive against France and Britain than the one 
recommended by Schlieffen'.24 To the suggestion that the politicai situation had 
become more dangerous and thus less accommodating to Schlieffen's bold strategy he 
replied impatiently that 'it was therefore even more necessary to remain true to the 
operational concept on which the offensive in the west was based . . ,'25 Groener thus 
stili adhered not only to Schlieffen's operational teachings but also to his - and the 
German army's - tendency toward bold decisive gambles justified as 'the only way' 
to fight a successful war. 
Groener's view of the true relationship and hierarchy of politics and strategy 
was manifested in his comment on the concept of the surprise attack on Liège 
executed in August 1914: 
23 Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, pp. 248-249. Groener also explained here why 
Moltke's initial intention, to attack in the east and defend in the west, was mistaken. A rapid 
French mobilisation and deployment, facilitated by the French rail net, and the possibility of a 
prolonged campaign in the east with serious politicai conséquences, ruled that contingency 
out. 
24 Ibid, p. 254. 
25 Ibid., p. 255. 
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Politically, this plan had serious conséquences. The coup de main had to be 
conducted at once during the first days [of mobilisation], the wound-up 
clock had to run smoothly. The statesman was shoved aside precisely in 
the days in which policies in the Bismarckian sense would have been in 
the position to push the responsibility for the déclaration of war and being 
the first to enter Belgian terrain onto the enemy. Entering Holland 
according to Schlieffen's plan left time for the diplomatie prelude to the 
war. However, Bethmann, Jagow and co. would not have been able to pull 
it off.26 
And in response to the idea that by merely waiting, Germany might have induced 
France, who was under pressure from its Russian ally, to attack first: 'by this line of 
reasoning, because we took the militaiy initiative in 1914, we could be held 
responsible for causing the war ' " 
The relationship between strategy (opérations would be the more appropriate 
term here) and politics depicted by Groener is clear: operational demands detennine 
ali else. Schlieffen had allegedly been wise enough to ease the diplomatie task, since, 
according to Groener, the violation of Holland's neutrality was not as grave a politicai 
mistake as violating Belgium's, presumably due to absence of a treaty of guarantee 
that Britain had signed. Ail in ail, Groener assumed that Gennan diplomacy had to 
find ways to serve military demands, and not vice versa. His second remark indicates 
that he could not possibly have understood that 'taking the military initiative' at the 
expense of any of Germany's neutral neighbours would have meant - and in 1914 did 
indeed m e a n - instant responsibility for 'causing the war5 
26 Ibid., p. 256. 
27 Ibid., p. 251. 
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His comment also corresponded to a traditionally distorted and one-
dimensional understanding of Germany's overall interests, seen solely through the 
lens of military necessity with tautological reasoning as the inevitable result. In that 
respect, another of Groener's comments from a later study, arguing that 'Schlieffen's 
plan was the summit of the military art and the most brilliant policy [höchsten 
Kriegskunst und klarste Politik] ' was most revealing, as was his insistence that the 
alleged fact that 'the plan only achieved implementation in weakened form was the 
greatest political error ever committed'.28 It suggests that Groener, like many other 
German officers, naturally attributed the ultimate responsibility for both the 'art of 
war' and 'politics' to one man: the supreme commander of the army. Embedded in 
Groener5s mind was the assumption that the 'art of war' was superior to 'polities ', that 
it overrode political limitations and swept aside diplomatic manoeuvring.29 Groener 
thus smugly reinforced the army's self-imposed misunderstanding that its own 1914— 
18 mistakes had been made by others — 'Bethmann, Jagow and co. '.30 The hidden 
lesson, logically, was that only by leaving politics to army leaders of genius, in 
accordance with Prusso-German tradition, could Germany achieve victory in its next 
28 Groener, 'Politik und Kriegführung', W10/50125. 
29 Groener's studies of the Great War are imbued with this assumption; he repeatedly 
stressed that Schlieffen's plan was politically wise, since it promised a swift annihilation of 
the French army and thus a speedy end to the war - a political goal that ostensibly overrode 
the political disadvantages of breaching Belgian neutrality and of provoking British 
intervention (see for instance BA-MA N46-40). 
30 Zuber, War Planning, p. 248. 
31 In 'Politik und Kriegführung' (W10/50125), Groener examined figures whom in his 
view embodied both politician and military leader: Frederick the Great, Napoleon and, of 
course, Schlieffen. 
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The same insistence on the primacy of military considérations even surfaced 
when Groener absentmindedly admitted that the pian had in fact been politically 
unwise: 
In the situation actually created by the politicai encirclement of Germany, 
no [merely] politicai operational plan would have served. Time was up 
[for any such solution], [and] in war no supreme commander [Feldherr] 
could seek anything other than to break the ring unhesitatingly at an 
appropriate point, that is, in the west, with an exceedingly powerful 
[;übermässig] offensive.32 
As late as 1927 Groener was thus Willing to push politicai limitations aside when time 
was of the essence; the nine years during which the Schlieffen plan served as the 
army's preferred war plan seemed to have provided insufficient time for producing a 
1politischen Operationsplan ' 
Groener also never abandoned the operational formula of a single decisive 
battle as the sole key to victory, however risky the gamble such a course might entail. 
He consistently claimed that the only way to end the World War was by achieving 
'full' victory in 1914; the alternative concepts employed later, be it attrition at Verdun 
or breakthrough in 1918, could not promise the overwhelming results of Schlieffen's 
purportedly infallible decisive battle of annihilation.33 In his comments from 1919 on 
Waldersee's pre-war suggestion of a preliminary short offensive in the east he wrote: 
'As an operational concept, isn't this a half-measure?'34 The only full or genuinely 
effective measure must naturally be the annihilation of the French army, the sole 
operational outcome that could determine the war's course. He stressed that 'A great 
32 A study from 1927: BA-MA N46-80. 
33 BA-MA N46-51, pp. 88-91. 
34 Ibid., p. 250. 
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victoiy [would be achieved] only through a veiy strong right wing'.35 In a display of 
impatience he dismissed the asswnption that Moltke the Younger did not intend to 
achieve 'complete destruction' but 'the most complete victory as possible . . . in order 
to gain some breathing space', with a short-tempered remark: 'This appears to me to 
be a too far-reaching assumption. What do you cali "the most complete victory as 
possible"? An "ordinary" victory, one that sacrifices the decisive effect of the 
operational concept?'36 
In an extensive study apparently drafted in 1927—28, Groener unquestioningly 
presented the decisive battle as the only possible operational goal. But since lie 
deemed it currently unattainable, Germany should abstain from war until it would be 
able to use such methods again.37 Even his writings about future war from late 1928 
onward, after he had become defence minister, reveal that his trust in tanks and 
modem technology stemmed from their supposed virtues in achieving the axiomatic 
early decisive battle.38 Groener1 s unpublished notes elaborate his claim that modem 
technology immensely increased numbers, formations, and armaments, thus making 
concentric movement leading to annihilation possible once more.39 
Groener's immediate post-war writings also made clear that the World War 
had strengthened not merely his military convictions but also an underlying world-
view widely shared in German military - and civilian - circles: Tacifism is without a 
doubt [just] such a sterile belief [unfruchtbarer Gedanke], for it goes against the 
35 Ibid., p. 254. 
36 Ibid., p. 254. 
37 'Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft für die Strategie', in Dorothea Fensch and 
Olaf Groehler, 'Imperialistische Ökonomie und militärische Strategie. Eine Denkschrift 
Wilhelm Groeners', Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 19:3 (1971), pp. 1171-1172. 
38 BA-MA N46-148, 73, pp. 54-56. 
39 BA-MA N46-73, p. 46. 
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nature of the life-proeess. Only Kampf is eternai',40 he wrote in 1919. Germany's 
task was therefore clear: 'I saw our foremost task as immediate engagement in battle 
against the Treaty of Versailles'.41 Since Germany was stripped of its military assets 
and could not fight the Treaty by force, the means to bring the change must be 
diplomatie, the use or abuse of the League of Nations. Restoring Germany 's military 
might was so essential that Groener stressed it several times in a major memorandum 
of August 1919: 'We must pursue only on e task, energetically, tenaciously, and with 
ali [conceivable] means: the revision of the Versailles settlement'.42 Throughout the 
decade that followed, Groener devoted himself to that mission. What made him 
différent fìrom others dedicated to the same goal was his ever-growing willingness to 
leave much of the task in the hands of diplomats using peaceful legai measures. 
Ultimately, according to Groener, déviation from Schlieffen's planning had 
brought about the criticai failure of 1914. Yet he also realised that a différent 
malfiinction had made ultimate disaster certain, and, conveniently enough, that failure 
was not within the army's area of responsibility: economic planning and mobilisation. 
Unlike his stubborn adherence to traditional operational concepts, in this case he 
recognised the necessity for change. In his study of 'strategie implications of the 
modem economy' of 1927-28, Groener elaborated his analysis of Germany's strategie 
possibilities in light of its economic shorteomings and of modem économies.43 He 
stressed the indispensability of an economically defined conduct of war; for Germany 
in particular it was a prerequisite for success. It was the Stellungskrieg that had 
doomed Germany in the World War: economic weakness required speedy victory. 
40 Groener, Lebens eri nnerungen, pp. 517-18. 
41 Ibid., p. 517. Groener is referring here to the summer of 1919. 
42 Ibid., p. 517-518 (emphasis in originai). 
43 'Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft', pp. 1170-1177; see also Groener's notes for 
this same article, BA-MA N46-73. 
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'Only movement leads to victory',44 since a war of movement was the only kind 
that would not exhaust Gennany's resources.45 In any case, Groener argued, Gennany 
must radically change its attitude toward economic preconditions, the key to future 
success. Only far-reaching economic préparations could sustain war, and a new war of 
attrition would require a mass army, advanced technology, and immense endurance on 
the part of civil society.46 According to Groener, the German leadership in 1914 had 
evidently ignored these imperatives, and had thus predetermined the war's outcome, 
despite Schlieffen's best intentions and awe-inspiring brilliance. 
A superficial reading of Groener's study would no doubt deem it an important 
contribution to Gennan military thought, a voice of reason expanding the scope of 
strategie considérations and thus, perhaps, introducing the German army to a more 
comprehensive and genuinely strategie approach toward military planning. But 
Groener, the officer who had allegedly departed most radically from the anny's 
established beliefs, proved unable to free himself from the chains of his own military 
culture. His persistent analysis of the purported trae cause of the failure in the World 
War; his suggestions as to what kind of war Germany should wage under its 
overwhelming post-1918 economic constraints; and his conclusions regarding the 
qualifies required if Gennany was to recover its position as the dominant European 
power all evidenced the same shorteomings and patterns that had plagued Gennan 
military thought throughout the previous two decades. 
Groener's fundamental assumption that Germany was economically incapable 
of fighting prolonged wars was not new to Gennan military planners, and had never 
before led them to prefer non-military solutions or to doubt the centrality of force. 
44 Handwritten study, not dated, BA-MA N46-44,46. 
45<Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft', p. 1174. 
46 Ibid., p. 1175. 
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Indeed, as Groener himself stressed, Schlieffen had understood the importance of 
economic considérations and, according to Groener, had built his entire strategy on 
accommodating their demands.47 Groener, however, went further by asserting that the 
connection between strategy and the economy went both ways: it both defined the 
shape of war and was defined by it. Germany's wars could therefore ne ver hinge 
around border questions alone; they must also express and maintain its position as an 
economic superpower. Economic warfare was as important as the clash of arms.48 
That might have been an important lesson for the Reichswehr to assimilate, 
especially in light of its operational and armaments planning from 1923 onward, 
which was and remained dangerously detached from strategie reality. However, the 
essential connections between strategy and économies that Groener drew from his 
analysis of the World War were surprisingly self-evident, superficial and banal, and 
did not manifest any deeper récognition of truths or implications as yet unknown to 
German military planners: the corrélation between strategy and économies had a 
hearing on war aims; modem mass armies required the reorganisation of production to 
facilitate war, in order to provide personnel and munitions, despite the ever-increasing 
difficulties that task imposed on the economy; armament and munitions production 
was especially burdensome; geography was an important factor, and so on.49 
47 See Chapter 1. It is interesting to note that Groener, faithful to Schlieffen's legaey, 
also used this opportunity to defend Schlieffen's operational departure from Moltke the 
elder's plans as a consequence of Schlieffen's respect for economic considerations. According 
to Groener, Moltke's plan for a defensive war in the west was unthinkable in a post-agrarian 
Germany, since the industrialized west could not be endangered by setting the 
Entscheidungsschlacht (decisive battle) there. Hidden within this ostensibly sensible Strategie 
rationale was yet another example of the primaey of 'decisive battle' to which virtually all 
German officers subscribed (ibid., p. 1173). 
48 Ibid., p. 1171. 
49 Ibid., pp. 1172-1175. See also his letter to Stülpnagel of February 1925, warning 
that war against England and the United States was destined to become yet another satanic 
Stellungskrieg because of their economic and technological power (BA-MA N46-42). 
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At the heart of Groener s strategie analysis stood his call for a strong 
economy that would be able to sustain a well-equipped anny capable of conducting 
massive and decisive opérations.50 The economic core was intrinsically connected to 
Groener's operational vision as well. In ternis of actnal operational planning Groener 
offered little in the way of new ideas. As did others who tried to portray the next war 
and define its requirements, he envisioned 'The weapons systems of siege warfare: 
gas, tanks, air forces'.51 Ail these, alongside improved artillery and mobilised infantry, 
would place a heavy bürden on production but, cmcially, would facilitate the return of 
operational movement. Decisiveness and movement would help to surprise the enemy 
and, to some degree, would compensate for inferior numbers.52 Modem anns - and 
the economic means to produce them - were therefore a prerequisite for victory. 
From the strategie and operational point of view, Groener did not expect 
Germany's next war to involve fundamental changes; but he stressed that the nation 
must be better prepared in terms of economic mobilisation. Since the economy had 
been, and still was, the principal impediment to a successful war effort, it should 
naturally be strengthened and taken into account in military planning far more 
systematically than hitherto. It goes without saying that traditional operational 
concepts were not the reason for failure, and therefore did not require major 
conceptual revision; a new, modem army would simply allow the fuller use of 
traditional concepts. Ludendorff would have no doubt agreed with Groener.53 But had 
Ludendorff only remembered, that self-evident truth had been known and tried (albeit 
50 'Decisive opérations' ('decisive' usually underlined) is a repeated idiom in 
Groener''s notes; see Groener in Zuber, War Planning, pp. 246-257. 
51 BA-MA, N46-73. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See Erich Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg (Munich, 1935), especially pp. 63-86. 
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too little and too late) before.54 The test of Groener as innovator is thus not how 
groundbreaking was his explanation, but whether he followed it vigorously enough to 
overcome the tendency - a sort of second nature - to suppress long-term economic 
demands in favour of perceived operational requirements and military 'necessities'. 
Groener examined his basic assumptions to their full, going so far as to 
speculate whether modem économies might be inherently connected with peace, due 
to the distortions and destruction inescapable in war. World politics might offer 
measures, such as disannament, security treaties, custom unions and so on, that could 
be instrumentai in preventing war. Yet in 1927-28, although economic interests and 
motivations were important for Groener, nothing was as decisive as his aspiration for 
war. Despite disarmamene security treaties, courts of arbitration, customs unions, and 
the League of Nations, he stressed that 'in that connection, alongside politicai 
conditions, géographie and economic ones [that] play a decisive rôle . . . efforts are 
ongoing to organize the peoples for war, and to integrate the economy into those 
efforts.'55 For the time being, Groener voiced the opinion that Gennany must achieve 
economic advantages through its conduci of war; for he had no doubt that Gennany 
could rise again only through war.56 That war must be, as he repeatedly stressed, a 
short war of movement, delivered by a well-equipped, well-anned mass anny. It 
should be based on a thoroughly reoriented, mobilised industry, and decided in an 
Entscheidungsschlacht - a point so self-evident that Groener referred to it only in 
passing. 
54 Only from 1917 onward did the OHL take full charge of economic mobilisation, and 
even then the Gennan economy never displayed the same level of organisation and 
mobilisation found in the Allied économies. See Gerald D. Feldman, Arrrty, Industiy, and 
Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1966), pp. 197-300,349-458. * 
55 Groener, 'Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft', pp. 1175-1176. 
56 And not the other way around, as Deist and others have argued (see for example, 
Deist, 'Dynamics', p. 112; Groener subordinated war to economic (and politicai) limitations 
and requirements only after he became defence minister. 
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It is therefore clear that if Groener was the voice of a new, sober, strategic-
economic policy, his studies from the years preceding his appointment as the 
Republic's defence minister did not reflect any such tendency. Although some of his 
later ideas do emerge in his early studies, his conclusions inevitably contradicted his 
careful strategie analysis, and reaffinned his continuity with Schlieffen's héritage. 
One factor exceeded all others in importance, but it was not the one Groener was 
trying so hard to point out: 
In particular the Gennan Volk requires [much time and patience] in order 
to travel the long and arduous road of politicai and economie resurgence. 
May it not forget along that road that despite material considérations and 
technology, spirit and the great moral values [der Geist und die 
moralischen Grössen] are the pre-eminent [elements in] the future of a 
people.57 
Groener's final conclusion was a tum back to old convictions of the primacy 
of the spirit and ofmoral greatness, which axiomatically took priority over economic 
imperatives and the operational plans deriving from them in detennining the outcome 
of Gennany's renewed bid for world power. Geist and morale, as far as Groener as a 
Gennan officer was concemed, were fundamentally Gennan traits. That conviction, 
deeply embedded in every military calculation of Schlieffen's followers, and shared 
by Groener, almost nullified his efforts to introduce greater attention to economic 
constraints into Gennan strategie planning. If ultimately the 'spirit', not économies, 
mattered most, then obviously it was the spirit, if fostered and wisely employed, that 
would prevail over economic limitations. Among the great moral qualifies required, 
Groener counted the talent of the Feldherren, the martial virtues of the forces, and the 
57 Groener, 'Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft', p. 1177 (my emphasis). 
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spìrit of the people. The more saíient they might be, he wrote, the more they would 
compensate for material weakness.58 
And vice versa, wamed Groener. For even the most modem technology and 
organizational measures at Germany 's disposai would be useless in the face of a lack 
of enthusiasm among the troops and people, or worse, under the devastating effect of 
pacifist sentiments. Germany should therefore make sure that 'since wars are not 
about to disappear from the politicai arsenal [.Rüstkammer], there is no alternative to 
awakening and reinforcing in [our] youth that Geist that means nothing other than 
burning love of the Fatherland [glühende Vaterlandsliebe]. [Even] in this age of 
material penury and of international economic interdependence, that element of 
strategy must not perish'.59 
Groener's writings of the early 1920s thus demónstrate the extent to which this 
purportedly most sober and realistic of German military planners nevertheless 
remained a product of Prusso-German military culture, unable to break out of the 
intangible, transparent boundaries that enclosed him and ali other leading officers, and 
prevented genuinely new ideas from challenging an outlook that radically distorted 
reality. Blinded by the 'wisdom' of the army's flawed hindsight, Groener portrayed 
the conditions of future war much as Schlieffen had envisioned them two decades 
before: a short, decisive war of movement planned and designed around economic 
needs and limitations. He elevated économies to a decisive factor yet not as decisive 
as the spirit, which could, and should, compensate for lack of materiel. Ultimately, the 
patience and endurance of civil society would determine the outeome.60 Groener did 
58 BA-MA N46-73. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See also the importance that Groener ascribed to 'kriegerische Geist', which tends 
to dwindle as war continues, allowing politicai and social antagonisms to break out once more 
(Hürter, Wilhelm Groener, pp. 22-24). 
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not dare draw the fundamental lesson of the World War - that under no 
circumstances could Gerrnany hope to achieve victory against an economically and 
industrially superior Western coalition. 
Groener indeed stressed the importance of conducting economic war, while 
taking into account the interlocking connections between économies and war, and the 
possible ramifications of economic imperatives on future warfare, including the key 
rôle in any future conflict of the economic preponderance of the United States.61 Yet 
the sum of all these lessons was to be integrated with 'the elements of strategy noted 
by Clausewitz - moral, physical, mathematical, géographie, and Statistical'.62 
Economic factors should be incorporated with, not dominate other factors. In 
assessing Groener's military, diplomatie and economic perceptions, it is impossible to 
ignore the fact that in the early 1920s, while still thinking as an officer rather than a 
civil servant, Groener did not yet conclude that war was no longer a viable proposition 
for Germany; rather his emphasis on economic constraints and the importance of 
economic variables brought him to insist on an economically well-planned total war: 
"Would it not have been better, instead of stumbling into war, to have prepared it in ail 
possible ways deliberately and stealthily [zielbewusst und schweigend]? In all areas: 
politically, militarily, and, not least, economically'.63 In 1923, even Groener could not 
avoid radicalising the rationalities and 'truths' of his military world-view. 
Only after he became defence minister did Groener gradually come to 
emphasise and express the goverament's — as opposed to the araiy's - outlook, 
61 Groener, 'Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft', pp. 1171, 1175-1176. 
62 Ibid., p. 1175. 
63 Groener, Weltbieg, quoted in Hürter, Wilhelm Groener, p. 23 note 109. 
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hierarchy of interests, and frame of mind.64 But if Groener's change of heart took 
place after he left the inner circle of military decision-makers, would ascribing to him 
a substantial level of influence on military theory and operational planning faithfully 
reflect the realties of Weimar's civil-military relationship, as well as the rationales and 
preferences of the mainstream of the officer coips? The process of aliénation from 
traditional military views that catalysed the final change in Groener's perceptions 
worked both ways, and naturally affected how the general staff received his ideas — 
and inevitably interpreted them as external views imposed on the army. What kind of 
influence did Groener exert? Should his ideas and concepts be considered a 'trend' in 
military thought in the same manner as the concepts of Seeckt and Stiilpnagel? 
2. Groener the Minister: 1928-1932 
As defence minister, Groener's analysis of the future war Germany might face, and of 
its operational and planning derivatives, did not supersede or negate his earlier 
assumptions and analysis. He stili founded his vision of the future on ali the above-
rnentioned components of his traditional military Weltanschammg: 
The forces that [must] always stand ready to overrun the enemy, cannot as 
in the past be the cadre of an army that is first to be mobilised. The war of 
the future begins out of the blue [,sturmartig], with that instantaneous 
shock [rasanten Wucht] that only active-duty peacetime armies, with 
fighting vehicles held in readiness even in peace, can produce. In the event 
of success, such an assault could swiftly decide the campaign . . . But one 
64 See also Hurter's analysis of Groener's military-political conceptions: Wilhelm 
Groener, pp. 21-35. 
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should not assume that a state will surrender after the first assault without 
exploiting ali its material and moral forces.65 
Faithful to his habit of coupling economic reasoning with longstanding operational 
axioms, Groener naturally assumed in 1928 that future war would gravitate toward the 
swift and decisive variety that Germany was inclined to fight. Modem means and 
technology, supported by effective economic planning and the German moral virtues, 
would malte such a war possible. Groener shared these assumptions and the 
operational tendencies they expressed with the majority of Germany's military 
leadership at the end of the 1920s. 
Yet Groener is widely considered a strategist for a différent aspect of his 
military-political vision. In 1928, when he became defence minister, Groener was 
finally Willing to choose economic welfare and peace over war openly, if temporarily, 
and to subordinate war to politicai requirements and solutions.66 Following the logie 
of this world-view, Groener outlined an armament policy that situated the army as but 
one instrument of national security, naturally subordinate to the state's overall 
interests and limitations.67 But by that time his influence on operational planning, 
although not rearmament planning, was fast declining.68 As defence minister, Groener 
was in no sense part of the inner circle of operational planners at the Truppenamt. His 
primary concem was liaison between the arined forces and parliament, and he indeed 
65 Groener, 'Deutsche Wehr'. BA-MA, N46-148, p 9. Groener went on to express his 
faith that future technology might 'attenuate, through new inventions, the terrifying effeets of 
[current] weaponry' (ibid.). 
66 Geyer, 'German Strategy', pp, 561-565. See also Groener's suggestion that a 
German counterattack against a Polish might 'alert' the 'international community' - despite 
the absence of a military purpose, or, as he saw it, of any hope of military success. 
67 Deist, Rearmament of the Wehrmacht', pp. 387-338. 
68 For différent analysis see Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 198-213. 
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promoted smoother cooperation between Germany's politicians and military 
leaders.69 But his relations with mid- or even high-ranking officers were 
correspondingly distant. Any possible influence he might have exercised on the 
operational and force-planning staffs was, to begin with, indirect, always mediated 
through the Ministeramt, the chief of staff, and other key officers.70 
Did the Generalstcìb fully intemalise or even temporarily agree with the place 
the Defence Minister had allocated to the army in his national security concept? The 
majority of scholars have assumed that in the second half of the 1920s, 
. .the Reichswehr leadership saw itself as having to draw closer to the 
executive institutions of the Republic for mainly military reasons and, in 
retura for financial and politicai assurance on illegal military measures, 
having to accept politicai control by the executive. As Reich Defence 
Minister, Groener endeavoured to extend this sphere of control . . . he 
penetrated to the heart of military leadership and control'.71 
Studies and memoranda that the army regularly produced certainly supported that 
analysis; one for instance noted: 
It would be useful if the peacetime Reich defence council and the war 
cabinet could be as similar in composition as possible. The war cabinet 
would then be fully in the game[eingespìelt] in the event of war. A unifìed 
69 Deist, 'Rearmament of the Wehrmacht', p. 386, and 'Ideological War', pp. 366-371. 
Howe ver Deist also acknowledged that between the autumn 1926 and 1930, 'The aim of 
revising Versailles and regaining unrestricted military sovereignty transcended ali ideological, 
politicai, economic and social divisións . . . ' , and that after Seeckt's departure Reichswehr 
leaders were merely more keen on achieving these goals through cooperation with the state 
(ibid., p. 369). That is, the trend of cooperation with the civilians emerged independently 
within the army itself before Groener entered office. 
70 Groener dealt with three chiefs of the Truppenamt during his tenure as defence 
minister: generals Werner von Blomberg, Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, and Wilhelm 
Adam. 
71 Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981), p. 14. 
armed forces ministry would be the best high command organization for the 
Wehrrnacht. . . [Ojpponents [of this view] pointed out that the conduct of 
war involved not [merely] the Wehrmacht alone, but rather the whole 
Volk. Thus many ministries rightly belonged under a single authority; the 
true defence minister was the minister-president.72 
Yet the planners immediately juxtaposed that display of cooperation with the 
government (or, more accurately, with the amorphous ' Volk') with the army's clear 
vision or the desired civil-military relations during wartime, delivered in even clearer 
words: 
'With regard to the command authority and responsibility of the armed 
forces minister in war, the English (sic) literature is disinclined to allow 
the political minister to interfere in operational matters (a cautionary 
example: Churchill and the Dardanelles)'. And although 'contrariwise the 
pushing aside of the minister by Joffre at the outset of the [world] war was 
also not correct', still, inexplicably, 'a theoretically ideal solution would 
be that the chief of the Wehrmacht himself receive a seat on the war 
cabinet as an armed forces minister above parties [iiberparteilcher]' ,73 
All that Groener had achieved was lip-service by the Reichswehr leadership to the 
idea of civilian authority over the army. But should a war break out, the army would 
regain its place above petty politics and politicians in accordance with Germany's 
traditions and history. It would once more reassert its independent, unsupervised, 
sovereign prerogative to formulate and implement military decisions regardless of 
their political and international implications and consequences. 
72 'Spitzenorganisation', late 1928/ early 1929, by Hilmar Ritter von Mitteiberger, BA-
MA, N46-148, pp. 79-80. 
73 Ibid., p. 81. 
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That outcoine was hardly surprising; ever since it had been compelled to 
accept a defence ministry headed by a civilian, originally designed to tighten civilian 
supervision of the army, the military leadership had made a elear distinction between 
the arnied forces and the ministry of defence. The days of 'complete fusion of general 
staff and war ministry' were gone once the head of the war ministry was no longer the 
first quartermaster general.74 The two organisations did not share the same interests, as 
had been - up to a point - the case with the Prussian Kriegsministerium.15 Groener's 
later ideas, so foreign to the traditional views of the officer corps, had little chance of 
finding support outside his ministry, and their durable incorporation into operational 
planning was an unlikely prospect indeed.76 
Groener the minister was, and should be assessed, as a civil servant. His 
primary concerns fully expressed that fraine of reference, which was very différent 
from the one held at the Truppenamt. To officers such as Stülpnagel, who exchanged 
friendly letters with Groener, the minister's concems were simply irrelevant.77 
74 Wild von Hohenborn, first quartermaster general and Prussian war minister January 
1915-October 1916, quote in Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor, p. 44. 
75 Gordon, Reichswehr, pp. 326-336. A Stülpnagel remark reveals that 'S[eeckt] could 
not be persuaded to discuss all these matters [of defence] openly with the government' (Post, 
Civìl-Military Fabric, p. 179). That for most of the 1919-23 period, and from 1928 to 1930 the 
government was ledby or included the 'Marxist' majority Social Democrats (SPD) hardly 
helped to consolidate a sense of shared interests between government and Reichswehr. 
76 See also Megargee, High Command, pp. 15-16. In trying to explain the unpopularity 
of Groener's ideas within the army, Megargee points to the officer corps' inadéquate strategie 
outlook, a produci of their organisational culture, that prevented its members from 
appreciating subtleties of strategy and the relevance of international power relationships to 
their calculations. Geyer, however, argues that the German officer corps was not Willing to 
share military control with civilian authority, as Groener suggested, because of its 'politicai 
mood' and ongoing effort to maintain its autonomy, identity and skills (Geyer, 'German 
Strategy', p. 564). On the persistent résistance in the army to Groener's ideas, and their 
conséquent marginality, see Geyer, 'Dynamics', pp. 112-114. 
77 The correspondence between Groener and Stülpnagel makes this evident. Although 
Groener urged his 'old friend' to consider the inévitable outcome of war against an 
economically and technologically superior 'England', backedby the United States, and 
concluded that war was therefore undesirable and should be temporarily avoided, Stülpnagel 
dedicated his research to finding a way to wage just such a war, which he deemed inevitable 
and even desirable, regardless of the devastating conséquences for Germany. It is therefore 
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Groener''s ideas never received serious consideration, and unlike the visions of 
Stülpnagel and Seeckt, they received no operational test. Naturally, as defence 
minister Groener deeply - if briefly - affected the course of armaments planning. But 
he did not radically alter the army's strategic views or its solutions for Germany's 
security needs.78 His later vision was hardly realised beyond the level of memorandum 
distribution and, as the army's doctrinal and operational documents indicate, never 
became widely accepted.79 
That was especially true during Groener's final months in office. As his 
political power base and the trust in him of both Reich president and Reichswehr 
waned, his ability to implement his concepts and transform them into durable plans 
came to nought. His successors, Kurt von Schleicher (1932-33) and Werner von 
Blomberg (1933-38), were both appointed fresh from their military careers and 
managed to eradicate his policy with ease, swiftly restoring traditional concepts of 
operational and rearmament planning. Groener's policy of careful subordination of 
Germany 's rearmament efforts to its overall international interests was turned upside 
down, as demonstrated by Schleicher's demands for equality of armaments in the 
Geneva disarmament conference, and the implementation of the 'second armament 
clear that neither Groener's strategic analysis, nor his insinuation that he would be 'advising' 
Stülpnagel on political and strategic problems again soon, prompted the latter to reconsider his 
views on the timing, nature and scope of Germany's future war (see BA-MA N46-42). 
78 Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 141-148, 198-228. Groener rationalised the Reichswehr's 
rearmament plans and smoothed cooperation between the army and the government, but he 
did not manage to subordinate those plans - much less the operational planning that derived 
from them - to his economic and political concept and to its implications; see also Deist, 
'Ideological War', pp. 367-368. 
79 See also Murray, German Military Effectiveness, p. 13. For a different view, see 
Deist and Geyer, who do not however explain how it was that, despite being allegedly so 
influential for a short while, Groener left no substantial legacy in Reichswehr war planning. 
See for instance the rejection by the chief of the Truppenamt, Werner von Blomberg, of 
Groener's concepts in March 1929 despite the clear failure of the 1928 war games, which had 
expressed competing operational concepts; Blomberg was removed from office yet the 
operational concept he supported prevailed (Deist, Tlearmament of the Wehrmacht', p. 391). 
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programme' in the spring of 1932, which marked the renewed subordination of 
Germany's foreign and domestic policy to its military policy.80 Schleicher, and even 
more so Blomberg, either refused to understand the connection between Germany's 
open rearmament efforts and its decreasing international status and overall security, or 
were simply Willing to risk Germany's security for the sake of rearmament.81 
Groener's civilian concepts, which had developed only in the final stages of his career 
failed to outlive their maker's term in office.82 
II. Joachim von Stülpnagel 
Joachim von Stülpnagel was an infantry and general staff officer who served as chief 
of the opérations department of the Truppenamt until February 1926, and was notably 
important thereafter. He has often been mentioned together with Groener and Seeckt 
as one of the figures who most heavily influenced Reichswehr operational planning in 
the second half of the 1920s. Interestingly, his concepts have rarely received detailed 
treatment; scholars have disagreed over whether he was 'revolutionary' or 
'reactionary '; yet all describe his operational plans as radical and his strategie 
80 Deist, 'Rearmament of the Wehrmacht', pp. 386-404, 508-509. 
81 Deist himself notes that 'international considérations played no role in the policy of 
the new defence minister [Schleicher]' (ibid., p. 395). See also Geyer's analysis of the 
fundamental contradiction between German rearmament and German security, Aufiiistung, 
and idem, 'Dynamics' 
82 In his analysis of change of strategie norms, Meyer refers to discrepancies in 
strategie perceptions between 'strategie elites' and the rest of society as a characteristic of the 
'societal leaming process'. That model applies equally to organisations; Meyer's statement 
that '[elites cannot] single-handedly transform collectively held strategie norms' also fits 
Groener's vain efforts to change the army's strategie perceptions (Meyer, 'Convergence', p. 
539). 
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analysis, in sharp contrast, as distinctly realistic.83 His studies and officiai 
correspondence disclosing his vision of Germany's future war make it easy to 
understand why Stülpnagel became identified with ruthless, extreme, and total 
warfare. His operational suggestions have indeed been considered so radical that many 
scholars have branded them 'delusional', 'irrational',84 or even claim that Stülpnagel 
and his supporters, who included Blomberg, were aware of the fact that their 
operational vision was fictitious and unattainable, but nevertheless consciously clung 
to it obdurately, tolerating no other solution, until Groener's Minister ami supposedly 
put an end to their wild plans for a 'people's war' blood-bath.85 
Stülpnagel lias been considered not only radical in his operational vision, but 
also substantially différent in his military perceptions and world-view from the 
majority of his conservative colleagues in the officer corps.86 The Seecktian old guard 
allegedly clung grimly to a strict military orthodoxy against which Stülpnagel and his 
circle 'revolted'.87 His readiness to involve the army in everyday politics, and his 
willingness to place Germany's hope for victory in its planned future war in the hands 
of unprofessional and lightly armed civilians in guerrilla-like warfare, have led 
commentators to describe Stiilpnagel's ideas as sharply deviating from the officer 
83 Deist, 'Rearmament', pp. 377-392 and 'Ideological War1, pp. 363-367; Geyer, 
Aufrüstung, pp. 80-97, 188-198; 'Dynamics', pp. 107-112; and 'German Strategy', pp. 556-
562. 
84 See for instance Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 365; and Geyer, 'Dynamics', p. 110, 
and 'German Strategy', pp. 560-561. 
85 Geyer, 'Dynamics', p. 108. 
86 Geyer, Auflistung, p. 84. 
87 The 'Fronde1, in Geyer's words, was led by von dem Bussche, Chef der 
Heeresorganisationsabteilung (T2), Stülpnagel, Chef der Operationsabteilung (Tl), and 
Blomberg, Chef der Ausbildungsabteilung (ibid., pp. 80-82). In a Ietter of April 1925 
Stülpnagel complained that the 'nothing new!' conduct of the army had remained as it was, 
while he and Bussche had managed to introduce their ideas only partially, within their own 
departments (BA-MA N5-20, p. 93). Scholars, in sharp contrast, agree that Stülpnagel's ideas 
dramatically affected the Reichswehr's planning; see for example Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 183-
198 and Deist, 'Rearmament', p. 378. 
100 
corps' traditional detestation, exemplified among others by Seeckt, of any breach 
of the sharp distinction between the armed forces and untrained civilian 'masses'.88 
This subchapter will therefore examine not only the origins of Stiilpnagel's military 
conceptions, but also the extent to which Stiilpnagel's views were unique among his 
cohort. 
The confusion regarding the character of Stiilpnagel's ideas and the extent to 
which they were a novelty is closely linked to their characterisation as 'extreme'. For 
if a clear link exists between Stülpnagel's desperate solution to post-1918 Germany's 
hopeless vulnerability on the one hand, and the logic of the conceptual pattern that 
dictated the army's conduct up to the end of the First World War on the other, then 
Stülpnagel's concepts cannot be simply branded irrational or novel. However extreme 
his ideas may seem to the contemporary reader, they could be accurately labelled as 
such only by Stülpnagel's peers, colleagues, and superiors. That this was far from 
being the case, and that — for instance - Stülpnagel's concepts stood at the centre of 
the Reichswehr's operational discourse, and were tested in the 1927/8 and 1928/9 war 
games, suggests that in the eyes of other members of the officer corps, Stülpnagel's 
ideas were anything but too extreme to be seriously considered.89 Stülpnagel was no 
radical loner; if anything, he was yet another link in a heuristic chain characterized 
above all by the continuity and persistence of a seemingly irrational inner logic.90 
As with Groener, and despite his best intentions, Stiilpnagel did not deviate in 
any substantial way from the military culture that inhibited his understanding of 
Germany's strategic reality and options. On the contrary: his was the clearest voice 
expressing the values and practices that military culture disseminated. This subchapter 
88 See for example Geyer, Aufrüstung p. 89. 
89 For an analysis of these war games see Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 96-97, 188-198. 
90 See Hull, 'End of the Monarchy', pp. 239-245. 
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will thus place Stülpnagel in his theoretical and operational context, and attempi to 
distil out the elements of continuity and change, and the shared axioms and values so 
vigorously expressed in the operational alternative that he proposed. 
1. Acknowledging the Problem: Stülpnagel the realist 
Stülpnagel's answer to Germany's security problems originated from requirements far 
différent than those that prompted Groener to write his studies in the early and mid-
1920s. Stülpnagel was a member of the camouflaged general staff corps and head of 
the TI (opérations) section of the Truppenami, and was thus involved with 
straightforward operational planning. While Groener could develop his ideas of grand 
strategy and military-economic planning to their natural conclusion in the form of a 
temporary rejection of war, offìcers such as Stülpnagel toiled upon the Reichswehr's 
mundane and detailed operational plans - and had to find immediate answers to the 
frightening reality they were strikingly Willing to acknowledge. 
Their problem was that not all members of the higher echelons of the army 
were as keen to face grim realities. Until the occupation of the Ruhr by French forces, 
the Truppenamt had been immersed in Seeclct's unrealistic strategie assumptions and 
planning, and had been influenced by his politicai aloofness, ail of which prevented 
the army from effectively pursuing Germany's security interests or even fulfilling its 
own organisational goals.91 The Ruhr events of 1923-24 (or 'rape', as a thoroughly 
humiliated officer corps repeatedly termed them)92 and the Reichswehr's inévitable 
91 Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 85-87, 'German Strategy', pp. 556-557. 
92 For instance, Blomberg underlined his rearmament suggestions with the claim that 
'great states cannot suffer military rape without military résistance', and supported the 
establishment of a border militia despite its obvious impracticality. 'What happens if France 
cornes and râpes us despite ail treaties, signatures and compromises', he wondered - without 
taking into account that the border militia would make no différence at ail if France attacked 
in force (quoted in Geyer, 'Dynamics', pp. 107-108; see also Geyer, Aufrüstung, p. 208). 
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display of impotence served as a dramatic wake-up cali. The crisis prompted the 
réalisation by Stülpnagel and others that the way they imagined themselves and the 
Reichswehr had nothing to do with reality.93 The very foundation of the arrny's 
strategie assumptions, the operational plans derived therefrom, and the capabilities 
required to implement them were ail flawed or totally absent. Stülpnagel and other 
officers of his circle thus set out to eliminate the painful gap between their self-
conceptualisation and surroimding reality, and to build the Reichswehr's war plans on 
realistic foundations.94 
At the heart of Stülpnagel's thinking therefore stood the sober 
acknowledgement of Germany's strategie weakness. Tragically, his response to an 
uncomfortable and unflattering reality, and to the limbo of unreality in strategie and 
operational planning into which the army had fallen, was a consciously self-
destructive program for action. Realism in the analysis of Germany's strategie dead 
end did not inhibit Stülpnagel in the least from following German military traditions 
and inherited dogma, and from exhibiting no realism whatsoever in his operational 
planning. 
To further complicate efforts to widerstand his ideas, Stülpnagel repeatedly 
declared his intention of malcing a clean and unsentimental break with past notions 
deemed obsolete or irrelevant to Germany's current situation and capabilities: 'The 
development [of war] is ongoing, [and it] changes constantly — it is thus our duty, 
basing ourselves on the military history of past centuries, to seek constantly after the 
new, not [after some] eternally valid recipe for victory' 95 Yet Stülpnagel failed 
93 See Geyer, Aufrüstung, p. 80. 
94 'Gedanken über den Krieg der Zukunft'. BA-MA N5-10, p. 2. See also Deist, 
'Reichswehr and National Defence', p. 377, and 'Ideological War', pp. 363-364. 
95 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 2. 
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miserably. As will emerge, this purportedly most radical of Germany's 1920s 
military thinkers failed as lamentably as Groener - the only supposed strategist among 
them - to break the glass wall of the culturally imprinted notions of operational 
realism that all members of the Prusso-German Generalstab had inherited. 
2. The opponent within: self-delusion 
Stiilpnagel launched his campaign for a stem wake-up call for the amiy with an 
assault on the draft Guidelines for Higher Leadership in War by Oberst Constantin 
Hierl, circulated within the Truppenamt in late 1923.96 It is worth describing Hierl's 
ideas, since they expressed the mainstream views of the officer corps that Stülpnagel 
so vehemently denounced. The Guidelines are notably detached from reality in the 
best Seecktian tradition: they speak to leaders of a non-existent army, armed with non-
existent weaponry, and enjoying a non-existent freedom of strategie choice. In short, it 
was an imaginary manual for an imaginary army. It offered no guide to a German 
military leadership seeking to solve strategie problems in the real world of the mid-
1920s, as the army's humiliating impotence during the Ruhr crisis so painfully 
demonstrated. Hierl's Vorschrift thus provided comprehensive discussion of guidance 
for the deployment [Aufmarsch] of a division equipped with modem weapons, 
although the Reichswehr had none,97 and on strategie attack as the only means of 
defeating the enemy and crushing his politicai will - while the dwarf-army could not 
96 'Leitlinien für die obere Führung in Kriege', BA-MA RH2901; see also Geyer, 
Aufrüstung, p. 81. 
97 BA-MA RH2901, pp. 33-42. 
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OR 
launch anything remotely similar to such attacks - along with detailed 
discussions on the 'decisive' advantages of frontal compared to flank attack." 
The Guidelines, it should be noted, were not merely a fantasy-guide for a 
phantom army; in the eyes of its writer and readers they were by no means a futile 
academic exercise. They were a draft doctrinal document, and as such they captured 
and expressed their audience's frame of mind as well as the dogmas that defined the 
successili! conduct of war. Their opening paragraph asserted that 'The overthrow of 
the enemy consists of the annihilation of the enemy forces', advising, however 
uselessly, that 'The quest for the annihilation [Vernichtung] of enemy forces is thus 
the highest principie of war' 100 That this axiom appeared in the Guidelines despite the 
fact that no German officer could conceivably have hoped to put it into effect in 1923 
speaks volumes of its status as an unequivocal self-evident truth. So powerful were 
this and other fondamental assumptions expressed in Hierl's draft manual that even 
his harshest critics, who successfully exposed his work's irrelevance, made no effort 
to challenge the dogma's infallibility. 
Hierl's Guidelines in fact evoked a number of enthusiastic comments. 'The 
draft is outstanding', claimed a T4 letter signed by Major Ludwig Beck: 'T4 therefore 
takes the view that the field manual should be published soon, as that is also very 
much in the interest of the training of general staff officers '.101 Stülpnagel, however, 
bitterly opposed it and the stagnant thought that it expressed and threatened to 
perpetuate. His response to the document was an immediate and sober cali for a 
painful reality check. 'The Hierl paper', observed Stülpnagel, 'has been drafted in line 
98 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
99 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
100 Ibid., p. 4. 
101 BA-MA, RH2-2901, July 1924. p. 125. Naturally, T4 had its own organisational 
reasons to support Hierl's 'Leitlinien', as it had been produced under its auspices. 
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with Schlieffen's outlook. Sch[lieffen] prepared for war with mass armies. [But] is 
it credible that in the Coming war we will be able to put up ''masses" against our 
enemies?''02 
Indeed, as Stülpnagel strenuously pointed out, self-delusion regarding strategie 
and operational deployment were but one expression of the conceptual dead-end in 
which German operational thought found itself, and he used the blatant irrelevance of 
Hierl's prescriptions to challenge the entire theoretical and operational structure the 
Guidelines expressed. What the army needed was a comprehensive change in its 
conceptual vocabulary, one that would break with outdated convictions, even - as 
Stülpnagel implicitly suggested - those inherited from the indisputably great 
Schlieffen himself: 
[As one] educated militarily in Schlieffen's tradition, it is not easy for 
me to have to argue against the practical application of that tradition. 
[But] only if the German general staff succeeds in thinlcing through the 
problem of the war of the future - which we shall have to fìght in a few 
years - and in generating new theory, will we [be able to] win it. We 
cannot seize the [victor3 s] laurei crown at one stroke. We must educate 
Volk and army in the thought that we must fìght a war in which we are 
"the weaker" . I am convinced that although we describe ourselves as 
the heirs of a great past, we must inaugurate a new era in the history of 
war. It will not be enough to content ourselves with time-honoured 
102 Stülpnagel's official reply to T4 regarding Hierl's 'Leitlinien1, undated (probably 
summer 1924), BA-MA, RH2-2901. 
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mies based on false assumptions; we must rather seek to think through 
[these] new conditions . . . 103 
Yet an enormous gap separated Stülpnagel's level-headed analysis of the actual 
realities and constraints the Reichswehr faced and of the tendency of its members to 
tackle them using unrealistic and outdated concepts, and his willingness to re-examine 
the very foundations of German military practice inherited from Schlieffen and from 
the imperial army on the one hand, and on the other the nature of the solution he 
eventualiy offered. For the sake of Gemían 'honour', Stiilpnagel seemingly replaced 
Seeckt's phantom single decisive battle of annihilation with a very real, blood-chilling 
gamble, equal in its risks only to the Schlieffen plan itself. His answer to Gemían 
military impotence was a tragically radicalised manifestation of pre-exiting German 
military culture in content, shape, vocabulary and frame of thought. The supposed gap 
between Stülpnagel's prescriptions and tradition calis for a careful examination of his 
strategie and operational thought - which will show that Stülpnagel's solution derived 
from the inherited world-view and rationales that he applied when analysing the new 
problems that he and the Reichswehr faced. 
3. Finding a solution: Stülpnagel the radical 
In his well-known and much-quoted briefing for the officers of the Reichswehr 
ministry, 'Thoughts on the War of the Future', as well as in his extensive officiai 
correspondence, Stiilpnagel laid out Germany's strategie problem as lie saw it: 
Germany would shortly have to wage war 'in Order to free itself from the Versailles] 
Diktat and from the French vermin in the Rhineland', despite the fact that it could not 
103 Ibid. See also Stülpnagel's comment: 'France maintains 800,000 men under arms in 
peacetime . . . Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium are hostile . . . these states possess a 
[mass of] materiel that we could not possibly begin to match even through the most strenuous 
imaginative efforts' (quoted in Geyer, Aufrüstung, p. 81). 
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'at this point generate manpower and matériel even approximately equal to that of 
the enemy'.104 The point of departure of Stülpnagel's entire project thus clearly 
ignored real-world politicai and strategie necessities or considérations; Gennany had 
to wage war without bothering to define its goals (be they military or politicai) clearly, 
and regardless of the chances of winning, that is, with no inner logie beyond the seif-
evident necessity of 'war'. In effect, in Stiilpnagel's eyes the chances of success and 
even its définition in the form of detailed goals were completely irrelevant to the 
question of 'war'. His point of departure therefore linked him from the very ineeption 
of his argument directly to the chaotic, extreme and eventually suicidai Zeitgeist of the 
OHL, in which he had prominently served in the final stages of the World War.105 
Furthermore, it exposed the similarity of his strategie assumptions to those of the same 
colleagues whom he had criticised: both had willingly and seemingly naturally 
ignored politicai constraints or rationales in their planning. 
In facing Germany's forced military weakness, Stülpnagel developed an 
unusual two-phase plan for the contingency of French or Franco-Polish attack. In the 
first phase the army and local population combined would employ an attrition strategy 
to halt or at least slow down the attacking forces through guerrilla methods. That was 
an unusual choice, but Germany's situation was so desperate that Stülpnagel saw no 
other solution: 
The great principies of war remain unaltered; only their implementation 
changes in accordance with the age. Inequality in material forces compels 
104 'Gedanken', BA-MA, N5-10, p. 22; parts of the document are also found in Heinz 
Hürten, ed., Das Krisenjahr 1923: Militär und Innenpolitik 1922-1924 (Düsseldorf, 1980), pp. 
266-272. 
105 Hull's observation regarding the ever-present probability that German officers 
would reject objective limits and resist any conceivable reality-test, continuing to believe that 
'victory, not defence, and not 'peace', was the goal of war', is thus also relevant to the state of 
mind of Stülpnagel - and others - long after the World War had ended ('End of the 
Monarchy', p. 244). 
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us to travel new paths. These novelties in strategy and taetics, reinforeed by 
the moral might of a gigantic national uprising, will surprise and dismay 
the notably rigid and methodical Freneh.106 
Indeed, the first phase's operational logie aspired to exploit fully the strategie 
weaknesses of over-stretched and relatively immobile Freneh forces vulnerable to 
surprise attacks by small y et highly mobile German forces.107 Standard guerrilla 
actions, however, would not suffice. By sparing or shying away from no means 
available and by implementing a comprehensive scorched-earth policy in order to 
deprive the enemy of operational assets, Stülpnagel hoped to create a window of 
opportunity in which the enemy would be weakened and disjointed enough to allow 
the Reichswehr to launch a battle of annihilation in the most favourable possible 
conditions.108 
Stülpnagel repeatedly stressed that in order to compensate for Gennany's 
weaknesses in conventional military might, nothing whatsoever was off limits or too 
extreme: 'All persons and ail things' would become weapons.109 That Leitmotiv, 
intended both as a method and as an end in itself, is the reason Stülpnagel's 'Thoughts 
on the War of the Future5 subsequently became the most well-known example of the 
radicalism and fanaticism of the Reichswehr approach to warfare: 'The weaker the 
field army, the more vital the 'people's war [ Volkskrieg]' becomes, as the ultimate 
means by which a helpless people defends itself against its oppressor. A national 
106 'Gedanken1, BA-MAN5-10, pp. 17-18. 
107 'Französischen und deutschen Kampfverfahren', BA-MA N5-20, pp. 37-39. 
108 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, pp. 18-20. Scholars do not dispute the nature of 
Stülpnagel's operational goals and recommended methods; for a brief yet accurate analysis of 
his plan, see Deist, 'Rearmament', pp. 377-378. 
109 Geyer, 'Insurrectionary Warfare', p. 148. 
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hatred that [we must] raise to the highest pitch must not shrink from any available 
means: sabotage, murder, [and] chemical or biological attack [Verseuchung 
Such an effort, as Stülpnagel himself readily observed, would either produce a 
bitter, costly and ultimately marginal military victory, or a comprehensive blood-bath 
and scorched-earth catastrophe that would mark the end of a sovereign Geraiany111 -
an outcome Stülpnagel was unreservedly willing to accept: 'Today and for the 
foreseeable future an appeal to arms would [only] be a heroic gesture. I am aware that 
we could have war forced upon us, but I am equally aware that it could only lead to 
[our] destruction [Untergang]112 That was not the first time Stülpnagel had envisaged 
Germany's choice as glorious death or shameful surrender - and as always, he made 
his choice without hésitation.113 
The ruthless and extreme warfare Stülpnagel stressed was but the natural 
continuation of the nightmarish Endkampf projects of late 1918. Stülpnagel's limited 
operational perceptions were a mirror-image of the narrow-minded outlook that had 
consistently brought the German general staff to disregard any contingency but 
victory gained through a single daring plan that might also bring Geraiany to its end 
as an independent state. Both during and after the World War it was not only natural 
but also perfectly rational for Stülpnagel to perceive Germany's strategie choices, 
once its military machine was engaged, as a Manichean dualism, and to accept calmly 
110 BA-MA, N5-10, p. 45. 
111 Geyer, 'Strategy', p. 558. 
112 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 45. 
113 Stülpnagel was one of the Generalstab officers who had tried in September 1918 to 
promote a suicidal 'death ride'' of the Kaiser in order to inspire an all-consuming yet heroic 
Endkampf Hull, 'End of the Monarchy', pp. 245-246, 255-256. In his memoirs, Stülpnagel 
claimed he did not approve the death ride initiative, yet other sources reveal his active support 
(see Joachim von Stülpnagel, 75 Jahre Meines Lebens, (Oberaudorf, 1955), p. 147 (Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, Munich; wärmest thanks to Dr. Thomas Schlemmer for facilitating my 
consultation of this important and otherwise unobtainable privately printed source). 
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the Fatherland's total demise in fiâmes as a viable strategie contingency: '"History 
knows no [other] Volk?\ as [Oswald] Spengler correctly says, "whose path has been 
shaped in a more tragic way than ours. In great wars ali [others] fight [merely] facing 
[the alternatives] of victory or defeat. We [must] always fight facing victory or 
annihilation'" 114 Germany's military tradition, for Stiilpnagel, required either total 
victory or honourable and equally total catastrophe.115 
An attempi to reconcile the divergent operational concepts expressed in 
Stülpnagel's plan, and to place them in a theoretical and practical context, is thus a 
confusing task. Stiilpnagel and his supporters apparently held both ends of every 
conceivable stick: they opted for a lengthy scorched-earth campaign of attrition and a 
short decisive battle of annihilation, people's war and mobile warfare by 
Professionals, and war free from politicai limitations, logics and goals, yet also a 
victory facilitated by well-timed diplomacy. Blomberg even invented international 
intervention as a deus ex machina to rescue Germany at a decisive moment, tuming 
the grim results of the 1927/8 war games, which were based on Stülpnagel's concepts, 
into a brilliant German success.116 That Blomberg feit free to use politicai intervention 
when it suited his purposes, and regardless of the entirely predictable lack of 
coopération by other powers, is indicative of the limited understanding of the 
members of this circle of the complexity of the politicai and diplomatie world, which 
did not stand awaiting their orders, as they naively and consistently assumed.117 No 
114 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 5 (my emphasis). 
115 Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 365; see also Hull's discussion of the imperative of 
absolute victory: Absolute Destruction, pp. 178-181. 
116 Geyer, 'Dynamics', p. 108. 
1,7 In this respect, Blomberg's lack of self-awareness is impressive. In his 
Besprechung during the 1928 winter games he reprimanded his offîcers in the following 
terms: 'Many participants have clearly recognized the necessity of avoiding decisive combat 
until after the arrivai of the second wave [of the planned mobilisation of German forces]. But 
despite that insight, they committed their units to the attack or to sustained résistance so early 
I l i 
wonder then that scholars have been confused about Stülpnagel - at first glance, 
his ideas seem a complete shambles. Nevertheless, under close analysis the basic 
tenets of Stülpnagel's military world-view make his seemingly self-contradictory 
concepts seem ali too — if perversely - logicai. 
4. A revolutionary and radicai approach? 
Was Stülpnagel's planning indeed so radicai compared to his cohort's fundamental 
assumptions about Germany's past and future wars? Scholars have stmggled to bridge 
the discrepancy between the sober analysis of Germany's strategie problem and the 
reality-free solutions that officers such as Stülpnagel offered, explaining that 'under 
certain circumstances, professionalism and extremism go together well' 118 
Surprisingly, this sound argument is accompanied by a self-contradictory assumption: 
that the general staff s planning of 'total war and scorched-earth tactics on German 
soiP marked a 'transition' in its military thinking, coupled with later 
acknowledgement that 'if the German military wished to preserve their 'traditional' 
standards, Bloomberg's stance [in supporting Stülpnagel's ideas] was quite logicai. 
Many officers, perhaps the majority, followed this line' 119 As was entirely natural, 
since, if Stülpnagel's analysis was realistic and professional, why then should we 
assume his operational ideas lacked those very same qualities? His ideas have indeed 
represented a 'quantum leap' in German military thought for scholars, and his 
operational vision was certainly an impressive adaptation of traditional goals to a new 
and so far forward that bloody combat against a superior enemy was unquestionably to be 
expected. The reason [for that conduct] is that these gentlemen avoided giving up terrain 
liberally and subordinating political or economic considerations to military ones as a logical 
consequence of their assigned missions' ('Operative Aufgabe 1928, Besprechung', BA-MA 
RH2-2964, p. 5). 
118 Geyer, 'Dynamics', p. 110. 
119 Ibid. 
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and pressing reality and an unprecedented and painfiil lack of means. But that 
vision did not express a fundamental 'transition' or change in Gennan strategie and 
operational logie, perceptions and tendencies, as the next pages will suggest. 
It should likewise be clear that Stiilpnagel and his supporters did not, as often 
suggested, 'recognise' or 'know' that their suggestions were 'unrealistic', 
'ideological' or driven by 'sentiment', and that they nevertheless stuck to them for 
lack of other solutions to the problems that their duty assignments required them to 
tackle militarily.120 The members of the Gennan general staff were in reality equally 
incapable of conceiving of a strategie problem that could not or should not be solved 
by military force, and of understanding the inherent limitations of that force. The 
foundation stones of their world-view and the ways in which they interpreted power 
relations channelled their understanding of choices and possibilities; the Gennan 
military leadership literally could not envisage other solutions to power-political 
challenges than purely military ones. That was the rationale and motivation behind 
operational planning and reaimament policies that seem so unprecedentedly extreme 
and counter-productive for Germany's security. Simply put, the Reichswehr's 
professional viewpoint left its leadership very little choice. 
But how can any of this be termed 'revolutionary'? In what ways did 
Stiilpnagel differ from Groener and Seeckt, who allegedly represented opposing 
perspectives and plans? As mentioned, in his studies and letters Stülpnagel repeatedly 
stressed the need to break with an outdated heritage and to focus on 'people's war' -
notions for which scholars have labelled him a revolutionary. But in reality Stülpnagel 
turned away from old operational patterns only in order to express them once more -
and without notable altération or delay. Whenever possible, Stülpnagel backed up and 
120 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
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validated his most radical arguments with quotations from the great Schlieffen 
himself, along with appeals to his colleagues' ever-present willingness to invoke 
extreme choices and measures regardless of cost if militaiy necessity seemingly 
demanded it: 
Schlieffen once said, "in desperate situations only desperate methods 
serve." Our situation will [indeed] be desperate, and unless we wish to 
resign ourselves to it, we must nevertheless find methods bom of despair 
that are of such elemental power that they appear to guarantee us either 
victory, or common ruin alongside our enemy [den gemeinsamen 
Untergang mit dem Feinde].121 
But it was above all when seemingly breaching the traditional conceptual 
constraints of German military thought by doubting its most central aspects, namely 
the dogma of annihilation, that Stülpnagel demonstrated most completely his 
conformity with it. Stülpnagel not only clarified that he sought the traditional 
operational goal, if by means adapted to Germany's post-1918 situation; he also 
turned to Schlieffen himself for support of his interprétation of dogma: 
It may seem presumptuous of me to assert that in the realm of strategy we 
have remained immobile [in our adherence to] the Schlieffen recipe - the 
theory of annihilation [ Vernichtungsgedanke] using modern mass armies 
of roughly equal force. The fundamentals of [his] strategie theory 
unquestionably remain eternally correct. But their implementation changes 
according to the corrélation of forces [in any] given [situation], and I am 
121 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 17. 
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convinced that nowadays Field Marshai Schlieffen would give us a new 
> 122 recipe . 
Stülpnagel's attempi to introduce a more practical approach to planning than 
that proposed by figures such as Hierl, and to tailor a new strategy for Germany based 
on realistic assessment of its military power was therefore confined by impassable 
conceptual boundaries. That is the explanation for the alleged gap between his 
Strategie analysis and his operational concepts that has bewildered scholars for so 
long. If Stülpnagel's operational vision was 'radical', it is only because it was a 
faithful adaptation of an old and equally radicai 'strategie Rezept' - self-contradictory 
terminology that pointing to the perennial réduction of strategy to tactical formulas, a 
Rezept to which Stülpnagel also subscribed. 
But might the idea of a people's war have been revolutionary within the 
restricted framework of German military thought? In actuality Volkskrieg was merely 
a desperate effort to make possible once again the axiomatic decisive battle through a 
force structure concept - in the final analysis - notably close to Seeckt's vision of a 
small, professional and highly mobile army backed by a larger mass of improvised 
militia.123 The intellectual origins of his concept, as explained to his colleagues in 
March 1924, were likewise entirely traditional both in substance and in method -
which was simply to scale the German defensive tactical system of the final phases of 
the World War upward into an operational concept: 'The tactical zone-combat of 
122 BA-MA N5-20, p. 110. 
123 See Dennis E. Showalter, 'Plans, Weapons, Doctrines: The Strategie Culture of 
Interwar Europe', in Chickering and Förster, eds., Shadows of Total War, pp. 66-67. 
Showalter attributes the idea of a national militia complementing a small professional army to 
Walther Reinhardt, Seeckt's predecessor as Chef der Heeresleitung, thus suggesting its 
popularity within the early Reichswehr leadership, but also links the early 1920s militia 
concept directly to its extreme Volkskrieg expression in the mid-1920s, as well as to its 
ultímate manifestation in the early 1930s - in the form of the army's support of the 
paramilitary Nazi Volksbewegung. 
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1917/18 thus becomes, operationaïïv, wide-area warfare in the greatest possible 
space and depth\m Stülpnagel's demand for an all-consuming people's war also 
corresponded well to the traditional willingness to sacrifice everything for militaiy 
necessity. He did not merely suggest any sort of Volksh-ieg; he demanded a 
deliberately and radically brutal and fanatical one. That was indeed an unusual 
measure in view of the Prusso-Gennan army's longstanding abhon-ence of 
'Freischärler5 125 But Stülpnagel operated in an unusual time. What was unusual 
about his suggestions was the dovetailing of guerrilla war - traditionally a protracted 
affair - with the operational logie of annihilation, and the reassertion of a single 
decisive battle as the ultimate goal - a partial change in method scarcely as 
revolutionary as often argued.126 
Any rational and realistic application of old wisdom to new reality - any 
attempt to 'translate' the laws of rapid 'decisive5 battles of annihilation, extreme 
warfare and tactical ruthlessness, faith in the strength of German spirit and the demand 
to fight on until victory or common Untergang alongside the enemy, in a world in 
which Gennany had no army to speak of - would have produced a "radical' plan. 
Stülpnagel's vision is thus 'radical' not because of its entirely standard operational 
assumptions and demands but because he was Willing to apply this operational logie 
124 BA-MA N5-20, p. 24 (emphasis in original); see also p. 23. For the scaling-up of 
tactics as tradition, see Chapter 1; on German tactical developments in 1917/18, see above all 
Lupfer, Dynamics ofDoctrine. 
125 On this often paranoid attitude and the reprisals it generated both prior to and 
during the World War, see John Home and Alan Kramer, 'War Between Soldiers and Enemy 
Civilians', in Chickering and Förster, eds., Great War, pp. 153-168; idem, 'German 
"Atrocities" and Franco-German Opinion, 1914: The Evidence of German Soldiers' Diaries', 
The Journal of Modern History, 66:1 (1994), pp. 1-33 and idem., German Atr-ocities, 1914: A 
History of Denial (New Häven and London, 2001); see also Mark R. Stoneman, 'The 
Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870-1871: A Cultural Interpretation', 
War in History 8:3 (2001), pp. 271-293. 
126 For a different assessment of the idea of people's war, and comparison of this 
concept with Seeckt's professional army concept, see Geyer, Aufrüstung, p. 89. 
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and its implications to untrained fighting groups of civilians engaged in guenilla 
warfare. As expected, the reasoning behind and justification for this demand was once 
again the paramount claim of military necessity: 
In this context we must keep in mind that the war of the future will be 
directed against the entire people. Not merely the field arrny, but also the 
sources of [economic] strength and nerve centres of a given country will 
be the objectives of warfare. [Although] victory over the enemy will 
always remain the goal, the roads to that goal will vary in accordance with 
the available forces.127 
It is also important to remember that expanding the borders of the operational realm 
and applying its demands to civilians were not in themselves at ali unprecedented in 
German military tradition, although they had usually been applied only to enemy 
128 societies. 
5. Operational concepts: from attrition to annihilation 
The first stage of Stülpnagel's two-fold plan1 s thus rested on an unlimited war of 
attrition fought by soldiers and civilians alike that would absorb the enemy's initial 
attack and slow, harass, and delay the attacking forces and possibly halt them 
completely, thus making possible the second phase - a decisive battle of annihilation 
launched by well-equipped, well-organised military forces with some limited, yet 
strategically suffîcient, success.129 International support for Germany as the victim of 
aggression would then put an end to the fighting before France and its allies could 
launch another strike. Stülpnagel conceived of the first phase as 'strategie defence' 
127 'Entwurf, BA-MA N5-20, p. 72. 
128 Hull, Absolute Destruction, pp. 226-262. 
129 'Gedanken' BA-MA N5-10, p. 20. 
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that, if effectively implemented, would lead into the second phase of 'war-
deciding offensive5:130 
In contrast to the first phase of the war, the strategie offensive will now 
move to the fore. It must force a décision through a coordinated assault 
with powerful air and artillery support. Great mobility - in other words, 
supply columns - is desirable . . ,131 
Our battle technique must involve accepting partial gains and [on 
reaching] an equilibrium of forces at several locations, but [must] in the 
process keep in sight the [ultimate] aim of annihilation [ Vernichtung] of 
the enemy. The récognition and exploitation of enemy weakness or error is 
the [essence of] the art of command.'132 
Stülpnagel's plan is often described as one based on 'attrition strategy', and it 
is worthwhile asking if this was indeed the case.133 Since Stülpnagel himself was 
caught between the limited operational possibilities of 'people's war' and the dogma 
of the mass-army battle of annihilation, his operational logie tended to be ambiguous 
and at times self-contradictory, as a resuit of his efforts to serve two incompatible 
concepts. Thus Stülpnagel's underlying logie seerns at times both attritional and 
annihilationist: 'Initially we must consciously employ "attrition strategy" rather than 
"annihilation strategy'", he claimed, but went on to assert that 'Obviously we must 
doggedly stick to the purpose of ultimately fighting the decisive battle through 
according to Schlieffen's teachings. [But] that can only happen once the preconditions 
for such a battle have been established and the corresponding equilibrium of forces 
130 Ibid. 
131 'Entwurf, BA-MAN5-20, p. 73. 
132 'Französischen und deutschen Kampfverfahren', BA-MA N5-20, pp. 37-39. 
133 See for example Deist, 'Rearmament', pp. 377-378. 
118 
has been reached.134 Yet as he commented immediately afterward, 'Not the 
annihilation of the enemy but the uprising of the entire Volk for [its] libération in the 
most primordial defensive struggle will be our first objective'.135 
Stülpnagel's theoretical confusion dissolves once we understand that his 
attrition strategy, to be implemented in the 'stratégie defence1 phase, derived directly 
from the centrality and necessity of annihilation. Stülpnagel in no sense abandoned the 
eternal axiomatic wisdom of pursuing annihilation at all costs. Rather, in a manner 
entirely similar to Falkenhayn in 1916, Stülpnagel subordinated his strategy of 
attrition to the logic and requirements of annihilation. Attrition warfare, unlimited in 
space and time, would eventually make the desired annihilation battle possible: 
. . . .to compel the enemy again and again to slowly 'gnaw his way 
through' the entire territory of Germany [immer wieder zu einer 
langsamen 'Durchfressen ' durch das ganze deutsche Gebiet zwingen] and 
thus gradually weaken him both in morale and materiel. The enemy, with 
his heavily armed masses, must face this invisible opponent in 
bewilderment. The temporary concentration of large forces at locations 
that permit sudden surprise offensive strikes must always be kept in mind 
in such a situation.136 
Stülpnagel also confirmed the interrelationship that he saw between attrition and 
annihilation by seeking to ascribe to his attrition strategy an 'annihilationaP quality 
regardless of its own merits and its contribution to the wearing down of enemy forces: 
134 BA-MA, N5-20, p. 26. 
135 Ibid., p. 27. 
136 Ibid., p. 25. 
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'Impairing lines of communication and evading décision can offer, even in this 
phase of the battle, the prospect of major successes even against a superior enemy'.137 
Stülpnagel indeed linked the attrition concept to the final Vermchîungsschlacht 
as much as he could in detailing his Rezept, either because he knew that linkage would 
appeal to his audience, or simply because for him as well, décision by battle was the 
cherry on the tedious, grinding cake of attrition: 'It is a question . . of seeking 
through individuai actions at the front and in the rear of the enemy a great success: 
gaining time - while damaging the enemy as much as possible - for the launching of 
the decisive battle . The struggle to gain time must thus lead into the struggle to 
annihilate the enemy'.138 He indeed played throughout music ideally suited to the 
officer corps' ears and mood, emphasising the 'battle' part of attritional combat, with 
the added military value it offered: 'As with the defence of a great modem fortress, 
the attacker must meet résistance everywhere throughout a broad forward area. The 
more active the conduci of that resistance, the better, naturally!'139 
All this was to be successfully accomplished by identifying and exploiting the 
numerous vulnerabilities, or in Stülpnagel's words the 'Achilles' heels' of the French. 
The French army was still exhausted from the World War, it hid behind its armour and 
thus deprived itself flexibility and manoeuvrability, and any war it would fight in 
Germany would expose its extensive masses and their extended communications, and 
provide a vast array of opportunities for surprise attacks. To those who doubted 
German chances, Stülpnagel suggested that it would be unwise to overestimate the 
French.140 
137 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 32. 
138 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
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Stülpnagel devoted considérable portions of his briefing to convincing his 
audience that local operational successes were possible for Germany's tiny army as 
long as its existing divisions enjoyed sufficient levels of armament, training, and 
mobility, and it cultivated a number of key operational axioms that were all far from 
new. He repeatedly stressed that flexibility, speed, mobility and surprise, as well as 
other tactical lessons drawn from the World War, would facilitate success: 
For a strategically defensive deployment, my idea is not an extremely 
thin broad front; I rather believe that we should deploy all-arms task 
groups, with the gaps between thinly covered by border guard militia and 
cavalry. If the enemy attacks, his rear-area communications will be 
disrupted by guerrilla action [ Volkskrieg] and rail démolitions . . The 
swift redeployment of our units through forced marches, railways - and 
truck transport becomes a necessity . . . I am thinking especially of night 
marches - and night combat. That is an advantage of the defensive that 
we did not need to consider as much in the World War, but which will 
play a notable rôle in a future war.141 
By thus linking his plan's two phases conceptually Stülpnagel had eased the tension 
between the unusual measures he had suggested and the traditional operational logie 
that they ultimately served. It was at this point in Iiis plan that Stülpnagel's instincts -
moulded by his embedded military perceptions - derailed his realistic analysis. Yet 
Stülpnagel and his supporters kept insisting on the feasibility of his concept, since it 
was the most faithful projection of the fashion in which they understood Germany's 
limitations and the means of overcoming them. The détails of his operational 
141 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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planning, and of Stülpnagel's efforts to cope with Gennany's military weakness 
and to apply his operational notions, are therefore worth examining. 
6. Operational concepts: a new iRezepf ? 
Scholars have so far presented Stülpnagel's operational ideas as revolutionary or at 
least novel because of the centrality of the people's war concept in his plans. Yet as 
suggested above, a well-organised conventional military offensive was a centrai part 
of the pian. In what way, then, did his vision of this offensive, regardless of its 
plausibility, and of the operational and tactical means to realise it, express new 
concepts of conventional warfare? 
Only a strategie offensive, preached Stülpnagel to the choir, could decide the 
war in Germany's favour, and the Reichswehr must therefore strive to execute it.142 
Yet in order to achieve that goal, the Feldherr should not cling to outdated concepts, 
but rather search creatively for means to démoralisé and eventually annihilate the 
enemy.143 Stülpnagel's creative search singled out five suggestions: 'The relationship 
between offence and defence; the deployment of forces [.Kräftegruppierung]; surprise 
of the enemy; the importance of the character of the terrain in the battle area; and the 
employment of army-level cavalry [reconnaissance].144 
Stülpnagel's readers were, of course, intimately familiar with these basic, self-
evident points. Yet Stülpnagel used some of these operational basics as the theoretical 
departure points that, with some slight exaggeration, have justifìed interpreting his 
ideas as revolutionary. The question that should therefore be asked is whether these 
operational ideas were indeed groundbreaking, or - as Stülpnagel himself repeated 
142 Ibid., p. 32. 
143 Ibid., p. 33. 
144 Ibid. 
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fastidiously - were they merely a manifestation of traditional precepts. It is 
important to note that here and elsewhere in his writings, in his attempts to promote 
the components of his lRezepf, Stulpnagel refrained from stressing their novelty. On 
the contrary: he painstakingly highlighted the links that connected ali his suggestions 
to embedded concepts, especially when adjusting them to the perceived requirements 
of future war. 
Thus he described at length the advantages of keeping the correct relationship 
and coordination between offence and defence, using relevant historical examples 
from Moltke the elder to the World War.145 He emphasized the importance of surprise 
with a quotation from 'our infantry training manual', in order to justify the extreme 
forms of surprise that he felt free to advocate: 'What is true for opérations and tactics 
is also true to an even greater extent for the invention, in the fields of technology and 
chemistry, of weapons systems that can ensure surprise. I believe that we must 
accomplish the maximum in creative work with a minimum of forces. No inhibitions 
of any sort should exist (gas and smoke, bacteria, motors, electrical remote control and 
détonation, aviation . . .).146 And the contribution of even a single cavalry corps would 
allegedly be immense, thanks to its ability to astonish enemy forces and thus fulfil 
'The foremost aim[:]. . . to employ each weapon in decisive offensive combat at the 
right time and from the most effective location' 147 Ali these ideas were wholly 
traditional, and Stulpnagel rightfully presented them as such. 
The concentration of force in order to achieve locai and temporary advantage 
in face of a numerically superior enemy was a more nuanced suggestion, designed to 
145 Ibid., pp. 33-36. 
146 Ibid., pp. 38-39. In the one Stulpnagel argument that might be interpreted as 
apologetic, he justified the use of measures illegai under international law by quoting 'an 
English officer' who allegedly claimed that a nation fighting for its life should disregard 
'paper conventions'. 
147 Ibid., p. 41. 
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satisfy the imperative of achieving decisive results with the minuscule forces at 
Gennany's disposai. Stiilpnagel's attempt to bridge the gap between operational 
imperatives and operational reality is a prime example of his mental boundaries. 
Instead of presenting genuinely new ideas - for instance taking his 'people's war' 
concept to its logicai extreme by avoiding decisive battles altogether - Stülpnagel 
simply decreased the level of ' decisi veness' demanded and thus fitted it to the abilities 
of the shrunken army. Thus he described concentration of force as a partial answer to 
the impossibility of flank attack, given that 'we will in many cases have to throw our 
weak units at the enemy merely frontally, and without deployment in depth, in order 
to hold him up.'148 Stülpnagel hammered home his conclusion that only tactical 
success was within reach (and only tactical success was required) by repeating that the 
tactical concentration of forces was the essential step. That logie, well-known to his 
readers, was not merely an operational lesson; it was a compromise to keep the 
familiar goal in sight while attempting to achieve it in an unorthodox way.149 
Stülpnagel's argument in favour of concentrated forces aiming at local tactical 
breakthroughs instead of strategie flank attacks, given the expected reality of warfare 
and the improbability of achieving 'decisive'' results in the coming war, was the 
pinnacle of realism that 1920s German military thought achieved - before colliding 
with and succumbing to its own peculiar, institutional, irrational rationality: 
In this case we must once again fìght in all-arms task groups that have a 
genuine [measure of] fighting power and possess reserves deployed in 
depth. Only in this way can we launch genuine opérations, that [will] give 
148 Because of the nature of the expected front and against Stülpnagel's own wishes 
(ibid., pp. 36-37); see also his discussion of outmanoeuvring the enemy by exploiting his 
mistakes (ibid., pp. 37-38). 
149 See also Geyer's emphasis on Stülpnagel's loyalty to the axiom of annihilation of 
enemy forces in a Single decisive battle (Geyer, Aufrüstung, p. 87). 
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an intellectually superior commander the chance to defeat even a powerful 
enemy. The long-standing fundamental principle of concentrating forces at 
a decisive point [while] notably weakening others must continue to 
dominate us.150 
These were not the words of a revolutionary. 
7. The thumb on the scales: German Geist 
Stülpnagel had based his entire bid for success through his novel concept of 'people's 
war1 on yet another traditional conviction which (as always) he shared with others: the 
greatness of the German spirit as a decisive factor for both soldiers and civili ans alike: 
'German Geist must vanquish French matériel!'151 Stülpnagel demanded, of course, a 
far more extreme expression of 'German Geisf from German civilians than did 
Groener and others. Yet it is the shared and unvarying confidence in this quality and 
in its supremacy over mere material factors that provided both Stülpnagel and Groener 
with the foundation for planning a victorious future war: 
Perhaps the German army will be called upon to inaugurate, in the war of 
libération that it has taken up, a new era in warfare, in that it will 
overcome, through the most extraordinary spiritual and intellectual 
efforts, the force of matériel, in the form of enemy military technology 
extraordinary both in numbers and effect. In any case I can conceive that 
150 'Gedanken', BA-MAN5-10, p. 37. A discussion, in the same spirit, of Schlieffen's 
teachings accompanied this conclusion: 'We speak ofthis [principle] constantly, in 
accordance with the teachings of our great master, Schlieffen, but forget that in reality, at 
Cannae Hannibal kept his centre weak in order to prevail with his strong wings. It is clear that 
a [plan of] battle of this kind places the highest demands on the commander's strength of will 
and the quality of the troops. But we must scrutinize tasks of this kind thoroughly from a 
theoretical Standpoint, in order to be capable of dealing with them in practice (ibid.). 
151 'Deutscher Geist muss über französische Materie siegen! ': 'Gedanken', BA-MA 
N5-10, p. 18. 
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these novelties in warfare will have a demoralizing effect on the French half-
breed Volk [.Mestizenvolk], that relies above ail on its gigantic 
armaments, and on the nationally [fragmented and] hastily thrown 
152 
together [zusammengewürfelte] Polish and Czech arniies. 
An equally important part of Stülpnage]'s conception rested on his conviction that the 
French lacked any such spirit - a commonplace in German military thought with 
devastating conséquences in both 1914 and 1916,153 Stülpnagel also paid considérable 
attention to a variety of ways to break the French spirit, as part of the unrestrained and 
hellish war he planned to unleash upon Germany; 'strong air units [might] attack the 
enemy population . . . the struggle for air superiority will take on a major importance 
in future war. And we [ourselves] must be prepared [to face] enemy forces landed by 
transport aircraft squadrons in our rear.'154 
Stülpnagel's understanding of the German spirit and of German moral 
qualities, however, did not simply reduce them to a code-name for lasting 
commitment. For him, unlike Groener, ' Geisf was neither an innate quality nor a 
mysterious Germanie silver bullet. Stülpnagel did not enjoy the same freedom from 
realistic planning Groener had enjoy ed in 1924; while Groener contemplated a distant 
future war that Germany would fight as the aggressor, Stülpnagel had to plan an ail 
too contemporary war in which Germany would be attacked by far stronger powers. 
However radical his plans may seem, strict realism was his guiding principle as well 
as a personal characteristic, and he could not afford himself to treat moral qualities as 
an omnipotent magie remedy that would answer every need. He wamed against the 
misunderstanding of the 'buzzword', as he called it, 'French materie! against German 
152 BA-MA, N5-20, pp. 26-27. 
153 Ibid., p. 27. 
154 'Gedanken', BA-MA, N5-20, p. 21. 
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Geist (which he frequently used himself), as implying that moral qualities in 
themselves would suffice in future war: 
That thought is complete nonsense [barer Unsinn]. We require strong if 
not [necessarily] équivalent armaments, and must [then] - arithmetically 
speaking - strive for balance or superiority through an advantage in moral 
forces. In addition, in accordance with the experience of the [world] war 
we should not underestimate the moral strength of the French, and should 
reflect that their well-organized units will be facing our newly-raised and 
inevitably loosely organized ones.155 
Stülpnagel's more practical (and demanding) version of faith in German Geist 
was therefore one that saw moral qualities as the factor that could tip the balance, 
provided some balance could first be achieved by a comprehensive rearmament effort 
and suitably creative planning. In that scénario, France' s powerful strike would break 
against the wall of German will, while France's spirit would be put to the test and duly 
fail: 'France fights for greed and plunder, with a sense of its own [material] 
superiority. Its sons and mothers will not be inclined to make great sacrifices [in such 
a struggle]... as bloody losses and risks increase, it may well emerge t h a t . . . the 
French Volk may quickly become war-weary, andprepared to leave us our freedom.156 
For Stülpnagel, the more total the warfare, the more likely that enduring German 
commitment, coupled with tactical wisdom, would prevail over French military might. 
155 'Gedanken', BA-MA 5-10, p. 18 (also 'Schlagwort'); see in additionhis 
'Französische und deutsche Kampfverfahren', BA-MA N5-20, p. 37. 
156 BA-MA, N5-20, p. 27. 
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8. Cooperation with the civilian authorities? 
Stülpnagel and other 'young Turks' often figure in the literature as those who, for 
practical reasons connected to their planning of future total war, supported a shift in 
the army's attitude toward the despised government of the German Republic.157 
Instead of Seeckt's suspicious and reclusi ve style - which was largely an extension of 
the Wilhelmine army's deep-rooted aversion to politics and civilians; increased 
mistrust between army and government; and impacted negatively on the army's 
yearnings for bigger budgets and multi-year reannament plans - the young Turks 
allegedly sought to deepen coopération between Germany's army and its government 
in order to overcome 'politicai obstacles' 158 But what kind of coopération did they 
have in mind? 
It should be noted that Stülpnagel was scarcely an enthusiastic supporter of the 
German Republic, its governments, parties, or politics, much less the national 
priorities it had so far pursued.159 Moreover, as a soldier, and especially one who had 
witnessed and had actively contributed to German escalation at the end of the World 
War, Stülpnagel's loyalty was first and foremost to the German army, not to the 
157 See for example Deist, 'Rearmament', pp. 381-383, and 'Ideological War', pp. 
364-365. 
158 See for instance Hull's comment on Hindenburg's 'fetish of his disdain for 
politics', and his and Ludendorffs persistent avoi dance of declaring themselves to be 
Germany's officiai politicai leaders (Hull, 'End of the Monarchy', pp. 238, 245-246). 
159 His introduction to 'Thoughts on the War on the Future' is thus full of rants against 
ali the above, well exemplified by the following: 'The German people has in the final analysis 
disarmed itself under the pressure of its own governments. I do not thereby ignore the fact that 
the fist of the Entente was enduringly at the throat of the government of the day, and that 
interaction with domestic politics may have blurred the vision of the republican government. 
[But] so long as we lack a German government that sets itself the task of preparing our 
struggle for national libération with clarity and consistency, and with ali appropriate foreign 
policy caution [nevertheless] considers the spiritual rearmament [ Wehrhaftmachung] of the 
German Volk as it highest moral obligation, [we] cannot expect genuine practical work in this 
area' ('Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 6). 
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political entity that the army purportedly served.160 It is thus not surprising that 
Stiilpnagel was consistently willing to sacrifice the Republic's interests to the army's 
interests and aspirations. 
It also goes without saying that Stulpnagel was naturally inclined to believe 
that while the civilian government officially held sovereignty over Germany, the 
military leadership alone was entitled to make decisions regarding war - where, when 
and how to fight it - entirely free from civilian interference. But what would happen if 
the people were to go astray in their aspirations, that is — if they were to refuse to 
wage war altogether? In other words, what room should be left for civilian decision-
making based on the people's will? Stiilpnagel's claims were simple: if the people's 
aspirations ran contrary to the army's best judgment, those aspirations must change: 
Weaiy sceptics and pathetic pacifists have declared that a future 
resumption of war by military means [mit den Wafferi\ is hopeless or 
criminal. . . large sectors of the [German] people even today regard with 
scepticism a war against a France bristling with weaponry, especially 
when [such a war] has been made into a domestic political catchphrase. 
We officers must take to heart all the [underlying] causes, [and] the great 
warning of the war: [the necessity] of greater political realism.161 
That was indeed a view far distant from Seeckt's traditional notion of 
immunizing the army against the divisions and temptations of politics, but it was 
scarcely a profession of faith in a close cooperation that involved submission of the 
army to civilian control. The actual meaning of cooperation between the army and the 
government was cooperation in achieving the goals the army believed must be 
160 Be it theKaiserreich or Republic (Hull, 'End ofthe Monarchy', pp. 245-246, 255-
256). 
161 'Gedanken', BA-MAN5-10, p. 4. 
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achieved, and in following directives and timetables for fulfilment of those goals 
dictated by the army. In that spirit, Stülpnagel shared with the Foreign Office in 
March 1926 his vision of 'the short-term goals of general German policy' and the 
'short-term goals of German disarmament policy'; he fully acknowledged that 
disarmament was a politicai issue, but nevertheless merrily assumed command, and 
prescribed world domination by stages: first an end to disarmament and 
demilitarization, the reconquest of the lost territories from Poland, and the Anschluss 
of Austria; then irredentist conflict with Czechoslovakia and Italy; and finally, in the 
more distant future, 'fighting in opposition to the Anglo-American powers 
[amerikanisch-englische Machth'eise] over raw materials andmarkets' 162 
Stulpnagel's correspondence at no point assumed an equal partnership with the 
civilians; for him, the army alone possessed the correct solutions, while the 
government was bound to make mistakes: 
Currently the question of whether and how the work of state and army in 
making our Volk Willing and able to bear amis can be carried forward is 
decisive. If, in accordance with the Versailles Diktat, the army must 
'play dead' for the next years, the question arises of whether the 
government [simply] accepts that situation while hoping for better times, 
or whether - as has not happened up to now — it resolutely takes the path 
of initiating ali measures outside the Reichswehr's narrower remit 
necessary to promote the future military power [ Wehrkraft] of our 
Volk.163 
162 Stülpnagel, 'Abrüstung', March 1926, Akten zur Deutschen auswärtigen Politik 
1918-1945, Series B, 1925-1933, vol. 1/1 (Göttingen, 1966), pp. 341-350 (war aims: pp. 343, 
345). 
163 BA-MA N5-20,p. 110. 
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Stülpnagel was thus no doubt more Willing to cooperate with the civilian 
authorities than was Seeckt; he had no choice but to support a coopération that would 
ensure the implementation of the total military préparation that he judged necessary 
and appropriate. As with Groener and virtually all his colleagues, Stülpnagel 
identified the weakest link, the one that had allegedly broken the chain of military 
successes in the World War, as the German people. Moreover, his plan necessitated 
politicai unity and an iron will on the part of the entire nation, the galvanisation of its 
spirit, and readiness for the utmost sacrifice by each of its members: 'the categorical 
imperative of fighting and dying for the Fatherland.'164 Ensuring that the Geist of the 
German people was unshakable thus stood at the very heart of his 'people's war"' plan, 
and his understanding — and demand - for that militarily necessary Geist was an 
extreme one. 
Stülpnagel knew that full well, and he was thus Willing to 'cooperate' with the 
civilian administration in order to awaken and harden the people's spirit and to ensure 
the national unity that had allegedly failed the anny in 1914-18. Unfortunately the 
govermnent did not exhibit the level of commitment and wisdom with which 
Stülpnagel was supposedly so keen to cooperate.165 Consequently, and in order to 
galvanise the people and nurture their military spirit Stülpnagel offered a list of 
'suggestions' that make it impossible to consider his intentions as 'cooperative': 
The necessary measures would include: the création of a national defence 
counc i l . . . the passing of a Reich sport law, the implementation of which 
would be only apparently the remit of the R[eich] Interior M[inistry], 
[but] in reality would be controlied by the R[eichs]w[ehr] Minfistry]. . . 
The assignment of sufficient state funding - directly or indirectly - to the 
164 'Gedanken', BA-MAN5-10,pp. 11-12. 
165 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Reichswehr . . . for the encouragement of military technology - and 
chemical [warfare],.. .the hiring of civilian employees to free up the 
troops . . . the strengthening of territorial defence in accordance with 
army suggestions, but camouflaged as civilian activity . . the most 
severe punishments for treason, which would be defined in the broadest 
possible way . . . Propaganda.166 
The inner logie of Stülpnagel's suggestions makes clear that at the heart of his 
concept lay the assumption that the civilian govemment and the army were entangled 
in an unequal relationship in which the party entitled to make demands was the 
army.167 The demands mentioned, and the many others specified in his 'Thoughts on 
the War of the War of the Future' , demonstrate that Stülpnagel did not assume the 
govemment or the people should have - or would wish to have - any say whatsoever 
in the effort to organise and prepare the country for total war. Stülpnagel indeed did 
not shy away from openly claiming that 
in internai politics a total transformation must occur before [we can] think 
seriously of appealing to arms [bevor ernsthaft an die Aufnahme des 
166 BA-MA N5-20, pp. 110-111. See also his suggestion of 'national and [para-
]military éducation [Erziehung] of our youth at school and university. The création of hatred 
against the external en emy'.('Gedanken1, BA-MA N5-10, p. 9). Stülpnagel's insistence on 
this point derived from his belief, shared throughout the officer corps, that a lack of fighting 
spirit on the part of the people had doomed Germany in the World War, despite its striking 
military successes. 
167 For a différent view see Post, Civil-Military Fabric, pp. 93-97. Post suggests that 
the Reichswehr aeeepted civilian control to some extent and with some degree of sincerity 
from 1925 onward. However, as MacGregor Knox has noted, Reichswehr coopération with 
the Republic was an outcome of budgetary, strategie, and operational needs, not to mention 
lack of alternatives to the Republic; the limited coopération did not change the Reichswehr 's 
self-image and understanding of itself as an institution independent of the current German 
state {To the Threshold of Power, 1922/33: Origins and Dynamics of the Fascisi and National 
Socialist Dictatorships, vol. I [Cambridge, 2007], p. 264 note 65). For another analysis which 
recognises the army's utilitarian reasons for partial coopération yet stresses that 
'considérations of foreign policy were at the forefront of the Reichswehr's view of and 
relationship with the Weimar Republic' see William Mulligan, 'The Reichswehr, the Republic 
and the Primacy of Foreign Policy, 1918-1923', German History 21:3 (2003), pp. 348-349. 
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Krieges gedacht werden kann]. The preconditions for this are . . . The 
création of a strong Reich authority while pushing aside [current] 
pathological parliamentary conditions . . . The éducation of oui- Volk to 
accept the state [die Erziehung unseres Volkes zum Staatsgedanken] — 
labour service obligation (the system of Frederick William I).168 
The government and people for their part should be ready to invest 
enthusiastically everything required, and be subject to incessant training, préparation 
and eventually execution of the army's destructive plans. Thus, 'The war of the future 
demands from the very first moment the commitment of the entire strength of the Volk 
. . . Dictatorial laws, the most strenuous discipline [Zucht], the most extreme demands 
upon leaders at ali levels are a matter of course. Sacrifices must be demanded of every 
Fo/Ä>comrade [ Volksgenosse].169 In an interesting choice of words, and 
correspondingly to his belief that the parliamentary system was 'pathological 
[krankhaft] ' and should be replaced by a system that would better 'represent' the 
people's will, Stülpnagel assessed that 'the moment for the national uprising will 
[only] come when the préparations of the politicians and the armed forces have been 
harmonized with the national will of the majority of the Volk'170 That remark 
displayed a total laclc of awareness of his own underlying assumption: that the people 
would naturally adopt the military viewpoint and warplan as the true expression of 
their own aspirations, regardless of whatever other choices might be available; that 
was the 'coopération' he envisaged.171 Stülpnagel could not have imagined the reverse 
168 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, pp. 9-10. 
169 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
170 Ibid., p. 6. 
171 Deist and others have taken Stülpnagel's words at face value, and suggested that 
his 'radical conclusion from the trauma of 1918' was the source of an aspiration to 
'harmonise' with the national will of the Volk (Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 364 and 
'Rearmament', p. 381). Stülpnagel indeed drew some conclusions from 1918, but respect for 
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scenario, in which the government cajoled the army to implement a civilian vision 
of security. And indeed a very similar scenario - in the course of Groener's attempi to 
promote his notions of graduai rearmament and closer coopération with the 
international security system - had failed miserably to find support and coopération 
within the Reichswehr, given its incompatibility with perceived military interests and 
with Reichswehr planning. 
Stülpnagel further clarified the unequal civil-military relationship that he 
envisaged in declaring that: 'Only the highest levels of the army need concern 
themselves with these matters . . . Following this road consistently will produce 
greater success than the muddling about [herumtasten] of the Reichswehr up to now in 
ali mobilisation] issues, with the related internal and foreign policy dangers'.172 Both 
the content and wording of these suggestions indicate that Stülpnagel had no desire to 
share responsibility with government or people, but sought rather to dominate both. 
He was profoundly unwilling to abandon Seeckt's demand for military autonomy in 
the conduci of war, or to 'harmonise' military measures with the Volk, but rather 
aimed to compel the government and people - if necessary, even by force - to talee an 
ever more active part in his all-encompassing total war. 
The true nature of Stülpnagel's views on the superiority of the army over the 
government, and his assumption that the latter ought to subordinate itself totally to 
military goals that it might initially resist - and should therefore be forced to accept -
is especially evident in his warnings against a French preventive war. Stülpnagel 
evaluated that threat as immense, but his recommended strategy to cope with it did not 
the will of the Volk ~ which after all had in the army's eyes had shamefully mutinied - was 
not one of them. By 'harmonising' he meant the total subordination of the people to the will 
and goals of the army, and not the other way around, or even some sort of co-equal 
partnership in determining goals and methods. 
172 BA-MA N5-20, pp. 110-111. 
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of course include diplomatie negotiations that might compromise Germany's 
rearmament efforts. After all, for Stülpnagel the conflict with the French 'half-breed 
Volk' was imavoidable, and therefore Germany's only realistic policy should be to 
increase the speed, extent, and secrecy of its rearmament plans, preferably 
implemented by a dictatorial system of govemment committed to the arrny's goal of 
an unlimited 'war of libération'. As he remarlced to a friend in January 1924, 'It is our 
misfortune to lack in Germany a man of outstanding qualities, who can and will rule 
dictatorially. We would support such a man, but we neither wish to nor can play that 
rôle ourselves.'173 The task of the politicians was thus to achieve swift rearmament by 
every possible means, whether they and the German people liked it or not: 
This danger [French preventive war] is so great that we must work against 
it with any and all methods. These are . . . politicai leadership, which must 
orient itself toward évasion and delay. The responsible statesman must 
have the courage to confront the unpopularity he will face from nationalist 
sentiment in the country . . . [S]ecurity précautions surrounding our 
préparations take on the greatest importance. If we do not summon up the 
necessary national discipline - secrecy, concealment, deniability - 1 see 
our task as hopeless. Blatherers and those elements who seek to exploit the 
préparation of external war for domestic politicai ends must go in front of 
a criminal judge, for the well-being of the state is in play.174 
9. The irrelevance of international politics 
Yet Stülpnagel's most obvious display of his inherited world-view was related to his 
analysis of and opinions on the nature, structure and workings of international politics, 
173 Hürten, ed., Das Krisenjahr 1923, p. 243; emphasis in original. 
174 'Gedanken', BA-MA, N5-10, pp. 44-45. 
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and of the desired design and conduct of Germany's grand strategy. To begin with, 
and as a resuit of Stülpnagel's limited understanding of international politics, his 
politicai analysis displayed his customary narrow-minded, one-dimensional quality. 
After briefly considering the possible rôles that Great Britain and Russia might play in 
a future war, he concluded that Germany's most relevant enemies were France ('oui* 
mortai adversary') and Poland.175 Since Stülpnagel could not have even imagined a 
solution to Germany's post-1918 problems that did not entail the use of force, war was 
by définition inévitable and necessary; the only question was, against whom, at least 
initially? 
When I thus see the precondition for the possibility of war in the moral 
and material support of foreign powers, I nevertheless do not suffer from 
the conceit that a beneficent providence will offer us a war between 
England (sic) and France . . We must prepare ourselves to stand alone at 
first against France and Poland, and perhaps Belgium; other powers [will] 
only gradually take our side.176 
Moreover, and despite his acute analysis of Germany's military options and 
possibilities, Stülpnagel never managed to expand the boundaries of his security 
perceptions, and break the mental framework fixed in his mind at least since the 
World War. The professional integrity and expertise that produced notably realistic 
assessments of Germany 's military capabilities were closely related to the same 
limited framework that hampered him in his efforts to conceptualise his country's 
politicai interests. Not only did he call for unlimited rearmament that would put 
Germany under severe economic strain and in ever-present danger of occupation by 
175 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
176 Ibid., p. 8. 
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France;177 he apparently could not understand the extent to which that path would 
damage Germany's international position, and did not consider dangers other than a 
French pre-emptive attack. At the heart of his understanding of the nature of 
international relations stood power, which he understood as being synonymous with 
military power. Without suffïcient arms, Germany was of necessity easy prey for its 
neighbour's power-political rapacity.178 Its only hope, which justified any potential 
danger deriving from its fulfilment, was rearmament. With anns, there might be a war 
that Germany could win; without anns, there surely would be a war that Gennany 
would shamefully lose. Stülpnagel had constantly displayed an extremely blinkered 
understanding of strategie threats and was never able to accept factors such as 
economic might and international alliances as strategie assets equal in importance to 
armaments, troops, and Geist}19 
Entirely typically in view of the precepts and intellectual background that 
constrained Stülpnagel's thought, the need to reann — however counter to Gennany's 
overall national interests rearmament might be - thus transcended in his eyes ail other 
interests, aspirations or policy considérations. His reasoning left no room for nuanced 
calculations of the sort advanced in Groener's elegant and elaborate later conceptions. 
In Stülpnagel's view, suffìcient armaments and powerful armed forces were the 
fundamental attributes of the position of strength without which no state could hope to 
negotiate successfully with its peers - and such negotiations were in his eyes 
177 Geyer, 'Strategy', p. 560. 
178 'Entwurf, BA-MA N5-20, pp. 72-73. 
179 See for instance Groener's 1924 letter to Stülpnagel urging him to include in his 
analysis the United States, as an overwhelming political and economic power that affected all 
European conflicts and their aftermaths - a factor that Stülpnagel scarcely mentioned, much 
less dealt with at length in his Strategie planning (BA-MA N5-20, pp. 70-71). 
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inséparable from incessant threats of force.180 Armaments were not, under any 
circumstances, themselves negotiable - not even if their acquisition or possession 
directly threatened Germany's international position and security interests; in effect, 
in Stülpnagel's world-view, any such scenario was logically impossible.181 
Today an awakening is underway in a great part of the Volk, a 
récognition that a people without armaments of its own in this warring 
âge [waffenbiegenden Zeit] can only be the plaything [SpielbalT] of 
other powers, and also that the Diktat of Versailles was only the close of 
one phase of the war, and that a new phase, carried on with the greatest 
bitterness, has followed, a phase that has as its objective the end of 
Germany, the annihilation of its politicai, economic and cultural 
independence [Eigenleben]. Either Germany capitulâtes forever - the 
thought, God be praised, is even today intolerable to every German - or 
Germany seeks once more in a great uprising to decide by force of amis 
the issue of whether 100 (sic) million Germans shall be the slaves of 40 
million Frenchmen.182 
Stülpnagel had no doubts about the only way to settle this question, and it had nothing 
to do with diplomacy: 'No one can paint our current impotence in too hard-headed a 
fashion, if he [also] must bear responsibility for committing German blood to battle. 
Our cry must therefore always be: "Let us arm!"'183 
180 'We must be clear that today we are a defenceless state, and are so considered. We 
can today no longer conduci overseas policy [Weltpolitik]] we have perhaps been thrown back 
by centuries, and must first once more seek to become a continental power . . . We must once 
again take up the position of Prussia in 1813 . . . [And] what I have set forth can only be 
implemented if the politicai instrument is [first] placed on a sound footing1 ('Gedanken1, BA-
MA N5-10, pp. 7-8). 
181 Geyer, 'Dynamics', pp. 109-110. 
182 'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 5. 
183 Ibid., p. 46. 
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Revealingly, Stlilpnagel accompanied his cali for unrestrained reannament 
with an economie analysis - but one that had a very différent point of departure than 
Groener's. Economies, for Stlilpnagel, merely involved statistical compilations 
indicating the quantifies of arms, munitions and other militaiy products a country 
could manufacture, and was no more than an instrument meant to facilitate war, and 
logically subordinate to its demands. In his extensive survey of the 'war of the future', 
Sttilpnagel even found room for a brief discussion of économies and its relation to 
war. Since his planning assumed from the outset the partial or complete destruction of 
Germany, including its economy, he - logically enough - considered a strong 
economy as an important but not decisive factor. Stulpnagel was ready to 
compromise: 'With regard to economie issues, it is enough to say that a people must 
live before it can fîght. Starving masses are only capable of riots; they will feebly and 
miserably collapse as soon as they face a serious adversary.'184 
Especially in the case of economie planning, Stulpnagel's analysis exposed the 
unwillingness of Gennany's military leadership to implement what even its members 
recognised as central lessons of the World War. Stulpnagel, along with many of his 
colleagues, had realised that strategie planning and the conduct of war entailed a much 
broader range of activities than the OHL had imagined or had been willing to engage 
in; that was particularly true of economie planning and of the structural reorganisation 
of the state administration needed to meet wartime requirements. In short, Germany 
must develop more comprehensive as well as more thorough war planning and 
préparations; and the Generalstab, which lacked sufficient knowledge, manpower and 
experience for that task, would have to trust, cooperate fully with, and share authority 
with the civilian government. But from time immémorial, every German military 
184 Ibid., p. 10. 
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instinct counselled abhorrence of any such possibility; the army inevitably aspired 
to reserve all war planning and decision-making prérogatives to itself, while 
simultaneously showing no real interest in any planning that was not strictly 
'military', that is, operational. The resuit was an unbridgeable gap, a striking 
dissonance; even an offïcer such as Stülpnagel, who had founded his concepts on 
civilian coopération, whether free or coerced, thus found himself coraered into briefly 
mentioning économies, and then leaving it completely out of his or anyone's area of 
responsibility: 
Economic mobilisation must be so [well] organized, that in the event of 
war the entire national economy can be shifted to new tasks and can work 
for the war unconditionally from day one onward. It would be tempting to 
go into ail these questions, on which I have only touched briefly. They 
[economic préparations] are however not part of my remit, and I would 
like to express the hope that I might occasionally discuss [these matters] 
with those more expert than myself.185 
That 'hassle-free' approach - admitting non-military aspects of strategie conduci and 
planning are vital but focusing on operational planning issues nevertheless - not only 
echoed the Reichswehr3s past, but also testified to its continued vitality. 
10. 'Holdlingl doggedlv to the aim of annihilation' 
Did Stülpnagel then rightly deserve his later réputation as a revolutionary theorist and 
planner? He never saw himself, nor was he seen by his colleagues, as such. His vision 
never demanded a complete divorce from the powerful constraints that regulated his 
thought and set the analytical boundaries of his heuristics. Stülpnagel sought to 
185 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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readjust - and succeeded in readjusting - his fraine of thought, rather than 
breaking with it; he criticised the mental ossification around him, but not the 
fundamental truths about warfare, strategy, and the conduct of war that had caused the 
stagnation that he denounced. In his call for new, more relevant operational concepts 
he was merely trying to serve perennial goals in more appropriate, practical, and 
rational ways: 
We must hold doggedly to the aim of the annihilation [Vernichtung] of the 
enemy in a great battle, [but] we must consider the path to that objective 
far more carefully than heretofore. Our times demand methods différent 
from those of the World War! [And] so long as this is not clearly 
recognized, it is best that we not [re-]issue old formulas as new field 
service régulations for combat leaders.186 
The inconsistency and confusion that later surrounded the character and 
qualifies of Stülpnagel's vision resulted from the clash between (i) his sound critique 
of the Reichswehr's stagnant interprétation of operational axioms on the one hand, 
and (ii) his adherence to those very same axioms when offering his own analysis on 
the other. True, Stülpnagel sharply criticised the clinging to operational concepts that 
were no longer practical or reasonable. But his answer conformed to yet another 
traditional pattern - the scaling-up of tactics into operational and even strategie 
concepts, and a parallel scaling-down of strategie planning and thought into simplistic 
tactical formulas.187 
Stülpnagel had also called for a thorough rethinking of past practices and a 
search for new frames of thought. But what did he offer instead? A war so total it 
186 My emphasis: Stülpnagel's official reply to T4 regarding Hierl's 'Leitlinien für die 
obere Führung im Kriege' (undated, probably summer 1924, BA-MA, RH2-2901). 
187 See Chapter 1. 
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lacked boiindaries or goals, and in which the chances of success depended upon 
putative German virtues and unrestrained ruthlessness: a war based on a pian devoid 
of strategie non-military calculations, utterly contemptuous of diplomacy, and 
necessitating unrestricted means and suicidai willingness to sacrifice everything in the 
name of an 'honourable' finale. His operational concepts derived from the same 
addiction to annihilation regardless of operational plausibility and strategie realism. 
And the centrality that he attributed to Geist also suggests that Stülpnagel shared with 
his colleagues more traditional convictions and pattems than he rejected. 
Accepting Stülpnagel's version of the war of the future as novel would force 
the reader to ignore the tenets underlying his vision. Stülpnagel's fundamental 
strategie and operational world-view, seemingly so différent from Groener's, although 
actually similar to Groener's total war argument of 1927, stemmed from the same 
limited reservoir of possibilities that had inhibited German military thought since the 
nineteenth Century; its very 'radicalism' was an accurate and 'realistic' expression of 
that limited reservoir, as it was understood in the 1920s Reichswehr. In that sense, 
Stülpnagel was indeed far more realistic and down-to-earth than Groener. He 
disdained time-honoured pathos, ancient buzzwords, and Schlieffenesque great plans; 
instead he fashioned his héritage into a plan that was conceivable and plausible to 
those who shared his tenets and believed in their eternai pertinence. The différence 
between Stülpnagel and Groener is therefore not in their shared departure point and 
system of beliefs, but in their différent perceptions of its applicability in the second 
half of the 1920s, perceptions that derived primarily from their différent posts and 
responsibilities. 
Stülpnagel represented the most serious, rational attempi to adjust German 
military theory to post-1918 realities. Not Stülpnagel the offìcer but the basic military 
Weltanschauung he inherited was itself radicai and extreme; any rational adjustment 
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to or relevant manifestation of its tenets in postwar Germany would hâve been 
'radical'. That is the reason Stülpnagel's colleagues did not criticise his ideas as 
irrational, extreme, or implausible. On the contrary: they were thoroughly examined, 
that is, they were treated as a possible strategy and operational concept.188 In that 
sense, Stülpnagel failed for the most unexpected reason: he was not radical enough. 
Had he fully exploited the possibilités of a prolonged 'people's war' - which would 
have obviously and comprehensively ruined Germany, but Stülpnagel was 
wholeheartedly Willing to risk Germany's existence as a basic assumption in his 
planning - without also proposing 'real' operational initiatives, he would have 
rightMly earned his place in a radicai pantheon. 
But any such break with the army's raison d'être was far from Stülpnagel's 
mind. Above all, Stiilpnagel sought to adjust - and succeeded in adjusting - the 
traditional patterns of the army's operational concepts to the grim reality that he faced. 
Fortified by the typical obtuseness of his ilk against the mere possibility that the 
people might not joyously lay down their lives in a Wagnerian Endkampf with 
Germany in fiâmes - in fact, against the possibility that war planning and war aims 
have facets other than purely military ones, Stülpnagel was incapable of producing 
anything other than a self-destructive plan for future war. His analysis of Germany's 
strategie situation was the most sober, sharp and clear-sighted that the Reichswehr of 
the mid- and late 1920s produced. That those qualifies did not characterise his 
resulting planning testify to the self-imposed blindness that his precepts dictated. 
188 As well as branding him as radical and his planning as illusory, scholars agree that 
Stülpnagel deeply affected Reichswehr operational planning: 'his "Thoughts on the War of the 
Future" formed the basis and provided an impulse for planning that went far beyond the 
strictly military sphere' (Deist, 'Rearmament', p. 378; see also Geyer, 'Dynamics', p. 110). 
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III. Hans von Seeckt 
An authentic aristocrat in manner, he brilliantly personified the old-school 
Prussian officer type.'89 
His giratesi strengths were in areas long-studied and familiar. Novelty he 
viewed with scepticism; nothing new [ever] crossed his mind.190 
Hans von Seeckt, anny chief of staff in 1919-20 and Chef der Heeresleitung from 
1921 to 1926, was — and is still seen as — the saviour of the Reichswehr. He allegedly 
reawakened the army's faith in a technologically advanced war of movement aiming 
at decisive battles of annihilation, and set in stone the army's faith in the infallibility 
of traditional operational notions. Most of all, he has figured as the man who revived 
the defeated army's self-confidence and thus marked out the path for the retura of 
Germany's famous tactical and operational superiority.191 Seeckt thus ostensibly 
provided an indispensable service to the Reichswehr, and rightly earaed his place in 
the German military pantheon. But in so doing he also iliade an unconscious yet 
crucial décision that dramatically affected the army's entire future trajectory: he chose 
self-preservation through intellectual stagnation and unrealism over the anny's past, 
present, and future, and over the realistic assessment of its capabilities, role, resulting 
doctrine, politicai goals, and future plans. In short, as the head of the German army 
and the most influential military figure of the Reichswehr he preferred, faithful to the 
organisation's pre-existing cultural patterns, to follow the army's narrowly perceived 
self-interest. He traded the present for the past and the future, and dangerously 
189 Stülpnagel on Seeckt, in Stülpnagel, 75 Jahre Meines Lehens, p. 189. 
190 Blomberg on Seeckt, quoted in Geyer, Aufrüstung, 81. 
191 See for example Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg, pp. 5, 7-72; idem, The 
German Way ofWar (Lawrence, KA, 2005), pp. 240-244. 
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distanced the army from the here and now of 1920s Germany and the limitations 
that the postwar situation imposed.192 
Correspondingly, Seeckt's agenda of refurbishing traditions 'abandoned' or 
'distorted' during the war necessitated the elevation of the consequences of these 
traditions into undeniable doctrinal and operational successes so great that they could 
not be doubted, much less radically amended or ignored, while simultaneously 
striving against the limitations of Versailles, and effectively imposing the army's own 
foreign policy on the Republic. The quintessence of Seeckt's legacy to the army was 
his agenda of ignoring reality and cultivating a comforting altemative reality, while 
remaining oblivious of the political, economic and even security ramifications of his 
choices.193 
In Seeckt's defence, his decisión was probably the only one that could have 
salvaged some form of cohesion, unity, and sense of institutional identity for the 
Reichswehr. Facing reality and the naked truth — that the army itself had utterly failed 
in the mission it set itself, and had brought military and political calamity on 
On Seeckt's escapism - his focus on putative future capabilities rather than present 
impotence - see Geyer, Aufrüstung, pp. 77-80. 
193 For a substantially différent view, see Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg, pp. 34 and 10-11, 
who claims that Seeckt, as the commander of a defeated anny, had sought and instilled a 
*new, novel and modem .. . military doctrine', despite of his 'conservative' and even 
'reactionary' views. Citino lavishes praise on Seeckt for his allegedly open-minded approach 
(also commenting that Seeckt 'refused to wear blinkers': German Way ofWar, p. 240); he 
assumed that 'lt would have been the easiest thing in the world for Seeckt, forced by the 
Versailles Treaty to maintain a state of military wealcness, to ignore the unpleasant 
experiences of the war, to succumb to the Iure of nostalgia, and to look longingly on the past 
and ape the doctrine of Moltke and Schlieffen in a sterile and uncreative fashion' (Path to 
Blitzkrieg, p. 35). Yet that claim could scarcely be further from the truth. Even before the war 
ended, and in its best traditions of self-analysis, the German army had inaugurated a massive 
research effort to draw out and assimilate the lessons of the war (see Markus Pöhlmann, 
'Yesterday's Batties and Future War. The German Officiai Military History, 1918-1939', in 
Shadows of Total War, pp. 223-238, and James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg [Lawrence, 
KA, 1992], pp. 1-24, 37-39). Ignoring the acute need for self-assessment would have been 
simply unprofessional, and unthinkable for Seeckt. But even the most honest intentions, such 
as those Seeckt presumably entertained, cannot compensate for detachment from reality and 
heuristic poverty. Seeckt's ability to see around his blinkers was and remained severely 
limited. 
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Germany, might have so damaged the self-assurance, public réputation, and 
politicai standing of the officer corps that the Reichswehr 's very existence would have 
been in doubt. Nor were Seeckt or other senior officers personally inclined toward or 
capable of putting aside the lenses through which they experienced and understood 
their world. In that sense, Seeckt's clinging to old precepts and to the basic claim that 
déviations from orthodoxy had doomed Gennany in the World War, coupled with his 
attempi to prepare the execution of traditional operational axioms with new 
technology that would promise victory in the next, was in effect the only policy he and 
his colleagues were capable of imagining and following. 
The very source of Seeckt's immense influence over the officers of the 
Reichswehr was therefore the powerful self-deception that he helped to create and 
legitimize. He was both allegedly sober and aware of the army's dire situation, and at 
the same time reassuringly optimistic about its future: 
I have already made clear that we are in no condition to resist militarily. I 
will not even mention numbers, [for] today's warfare also requires the 
provision of technological means, heavy artillery, aircraft, tanks, and 
especially munitions. Look the situation in the face. We must bear it; puny 
and narrow was the bridge that led over the abyss, and tortuous the road 
on either side, but we have put them behind us; I am hopeful that the 
flatlands lie before us. I believe in our future.194 
Yet as the humiliating results of the Ruhr Crisis so well demonstrated, a dangerous 
and eventually semi-permanent detachment from immediate realities lay at the root of 
Seeckt's optimism. 
194 BA-MA N247-75, 'Ansprache', 10 July 1920, pp. 23-27. 
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Periods of social unrest, transformation, or crisis can sometimes induce 
deep systemic and cultural change - both in modes of experience and in 'natural' 
habits.195 But the post-war Reichswehr 's existing cultural assumptions remained 
firmly locked in place. If araiy doctrine and practice had not failed Germany in 1914— 
18, there was no need to challenge them. Instead, their further enforcement and the 
repression of any 'déviations' was the obvious line to follow. The army, by explaining 
defeat without re-examining its own fundamental beliefs, preserved its institutional 
identity. But the price it paid in return was heavy; setting this identity and its 
accompanying practices in stone as unchallengeable truths meant sacrificing the 
possibility of genuine learning from past mistakes, of effectively assessing reality, and 
of flexibly re-evaluating basic ideas, assumptions and practices as ever-changing 
conditions demanded. The complete and overt disregard of real-world demands and 
limitations that still baffles readers of German interwar military writings, as well as 
students of German military planning in the Second World War, originated and was 
nurtured in German military culture long before the 1920s. And thereafter Seeckt's 
agenda legitimised the irrelevance of reality to military planning, and thus presented 
the army, along with the chance to prosper and excel for a time at the tactical level, its 
ultimate death-sentence. 
Hans von Seeckt is the most clear-cut example of the argument at the core of 
this thesis, that between 1919 and 1938 no paradigmatic shift in military concepts 
occurred in the German army - and especially not during the 1920s, in which the most 
prominent of Germany's military brains closely followed and conformed to the army's 
organisational culture. In words and deeds alike, Seeckt's prime motivation was to re-
establish and revive - with minor adjustments and improvements - certainly not to 
195 Swidler, 'Culture in Action', pp. 278-280. 
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revolutionise. Unlike Groener and Stülpnagel, he never aspired to change; as 
Stülpnagel retrospectively remarked, this was 'an old general, who held existing 
circumstances to be good, and desired no further innovations in the anny5 once the 
Reichswehr had been Consolidated.196 Seeckt's program, his vision and his pian to 
rebuild the anny from the ruins, rested on the restoration of old notions that allegedly 
- and with disastrous conséquences — had not been respected or implemented. Yet 
what precise system of military beliefs did Seeckt promote, and how did he aspire to 
apply it? What concepts did he oppose, and why? And what was the price that he 
unintentionally committed the amiy to paying, by prefemng to strengthen the 
Reichswehr's self-esteem and status at the expense of realistic self-assessment? 
1. Military world-view and operational vision: forgetting nothing 
Reflecting back in 1933 on his career and on the foimdations of his military analysis, 
Seeckt commented that: 
The development of German military institutions in the fifty years before 
the war had involved continuous standardization and hannonization; the 
war itself had in its naturai course moved things further along that road. 
The récréation of the anny begun after the war, under the pressure of 
events and the conditions imposed [at Versailles] could only bring this 
process to its conclusion if something new and vital could be created, and 
this could only succeed through the coordination of ali concerned for the 
achievement of a single goal.197 
But what exactly did Seeckt mean, beyond his stress on the increasing domination of 
the Kaiserreiches Pmssian military core over the annies of the lesser federai states, 
196 Stülpnagel, 75 Jahre meines Lebens, p. 234. 
197 Seeckt, Die Reichswehr (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 54-55. 
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and what were the décisions and conduci involved in this self-proclaimed mixture 
of tradition and innovation? 
Seeckt's faith in a war of movement and his attempts to resurrect that concept 
have made him the talisman of German military brilliance, and, as mentioned, have 
spared him some of the criticism that post-1945 military history literature has 
showered upon his colleagues. Expressing faith in mobile opérations and attempting to 
rebuild an army to execute such opérations was no obvious military agenda in 1919, 
as the internar trajectory of the French army demonstrates.198 But the question 
remains whether Seeckt stuck to his guns as a gifted and far-sighted military planner 
reacting intelligently to the crisis of mobility - thus initiating a new doctrine for the 
Reichswehr199 - or whether he simply clung blindly to the old and familiar, aiming 
merely to reuse the same purportedly winning formula with improvements that would 
allow Germany to re-launch the same war that it had just lost, but in a fashion that 
would be winnable.200 The strengthening of traditional doctrinal tendencies and 
operational faith in itself was exactly what the Reichswehr needed as an institution. 
But that is all it was: a clinging to traditional patterns, often insufficiently adapted or 
even completely unsuitable to new politicai, strategie, and technological realities. 
198 See Deist's analysis of the army's early and mid-1920s internai debate over the 
reasons for the failure of the Schlieffen plan — a debate over the plausibility of achieving swift 
décision in the âge of mass armies. Such reassurance 'seemed to be necessary', especially in 
light of the indecisive positional warfare of 1914-18: Deist, 'Reichswehr and National 
Defence', pp. 378-379; see also Gross, 'Dogma der Beweglichkeit', pp. 154-156. For an 
analysis of the role of Seeckt's vision of small, high-quality, mobile armies, supported by air 
forces as the theoretical foundation of Blitzkrieg warfare, see Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. 
Greenwood, The Blitzkrieg Legend (Annapolis, 2005), p. 331. 
199 As suggested by Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg, pp. 5, 7-11; likewise Matthias Strohn, 
'Hans von Seeckt and his Vision of a "Modem Army'", War in History 12:3 (2005), pp. 334-
335. 
200 As Geyer had argued in Aufrüstung, pp. 79-80; idem, 'German Strategy', pp. 555-
557. 
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Seeckt was a highly intelligent man, and his approach was naturally 
scarcely one-dimensional and simplistic. But it was also less sophisticated and 
advanced than usually depicted. One example is Seeckt's often-mentioned detestation 
of catchphrases, including the invocation of the sacred battle of Cannae, and of 
simple-minded dichotomies such as the strategy of destraction versus the strategy of 
exhaustion.201 Yet what might seem as nuanced critique of his era's gospels was 
actually far from it. Seeclct's 'campaign' against 'catchphrases' was in reality, for all 
his elegance of style, a recapitulation of rnilitarist notions that nakedly exposed his 
rigid world-view and limited political understanding. Seeckt thus rejected 'pacifism', 
since 
[w]ar and peace are decided by higher powers than princes, statesmen, 
parliaments, treaties and alliances - they are decided by the etemal laws 
which govem the growth and decay of nations . . . the kind of pacifist who 
would deliberately malce his own nation defenceless in such fateful 
encounters . . . deserves to be hanged to the nearest lamp-post'.202 
'Imperialism', the catchword that summed up so many of Wilhelmine 
Germany's attitudes and policies, Seeckt sought by contrast to re-habilitate: 
Unfortunately, the word [imperialism] is often used in public to designate 
and confute every strong démonstration of vitality, every expression of the 
will to survive in the great struggle of nations . . . only the Englishman is 
permitted to view the conception of 'empire' as a reflection of legitimate 
pride in a might which encompasses the earth; in any other nation 
201 See for instance Citino, German Way ofWar, pp. 240, 242. 
202 Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, trans. Gilbert Waterhouse (London, 1930), 
p. 6. 
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'imperialism' clearly implies a treasonable menace to the peace of the 
world.203 
And accordingly 'militarism . . ha[d] become almost a term of abuse'; but 
unjustly so, as Seeckt echoed, with perfect pitch, the 1914-18 effusions of German 
savants and public figures: 'I assert that militarism made first Prussia, then Germany 
great and strong . . . it enabled us to resist a hostile world for four years and . . . 
repelled waves of Bolshevism . . . Prussia and Germany of to-day owe their survival to 
the old militarism'. Nor did Seeckt neglect the complaint that 'patriotism' in other 
countries was attacked as 'militarism' in Germany, and concluded by warning of the 
fatal consequences of catchwords - Germany had been forced to agree at Versailles to 
the destruction of its armed forces because of its so-called 'imperialistic' and 
'militaristic' aims.204 Small wonder than that the man who based his outlook on the 
very mainstream of general staff thought concomitantly adhered to the set of 
operational formulas that mainstream abided by and dictated. 
2. Modern warfare, modern armies, antique dogma 
Seeckt is most famous for translating his operational vision, which stemmed from his 
assumptions regarding the nature of modern warfare and the lessons of the World 
War, into detailed structural and operational conclusions, based on the employment of 
a small, well-equipped and highly mobile professional army backed up by a larger 
militia.205 That army would be able to absorb the enemy's initial blow, reorganise, and 
203 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
204 Ibid., pp. 7-8. The same logic caused Seeckt, in his prophetic mode, to claim 
expectantly that 'war of aggression' was a defmition imposed by the Victors, and that a war of 
aggression was, in effect, 'only a defensive policy (like preventive war)' (ibid., p. 13). 
205 Seeckt had entertained this idea as early as February 1919, in a letter to Groener 
that elaborated his grand scheme of rebuilding the German army, and included at-length 
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deliver a decisive blow of its own. Thoroughgoing emphasis on combined-arms 
opérations, coupled with force-enhancing technologically advanced weapons, would 
facilitate decisive battle; the untrained militia would then assist the professional forces 
in annihilating and mopping up enemy forces. Seeckt sought to rebuild the 
Reichswehr according to that concept, based on his projections about the nature of 
modem armies and modem warfare.206 He was and still is persistently praised for the 
supposedly modem elements in his operational concepts, such as 'mobility', 
'combined arms', and most of ail his famous aversion to mass armies. But were these 
views ground-breaking, and did they stem from doubt about the dogmas of the Prusso-
German military creed? 
The tenets of Seeckt's operational world-view were clear enough. 'If we give 
the conception "Cannae" its right meaning, we find that it implies insistence on that 
method of warfare which leads to the destruction of the enemy. This is to be the most 
surely attained by a vigorous envelopment of his two flanks - see Cannae'.207 The 
logie Seeckt displayed from this point on was clear, coherent, and utterly flawed. 
Seeckt held to pre-existing operational truths, even when aware of drawbaclcs that 
might prevent the fulfilment of the German army's prescribed formula. Thus, while 
explaining that double envelopment was only possible when enjoying superiority of 
force and a favourable strategie deployment, Seeckt concluded that in the absence of 
both, and when a 'Cannae' envelopment was impossible, 'it must at ail costs be kept 
discussions of force structure and the division of labour between the line and militia (BA-MA 
N247-77, pp. 8-9). 
206 For a succinct and balanced analysis of Seeckt's operational vision that elegantly 
places it in its theoretical and operational context, see Wallach, Dogma, pp. 229-240. 
207 Seeckt, Thoughîs of a Soldier, p. 10. 
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in mind that any form of envelopment, if only on one flank, is the surest road to 
annihilating success' 208 
Indeed the series of manuals produced in the early 1920s, faithfully reflecting 
Seeckt's operational beliefs, recommended that operational technique as the most 
reliable one for achieving annihilation.209 As the momentous field service régulations 
of 1921, 'Command and Combat with Combined Arms' (H.Dv. 487, Führung und 
Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen or F.u.G.) succinctly explained, 
The attack alone snatches the initiative from the enemy. It gives the füllest 
scope to the superiority of leaders and units. The envelopment of one or 
both flanks and attack on the enemy's rear is especially effective. Thus 
can the enemy be annihilated [.Hierdurch kann der Feind vernichtet 
werden]. All attack Orders must bear the stamp of the most extreme 
decisiveness. The leader's will to victory [Siegeswille] must penetrate 
down to the last rifleman 210 
Seeckt was engaged in what he honestly believed to be a sincere, genuine, and even 
painful process of learning the lessons of the World War, a process also expressed in 
his reflections on military history and practice. Yet his attempi to draw lessons well 
illuminâtes the conceptual boundaries that obscured his thought. Seeckt directly 
acknowledged that envelopment was not the operational aim or norm in numerous 
battles, and suggested frontal attack as the most effective possible solution when 
either single or double envelopment was impossible. In strong words he denounced 
208 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
209 Interestingly, the impossibility of fully annihilating a modern mass army was not 
one of the characteristics, challenges, and setbacks pertinent to such armies that Seeckt 
discussed; at the very heart of his otherwise critical analysis of modern warfare, Vernichtung 
remained unchallenged as the primary goal and rationale for action. 
210 H.Dv. 487, Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen (F.u.G.), Part 1 (Berlin, 
1921), p. 9. 
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the 'military precept' that had dominated German campaigning in 1914-18 and 
had persisted in German military thought after the war: 
In post-war manoeuvres the desire for envelopment at any price and the 
extension of the front [in an attempt to outflank the enemy] until it ceased 
to be a front at ali had to be combated as though there had never been a 
war to teach us. The conséquences which this craze for envelopment 
produced in the war were inevitable.211 
Yet as already suggested, Seeckt's analysis in no way altered the simple 
tactical and operational guidelines at the core of Reichswehr doctrine, guidelines that 
also carried Seeckt's signature. Führung und Gefecht naturally followed this line, 
once again stressing envelopment as all-purpose panacea: 
Pursuit harvests the fruits of victory. The pursuit strives for the 
annihilation of the enemy if this was not possible in the preceding 
fighting. Préparations for pursuit should be made early, [and] stili 
uncommitted units launched along a decisive avenue of attack. Impact on 
the flanks and rear of the enemy remains the aim for which to stri ve. 
Troop fatigue is never sufficient reason for wholly or partially neglecting 
717 
the pursuit. 
Even Seeckt's harshest critique did not suggest any drastic change of means and 
methods, much less the répudiation of Gennany's acclaimed military masters whose 
example the araiy should follow. Like virtually every other German officer seeking to 
prove or disprove military wisdom, Seeckt calledupon 'Schlieffen himself to validate 
other forms of battle as legitimate: ' . in his plan for a war with France, [Schlieffen] 
renounced all attempts at double envelopment in favour of re-enforcement of the 
211 Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, p. 11. 
212 H.Dv. 487, Führung und Gefecht, Part 1 (1921), p. 10. 
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decisive right wing'.213 Above ali else, Seeckt never doubted that the one decisive 
battle, whatever operational forni it might take, would remain the key to successful 
campaigns and wars; he was incapable of envisaging, rauch less developing, a 
strategie outlook free of the all-embracing tactical logie of the battle of annihilation. 
Seeckt's adherence to decisive Vemichtungsschlachì as the motivation, prime 
goal, and basic logie of strategie and operational planning can also explain the small 
to non-existent attention he devoted to strategie questions that extended beyond the 
very narrowest operational framework. If battle was still the key to successful 
warfìghting, why should anyone waste doctrinal effort and attention on minor matters 
such as economic mobilisation and coopération with the civilian government? 
Seeckt's force planning and proposed military build-up not only accommodated the 
demands of rapid, mobile warfare, but also spared the army from the annoyance and 
distraction of genuine strategie planning and war conduci214 
Seeckt's adherence to the pivotai dictum of decisive battle and to its rigid 
operational implications is most evident in his analysis of the strategy of destruction 
versus the strategy of exhaustion. Sharp as always, Seeckt mocked those who 
conveniently placed the 'Hindenburg-Ludendorff regime5 under the 'Clausewitz-
Schlieffen doctrine of "destruction of enemy forces'" while marginalising 
Falkenhayn's era as a 'feeble strategy of exhaustion'; Seeckt knew that neither the 
second nor the third OHL had neglected the destruction of the enemy as guiding 
principle and highest goal of war, and that both stratégies had been understood and 
framed with that aim in mind: 
213 Ibid. 
214 See Deist's assertion that Seeckt's small operational army plan 'offered the 
advantage of avoiding two main problems .. the motivation of the population and the 
readjustment of industry. Such factors were irrelevant to Seeckt's preferred kind of warfare' 
(Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 363). That preference further deepened the German army's 
indifférence to in-depth strategie planning. 
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[in the World War ] . . . our means to pursue a strategy of destruction in the 
decisive military sense failed . . . our only hope was that our enemies, 
impressed by this desperate resistance, migh t . . . grow weary of the 
tedious strife . . . every one of these sorties was conducted with the will to 
secure a decision . . the soldier know only one aim of the war: the 
destruction of the enemy forces.215 
The 1924 capsule summary annex of Führung und Gefecht emphatically reiterated 
this wisdom, and explained fiirther that: 
Only pursuit consummates victory. In the pursuit the annihilation of the 
enemy should be sought by overtaking him and seeking to cut off his 
retreat. Successful pursuit makes further battle unnecessary. Thus even 
today the saying that 'the last breath of man and horse' must be committed 
to the pursuit is binding. Even a victorious unit is exhausted . . . [But] the 
leader who recognizes in good time the approach of victory [der den 
heranreifenden Sieg rechtzeitig anerkannt] can fashion an 'ordinary 
victory'' into an annihilational decision [kann aus einem 'ordinären Sieg' 
eine vernichtende Entscheidung gestalten] even with numerically inferior 
forces. For that purpose the mobility of all units, especially artillery and 
air assets, and all available transport is to be exploited . . . ,216 
The means that would allow the resurrection of the war of movement and thus 
achieve annihilation were modern technology in the form of aircraft, tanks, mobile 
artillery, and the like; Seeckt earned his favourable reputation in the eyes of scholars 
215 Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, pp. 14-17. See also a similar remark from Seeckt's 
'Moderne Heere' article of 1928, cited by Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg, p. 10. 
216 H.Dv. 487, Führung und Gefecht, Part 3, Einführung und Stichwortverzeichnis 
(1924), pp. 30-31. 
156 
through his specifically technological approach to modem warfare.217 He is 
consequently often described as a brilliant planner, open to incorporate and cleverly 
employ technological advances, although Seeckt's faith in the continuing if limited 
operational value of cavalry - and insistence on retaining the lance - tarnished his 
supposedly sophisticated technological verve and understanding in the eyes of some, 
despite his careful réservations.218 
Seeckt had no interest in technology per se, nor was he Willing to amend 
doctrine in light of or in the service of technological advances and requirements. His 
approach to technology - as Schlieffen's before him and many others after him - was 
practical and utilitarian: how can technology serve the army in realising Us currertt 
doctrinal goals? Seeckt was thus Willing to mix old means and objectives with new 
technology. Technology was never an end in itself or a decisive factor in doctrinal 
development; it was simply an aid, one among many, to an operational goal — decisive 
battle - that was always prior and superior to the means used to achieve it: 
It is the specific characteristic of the art of leadership that it concentrâtes 
ail available forces for the décision. Greater mobility must often 
counterbalance numerical inferiority. In this connection the marching 
performance of troops, the use of rail, motor transport, and all manner of 
vehicles, as well as the exploitation of night to conceal movement play 
notable rôles. Frequently the commander [Führer] will have to made do 
with forces that seem to him inadequate. Such situations require 
217 See for instance Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg, p. 9, Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 363, 
and Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 31-33. 
218 Blomberg proposes depriving the cavalry of its lances; Seeckt disapproves: Kirsten 
A. Schäfer, Werner von Blomberg. Hitlers erster Feldmarschall (Paderborn, 2006), pp. 58-59 
and note 313, p. 230. 
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correspondingly greater economy [of force] in areas [that are] not decisive 
for the battle.219 
Finally, Seeckt had yet another vital operational value to impart in his manual 
and to his araiy; a force so vital that it determined the outcome of battles and 
campaigns: 'The décision must always be a whole-hearted one [Der Entschluss muss 
immer ein ganzer sein]. Only the will to victory can ensure victory . . .'.220 Seeckt's 
faith in moral qualities was not restricted to such characteristic expressions of the will 
to win, crucial as it might be to the combat soldier; he deliberately demanded the kind 
of spirit responsible for the army's radically self-destructive préoccupation with 
tactical victory at all costs: 
[I] thank [you] for recalling [the anniversary of] Gorlice [Seeckt's greatest 
victory, the 1915 breakthrough that cracked open the Russian front]. That 
it was the only [such remembrance] enhances both its merit, and yours . . . 
What a miserable era! . . [And], indeed, a miserable Volk, that cannot 
remember [the things] about itself that were genuinely great and that 
forged victory: extraordinary gallantry, and obedience [Todesmut und 
Gehorsam]. Yet an end will again come; I know not when, but I know it 
will come at some point . . 221 
Seeckt never came close to questioning, much less challenging, what his 
culture affirmed was the nature of warfare and the necessary elements of effective and 
successful combat. Consequently, even when commanding an army wholly unable to 
engage in any fonn of decisive battle - and when partially admitting that such 
décisions could only be achieved by modern armies fighting modern wars — Seeckt 
219 H.Dv. 487, Führung und Gefecht, Part 1 (1921), p. 12 (emphasis in original). 
220 Ibid., p. 9. 
221 Letter of May 1922, quoted in Rabenau, Hans von Seeckt, p. 271. 
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could not have consummated his valid critique by enunciating a new, 
revolutionary, or merely improved doctrine. He remained confined within the very 
same precepts he deplored. Worse, he stamped them indelibly upon the Reichswehr 
for years to come through the power of his post and his charisma and personal 
prestige. 
3. Civil-military relations: learning nothing 
An intriguing trend among military historians tends to generally absolve Seeckt of 
opinions, theories and policies for which his colleagues have been harshly 
criticised.222 Seeckt's world-view and conduct in his relations with the German 
government, and what he deemed to be desirable structure of 'cooperation' or 
'subordination' between the army and the state were all typical of his ilk. His view 
rested on the same traditional concepts and bore the same imaginary scar of civilian 
'defeatism' and 'betrayal' that had purportedly ended the World War with German 
defeat. Yet Seeckt also operated in what he no doubt felt to be a complicated political 
reality, suppressive of and hostile to the army.223 He often used more soothing 
wording in political matters than other Generalstab officers cared to use, presumably 
in order to safeguard the Reichswehr's interests and to cultivate its friends. 
Camouflage, in other words, has favourably affected historians' judgement of Seeckt's 
world-view, of his policies, and of his attitude toward the Republic. Despite the 
indisputable fact that Seeckt conducted his own secret foreign policy and maintained a 
222 For instance, Post (Civil-Military Fabric, p. 95) has claimed that 'Seeckt believed 
that the Clausewitzian principle of political primacy must be revived', while nevertheless 
admitting that Seeckt himself 'challenged' that very same 'dictum'. According to Post, the 
inconsistency resulted from Seeckt's contempt for politicians. But that contempt itself was 
simply yet another facet of Seeckt's inherited normative concept of civil-military relations, 
rather than the source of Seeckt's utterly independent and almost subversive conduct of 
military affairs. 
223 See also Meier-Welcker, Seeckt, p. 282. 
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frosty and sometimes deceptive stance toward the various govemments he was 
sworn to serve and defend, his persuasive déclarations of service to the state still 
affect historical assessments of his conduci. 
One notable example of the manner in which Seeckt managed to speak 
'démocratie republicanism' and mean 'primacy of the army and of its interests over 
civilian requirements and civilian control' was his bid to double the size of the 'dwarf-
army7 forced upon Germany at Versailles: 
The survival [Bestand] and prosperity of the Volk is inextricably linked to 
the Reichswehr. As a part of the Volk and as the most powerful support of 
the state, the Reichswehr must conform to the development of Volk and 
State . . . [a]nd the trust of the Reichswehr in the government and to [its 
own] higher commands . . [as well as] the trust of the Volk in the 
Reichswehr must be sustained, and, when it has been lost, re-
established.224 
That heart-warming introduction preceded Seeckt's suggestion that Germany should 
establish a 200,000-man army instead of the Treaty-mandated 100,000 men, a 
recurring theme of Seeckt's throughout the spring and summer of 1920, not simply as 
a result of security requirements but first and foremost in order to allow the members 
of the now-demobilising Freikorps to join the army legally.225 The Seecktian world-
224 BA-MA N247-67, 18 Aprii 1920, p. 46. 
225 For Seeckt's own thoughts regarding the multifaceted German attempi to révisé the 
terms of Versailles and to create a 200,000-man army, see BA-MA N247-67 pp. 47-48, BA-
MA N247-75, pp. 20-27 and BA-MA N247-77, pp. 8-9. The attempi had failed, according to 
Seeckt, because of the opposition of the Left: ' [a]dmittedly a united front cannot be 
established, since the radicai politicai parties on the Left under the leadership of the 
Independent Socialists have declared themselves against the claims of the armed forces', even 
before he had had the chance to face the French and their 'naked will to annihilation' at the 
Spa conférence: BA-MA N247-75, 'Ansprache an die Offiziere des Reichsministerium', 10 
July 1920, pp. 20-21; see also Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg, p. 30. For a différent analysis of 
Seeckt's original intention in promoting the 200,000-man army, see Strohn, 'Seeckt and his 
Vision', p. 322. Yet Strohn's claim that Seeckt had subordinated his military demands to the 
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view stemined from the assumption that an inherent difference existed between the 
interests of the army and those of the Republic, and that the superiority of the interests 
of the former over those of the latter was self-evident. That claim Seeckt soothingly 
expressed as the army's shared destiny with the state, while ignoring that same state's 
needs, limitations, and expressed will - a stance characterized Seeckt's dealings with 
the Republic from beginning to end. 
Seeckt himself never concealed his fundamental visión of civil-military 
relations and its origin, which firmly placed him at the very heart of the Prusso-
German military tradition. One of the allegedly misguided 'catchphrases' he took 
upon himself to correct in his 'Thoughts of a Soldier1 of 1929-30 was Clausewitz's 
most famous claim that military power must serve political ends and limitations: 'war 
is a continuation of policy by other means' Unintelligently applied, Seeckt argued, 
that catchphrase could be used as 'a premise to the most erroneous conclusions' 226 
Seeckt then set out to explain Clausewitz's real intentions, elucidating the way the 
Germán military leadership had always interpreted Clausewitz. Seeckt understood 
well the theoretical gap between the concept of war as policy and the ideal-type of 
uncontrollable annihilational nature of war. And he made his choice without 
hesitation: 
. . . añer the experience of our own day, Clausewitz's dictum cannot be 
accepted without qualifications, although it must be admitted that political 
presumptions and political preparations have their influence on the 
'political and economic possibilities of the state' (since Seeckt was willing to compromise 
over his initial insistence on 300,000 men) would make Seeckt the most unusual and 
politically - and economically - aware army chief that Germany ever possessed, and ignores 
the general's own well-nigh irrefutable testimony about his motivations at Spa. The same can 
also be said for Meier-Welcker's attribution (Seeckt, pp. 283-284) of the general's insistence 
on a 200,000-men army to his commitment to intemal security, again in direct contrast to 
Seeckt's own words, as well as to his later studied indifference to the fate of the Republic. 
226 Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, p. 8. 
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conduct of war. The quotation from Clausewitz has been misunderstood if, 
as a mere platitude, it obscures Clausewitz's own doctrine of the trite 
nature of war, which has for its object the destruction of the enemy. 
Properly understood, the words quoted mean that war has no existence per 
se, but is joined by laws of its own to the organic life of nations . . . 
Clausewitz . . . himself became a catchword when we piously repeat his 
pronouncements without studying his meaning'.227 
Seeckt naturally presented the two spheres - military and political - as distinct and 
separate from one other. The military sphere was wholly free, in its pursuit of victory 
— which Seeckt conceptualised in military terms alone - of the limitations attending 
the civilian sphere. Seeckt was as adamant as Germany's military leaders before him 
that when it came to war, the army had the first and the last word. That was his 
fundamental philosophical framework, which in effect nullified his ostensible 
tolerance for civilian authority, since for him no such authority could exist once war 
had been launched: 'War aims . . . those things [territorial acquisitions and other 
benefits] would have been the consequences, not the aims, of war. They are political, 
not military problems . . the soldier knows only one aim of war: the destruction of 
228 
the enemy forces'. 
Given that framework of civil-military relations, which established the 
distinctiveness and independence of the army, its conduct and its goals, from civilian 
authority (whatever the form of regime), Seeckt's call for the re-establishment of trust 
227 Ibid., pp. 9-10 (my emphasis). 
228 Ibid., p. 17. Post's almost apologetic suggestion (Civil-Military Fabric, pp. 170-
171) that Seeckt's 'deviation' from the 'principle' of political control resulted from his 
distaste for the Republic and for its party politics is thus unnecessary. Seeckt would have 
exhibited the same aversion to monarchical interference or political guidance in military 
affairs and warfare: 'I use the word "statesmen" in this discussion to mean the political head 
of a state, be it an absolute or constituency limited monarch, a dictator, a president, or a more 
or less anonymous government, or cabinet' (Thoughts of a Soldier, p. 33). 
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between the arniy and the govemment was naturally a one-way Street: the 
govemment had a lot of improving to do: "It is impermissible that only hostile 
comments and [politicai] attacks are brought to the Reichswehl" s attention, while 
signs of care and concern [Fürsorge], of thanks, and of récognition remain 
unexpressed'.229 Seeckt's resentment of the Republic's govemments of course derived 
from far more serious causes; he held the Republic as responsible as the Entente 
powers for the harsh terms of Versailles. Reporting on the anny's failure to secure 
changes to the Treaty 3s military clauses at the Spa conference of July 1920, he bitterly 
commented that . . I spoke against the notion of handing over responsibility to large 
numbers of individuai, the Reichstag, the Reichsrat, [or] the cabinet members in 
Berlin, who would have to permit us to guide them in their décisions, or be excluded 
and placed before a fait accompli\230 
That statement also expressed Seeckt's assumptions regarding the precise 
nature of the relations between the civilian and military echelons of the Weimar 
Republic. The 'pygmy' anny, in Seeckt's words, had no choice but to cooperate with 
the Republic; neither liked one another, but each was dépendent on the other for 
survival.231 In poetically explaining their shared destiny, Seeckt went so far as to 
suggest a shared identity between the ariny and the state; that identity was, however, 
by définition a military one.232 Quite like Stülpnagel, who merged anny and Volk into 
a single entity fighting for and in the name of military values in the future, Seeckt 
229 BA-MA N247-67, 18 April 1920, p. 46. 
230 BA-MA N247-75, 'Ansprache', 10 July 1920 p. 22. 
231 Post, Civil-Military Fabric. See also Deist's explanation of Seeckt's comment: 
since both the dwarf-anny and the Republic in which the army play ed a restri cted politicai 
rôle were Versailles-born 'anomalies', they could thus only be an interim créations, and in that 
sense they would share the same destiny (Deist, 'Reichswehr and National Defence', p. 376). 
232 See also Wallach's similar analysis and interprétation of Seeckt's remark that 'The 
army serves the state and the state alone; for it is itself the state' (Wallach, Dogma, pp. 236-
237). 
163 
merged the army with the state and granted that state military values in the past, 
present, and future. 
This army possessed the unique characteristic that it closely 
accommodated itself to politicai developments, and even after some parts 
of it had confronted one another in enmity [in 1866], had nevertheless 
developed into a uniquely structured whole unifïed around a single 
concept - like the Reich itself. That feeling for order and subordination 
that was rooted in and had been systematically developed among the 
prewar German people, combined with inborn commitment to the 
homeland and long-cultivated submission to the idea of the state, had 
created a people's anny that corresponded as perfectly with Germany's 
unique qualities as [it did] with its [own] historié mission. If the victor 
wished to destroy Germany through the so-called peace settlement, he had 
first of ail to destroy its army.233 
When pressed to the wall in the difficult times of early 1919, Seeckt went so 
far as to stress that a strong army meant a strong Republic. But such statements are 
scarcely evidence of a sudden willingness to subordinate traditional military 
prérogatives to civilian control. Rather, Seeckt's emphasis on power-politics and the 
centrality he ascribed to military might in both internai and foreign affairs, which he 
revealingly reduced to a single entity,234 suggests the kind of shared identity he had in 
mind - an identity that partook far more of the well-known 'army that has a state' than 
vice versa: 
233 Seeckt, Die Reichswehr, pp. 8-9. 
234 See also Seeckt's note that 'if we wish to speak of foreign policy, then we are 
almost compelled to begin with domestic affairs, for internai circumstances provide the 
foundation on which foreign policy must be constructed ' (BA-MA N247-141, p. 97). 
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The domestic power of the state must be based on [military] might. In order 
to govern, the govemment needs a standing army. The strength of that 
standing army has been prescribed to us by the peace settlement [That 
strength] is in addition dépendent on our economie efficiency. [But] 
within those limits, anyone who stili crédits us with a world role [der uns 
noch Weltgeltung zuspricht] must wish for as large a standing anny as 
possible. That [aspiration] has nothing to do with foreign policy aims and 
principles. First the fog of [fine] phrases [and] the pale shroud of anxiety 
must disperse, and our politics must be led by men who will rather than 
[simply] suffer; not one of them will see a strong army as being 
detrimental to his policies.235 
To Seeckt's dissatisfaction, the Republic's government consistently failed to live up to 
the army 's expectation that a façade of de jure civilian control would merely veil the 
army's complete de facto freedom of action. The government, although normally 
Willing to cooperate, could never do enough. Seeckt on his part had maintained a deep 
suspicion of the 'radical left' government, and tried to shield the army as much as 
possible from its dangerous influence. 
But Seeckt's assertion of military primacy had yet another implication, which 
he vigorously enunciated. If 'war influences policy as it is influenced by policy',236 
and if the Republic and its politicians were contemptible, then naturally the army as 
the supreme power within the state should not shy away from itself engaging in the 
international game of power politics. If politicai décision making was to affect 
décisions about war, Seeckt had no intention of leaving that kind of politics to the 
politicians. His contempi for parliamentary politics, exacerbated by his hostility to the 
235 BA-MA N247-77, pp. 8-9. 
236 Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, p. 10. 
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post-1918 regime, prompted Seeckt to exercise his 'authority' and initiate his own 
foreign policy: 
The army is the foundation of state power and [that power1 s] mightiest 
weapon. [The state] must be disposed to commit it to action at any 
moment, and correspondingly prepared. That the anny cannot do, if its 
leadership remains without infonnation on and influence over the internal 
political situation . . . The demand that the anny be kept out of politics is 
indisputably correct . . . [But] this fundamental principie that the anny be 
unpolitical should not be interpreted as . . . barring the anny leadership 
from [playing a role in] the overall development of state policy.237 
Seeckt's anny accordingly took an active part in designing a separate strategie 
frame of action, as well as in setting its own foreign policy goals. The vast 
reannament effort and military build-up that Seeckt promoted directly threatened 
Germany's security. Military coopération with Soviet Russia - another pariah in the 
international order of the early 1920s - could and in part did undennine Weimar's 
fragile foundations even further.238 The Reichswehr's independent foreign policy 
disregarded the Republic's needs and immediate interests, and stood in striking 
contradiction to Seeckt's famous theoretical writings on the question of division of 
237 Seeckt, Die Reichswehr, p. 79. Interestingly, the relevant literature ali too often 
chooses to quote, stress, or favourably interpret Seeckt's words on this matter, as on so many 
others. Meier-Welcker for example mentions that Seeckt's orders 'that the anny should 
definitely be informed about political developments', were coupled with the assurance that 
'the resulting political intelligence service should not lead to political activity by military 
organizations, and that intelligence bureaus and command staffs should avoid [expressing] 
any judgments on politicai matters' - a precept that Seeckt himself scarcely honoured (Meier-
Welcker, Seeckt, p. 285). 
238 For the détails of Soviet-German coopération, and Seeckt's political analysis and 
rationale that complemented his strategie and operational motivations, see Vasilis 
Vourkoutiotis, Making Common Cause. German-Soviet Secret Relations, 1919-22 (New 
York, 2007), pp. 62-105, and Manfred Zeidler, 'The Strange Allies - Red Army and 
Reichswehr in the Inter-war Period', in Karl Schlögel, ed., Russian-German Special Relations 
in the 20th Centuiy (New York, 2006), pp. 106-118. 
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authority, responsibility, and priorities in terms of interests between army and 
government. It further exposed the historié fracture between the German army and its 
civilian government, which had remained hidden and under control until 1918, and 
made it an open schism. 
But Seeckt could always explain his interference with German foreign policy 
as yet another facet of his highly complicated - not to say self-contradictory - theory 
of civil-military relations. 'The nature of their [the statesman and soldier] respective 
duties demands of both departments a close, constant, and frank co-operation',239 he 
declared, and went on to explain that 'It is for the statesmen, not for the soldier, to 
decide whether the possibiy superior prospects of a military offensive are not 
outweighed by politicai disadvantages'.240 At the same time, 'The prime responsibility 
for deciding against which enemy his forces must be launched to secure a decisive 
issue falls to the soldier. . this décision involves politicai considération'.241 And 
Seeckt's unvarnished interprétation of the division of responsibilities between the 
army and the government was fully revealed in his discussion of the Schlieffen plan, 
always the touchstone of internar German military thought: 
Graf Schlieffen's plan . . . was known to the Government. Once the 
Government accepted the plan and the contingent necessity for widespread 
préparations during peace, it accepted the responsibility for ali the politicai 
conséquences which might arise therefrom. . . My only concern now is 
to fix the responsibility for the fateful war plan of 1914 . . . in 
239 Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, p. 35. 
240 Ibid., p. 37. 
241 Ibid., p. 41. 
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exemplification of the principles whieh must underlie the coopération of the 
politicai and military heads'.242 
Using and abusing civilian authority according to its needs, accepting or avoiding 
involvement and responsibility at will, was a convenient cover for the Reichswehr.243 
Nor did Seeckt see this stance as contradicting his understanding of the desirable 
division of responsibilities between the politicai and military echelons. He was simply 
following old pattems: the army is allegedly not involved - except for 'military 
matters' and everything those matters might include. 
In ail probability, Seeckt believed that he was sincerely, openly, and honestly 
conducting a policy of coopération with the civilian authorities - or would have 
conducted one under différent, more favourable politicai conditions. However deeds, 
far more than words, best delineate his concepts. As most literature on the early years 
of the Reichswehr stresses, the levels of coopération, trust, and transparency of the 
budgetary, politicai, and other goals involving both anny and Republic dramatically 
increased after Seeckt's departure, once the operational concept of 'people's war' as 
the answer to French superiority, and the level of coopération that concept was 
assumed to necessitate, overrode the army's inherent distaste for the Republic.244 
242 Ibid., p. 38. 
243 Seeckt conveniently omitted from his analysis the fact that the Imperial German 
Army did not present the government with several différent operational choices in 1914, and 
thus forced the government to accept the Schlieffen plan and its politicai implications in its 
entirety, if the government wanted - as it soon did - to use military force to achieve its 
objectives in the July crisis. It is noteworthy that Seeckt's linkage of convenience between 
government décisions and military outcomes served him well as early as 1919, when, in his 
attempi to save as much of the Wilhelmine army as possible, he stressed that 'The 
contemporary objection that a strong standing army leads to a policy of conquest is untenable. 
State policy détermines the use of the army; if [state policy] is harmful, it will use the army in 
a fallacious way, whereas a beneficiai policy [will use it] in a correct way' (Seeckt, 'Entwurf, 
17 February 1919, BA-MA N247-77, p. 8). 
244 Post, Civil-Military Fabric, p. 8, and Deist, 'Reichswehr and National Defence', 
pp. 383, 385. 
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Military requirements, not fine words and repeated lip-service, motivated the 
limited coopération with their government that Reichswehr officers were Willing to 
tolerate. 
The unbearable toll that Seeckt's reality-free optimism demanded, and the 
deliberately blinkered operational vision his refusai to accept and face the present 
imposed, inhibited military planning and shaped the Reichswehr's doctrinal path for 
years to come. It strengthened not merely the anny's tendency to avoid present-day 
Strategie and operational tasks, but ultimately shaped its évasion of future tasks as 
well: 
Some future chief of the general staff can rack his brains over whether, in 
the field employment of the war army as a whole, the standing army 
should be mixed in with the militia units, or whether the first should act as 
an elite force [eine Stosstruppe] . . . An armyJs force structure can only 
have war, not eternai peace, in mind.245 
Seeckt unabashedly admitted that his solution to Germany 's strategie problems 
was not only operationally unfeasible and strategically insufficient for the present, but 
also possibly for the future. That, however, was decidedly the lesser evil. Although 
Seeckt's operational vision and planning lacked the basic merits of plausibility and 
suitability, that did not prevent him from promoting his vision regardless - simply 
because his solution perfectly implemented his military preeepts. In doing so he 
impressed on future planning a pattern of studious indifférence to real-world 
constraints; that was his most lethal bequest to the Reichswehr. 
One typical analysis of Seeckt's legacy has suggested that 'the principal charge 
against him over the years has been politicai: that he obstinately refused to accept the 
245 Seeckt, 'Entwurf, 17 February 1919, BA-MA N247-77, p. 10. 
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legitimacy of the Weimar Republic . . . About his military abilities, however, there 
have been very few complaints' 246 Yet Seeckt's faults did not lie primarily in his 
highly traditional approach to relations with the civilian leadership and to its authority. 
Rather, Seeckt failed in his duty as the commander of an army: to conceptualise his 
tasks, build his forces, and design a doctrine suitable to the military challenges of the 
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present. 
Seeckt thus ultimately both saved and doomed the Reichswehr. he cut the last 
threads that connected German military planning to political, economic, and 
eventually operational requirements, limitations, and logie. Seeckt knowingly placed 
strategie and operational décisions beyond political restraints and outside the 
immediate context of Gerrnany's security problems, and within an imaginary, one-
dimensional wish-fulfilrnent fantasy. By doing so he did not merely prepare the 
ground for future planning that ignored basic operational needs, limitations, and 
setbacks for the sake of keeping cultural assumptions and patterns intact — he made 
that quantum leap himself. 
Conclusion 
It is perhaps understandable that so many scholars have found the discourse that 
evolved throughout the 1920s in the Reichswehr to be rich, diverse, and innovative. 
The military and politicai events of late 1918 and early 1919 could and probably 
should have facilitated great leaps and changes even in the most stagnant of 
240 Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg, p. 7. 
247 See also Geyer's assertion that 'Seeckt's strategie thinking never conformed to 
European realities: 'His operational doctrines posited an army that did not exist. . . despite 
efforts at modernisation, rigidity and inflexibility characterised the internai practice of the 
Reichswehr' (Geyer, 'German Strategy', p. 556). 
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environments. A transformed military culture might well have emerged in the 
turbulent decade that the Reichswehr faced after its defeat. Indeed a number of 
operational solutions and organisational assumptions that appeared to be new took 
shape, and were expressed in officiai manuals and documents. That apparent novelty 
was, however, a mirage that disguised traditional patterns and concealed an increased 
and inherent drive toward extremes that intensified and amplified the army's 
seemingly outmoded inheritance. The alleged compétition between three superficially 
différent operational concepts was in effect redundant; all three bore the marks of their 
common origin, adhered to the perceived truths of the army's organisational culture, 
and ultimately drew upon the same array of ostensibly effective solutions. 
The greatest military mystery of the 1920s is thus not how well the Germans 
managed with the very limited resources, both legal and illegai, at their disposai, but 
how the Reichswehr managed to spend an entire decade intensively studying its 
conduci in the World War while effectively evading drawing any meaningful strategie 
and operational lessons from that experience. A revealing example can be found in the 
immense officiai history of the World War that the Reichsarchiv ~ acting as host to 
research teams of ostensibly retired officers - organised and largely completed. That 
comprehensive effort concentrated almost exclusively on the operational aspect of the 
war — hardly a surprising outeome, given the traditional focal point of German 
94R 
military thought. What else was there in war to research? The result was an 
impressive yet redundant effort of broadening and improving German understanding 
of battlefield failure in the World War. Traditional frameworks dictated the questions, 
248 For military historiography in interwar Germany, see Markus Pöhlmann, 
Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg: die amtliche deutsche 
Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1914-1956 (Paderborn, 2002), and idem, 'Yesterday's Batties'. 
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themes, and interests of military history research, as well as the results of the 
various studies produeed to answer them. 
Could the Reichswehr have developed a truly novel and groundbreaking 
discourse on security, strategy, and warfare? Most certainly yes, given a context 
conducive to change, such as a wide-spread récognition of German operational and 
militaiy failure in the World War. The rigidity of fundamental German military 
assumptions was an inevitable outcome of the araiy's acute need to maintain the 
legend of a civilian stab in the anny's back, a narrative required to maintain self-
respect and perceptual cohésion, and to explain to itself and to the nation the 
inconceivable reality of a war lost without honour [Ehre] and glory, without a great 
and decisive Endkampf, and without the attainment of the comprehensive destruction 
that its world-view dictated.249 That need superseded ail other considérations, and 
doomed from their conception efforts at learning lessons and developing doctrine, as 
well as the Reichswehr's future operational planning and conduci. Quite logically, if 
military failure had not determined the World War's outcome, then nothing more than 
minor improvements and better technology were needed for the next war. 
The leading general staff offícers of the 1920s were convinced that they were 
indeed learning how to avoid mistakes - mostly those of others. That conviction 
exercised considerable influence over later historical évaluation of their doctrinal and 
organisational efforts. Yet in reality they remained deeply ignorant of the reasons for 
their unacknowledged military failure. That is the reason for the absence of signifícant 
perceptual or doctrinal shift away from the theories that had guided the Imperial 
German Army tbroughout the war and had steadily radicalised its conduci throughout 
249 For the context, see especially Boris Barth, Dolchstosslegenden und politische 
Desintegration. Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1914-1933 
(Düsseldorf, 2003). 
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the war's final, ehaotie, and supremely destructive phases. In the eyes of 
Germany's military leaders, any necessary changes must involve the people and 
politicians whom they allegedly served - the purportedly defective parts of the 
German war machine. And thus a considérable portion of future planning was now 
dedicated to various way s of ' organi sing5 German civil society. Yet even that interest 
in a non-operational aspect of war-fighting was scarcely revolutionary. It was deeply 
inhibited by yet another traditional unquestionable and unquestioned assumption: the 
centrality of the army and of military power within and to the state. When war 
impended, the people must gladly serve 'the categorical imperative of fìghting and 
dying for the Fatherland', and the politicians must uncritically and unconditionally 
obey military demands and requirements. 
Thereafter the road lay open for the further évolution of German military 
culture in complete accordance with the defining moments at the end of 1918. The 
aspiration to and planning for dictatorial iron-fïst organisation of the entire people to 
face war was accompanied by disdain toward parliamentary civilian government and 
unwillingness to 'dirty' the armyJs hands with politics. What had begun as aloofness 
toward politics under the monarchy ended as overt hostility to the Republic; the habit 
of self-referentially setting military goals and deciding independently upon the 
conséquent plans and policies followed. Even more dangerous was the pattern of 
avoiding realistic assessment of constraints and plausible calculations of feasibility. 
Other qualifies that thrived in the 1920s climate of self-inflicted blindness were the 
cult of military necessity, with its inherent pressure toward the radicalisation of 
warfare; the imperative of extreme risk; and the infallibility - as operational concept -
of the decisive battle of annihilation. German military culture remained in a time-
warp, embracing flexibility of thought and practice only when they served its long-
standing operational goals and furthered its inherent extremism. Its interest in 
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technology - motors, radios, poison gas, rockets, and aircraft - was simply a 
conséquence of its atavistic thirst for *vernichtende Entscheidungen\250 
Groener, Stülpnagel, and Seeckt ali briefly threatened to push the edge of the 
envelope of accepted military wisdom: Groener by suggesting the subordination of 
military requirements to state interests; Stülpnagel by blurring the divisions between 
civilians and soldiers in a merciless all-embracing guerrilla war; Seeckt in his clinging 
to a war of movement carried out by a small professional army. Yet none was as 
revolutionary as often portrayed. The seemingly différent operational solutions 
advocated by Groener, Stülpnagel, and Seeckt in their attempts to address Germany's 
strategie problems developed from a shared doctrinal root. Führung und Gefecht der 
verbundenen Waffen was the ultimate proof that neither 'mainstream' officiai thought 
nor 'radical fringe' suggestions varied notably from past notions, despite their 
revamped appearance. 
The solutions the Reichswehr considered assumed the restoration of 
Germany's military might as an indisputable prerequisite, and thus endangered the 
fragile Republic far more seriously than its pereeived enemies were lilcely to.251 Yet 
how and in what sense did the army 'fail' to 'understand' that the solutions it so 
meticulously debated and tested were, for the most part, wholly unrealistic? The 
officer corps saw both Seeckt's operational assumptions and ambitious armament 
plans and Stülpnagel's operational ideas as realistic and achievable. The question is 
therefore not whether those plans and ideas kmade sense' or not, but rather in what 
way did their inner logie comply with the unshakable system of truths that animated 
250 On the exemplary mix of military-technological fanaticism and strategie autism 
that characterised the army's missile programme from its origins in 1929 onward, see above 
all Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich " Peenemünde and the Coming ofthe 
Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge, MA, 1995). 
251 As Geyer convincingly contends in Aufrüstung and 'Dynamics'. 
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the Reichswehr, that set of assumptions and explanations that yielded meaning and 
desired courses of action in a bewildering reality? Being 'rational' in the German 
officer corps meant obeying both the inner logie of German military thought and 
practice and its operational imperatives. Security problems must be answered 
militarily, and by the army alone, freed of a civilian authority that was illegitimate 
because civilian; and only through operational pattems that had supposedly never 
failed. In that sense to plan seriously a large-scale suicidai war against France in 
1924-26 was not only sensible but also perfectly rational, and the inner cultural logie 
that inspired it persisted into the intellectually unchallenging, technologically exciting, 
and budgetarily exhilarating environment of the Third Reich. 
The most immutable feature of German military logie and the one to which 
virtually all succumbed in the 1920s was its chronic disregard for the need to grasp 
strategically, as well as to plan, any military effort - a direct resuit both of the army's 
absence of a strategie tradition, and of its assumption that strategie planning before 
and during the World War had generally been faultless. That is not to say that the 
general staff intentionally abandoned, or was uninterested in, strategie planning and 
the conduci of war. But it is to emphasise that the Reichswehr's very concept of 
'strategy' remained the one it had inherited from the Imperial German Army: flawed, 
shallow, superficial and essentially tactical. 
As in its pre-war operational studies, the army's focus on tactics and tactical 
imperatives subjugated strategie conduct to operational and tactical demands, rather 
than vice versa; that tendency was evident in the studies, plans, and officiai documents 
that Seeckt, Stülpnagel, and even Groener produced, as well as in the institutional 
research conducted by the Reichsarchiv and the general staff history branch. Although 
fully recognising the totality of the World War as a decisive cause of German failure, 
the Reichswehr's offìcial-historical analysis stili privileged battle narratives, 
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technological issues, and 'strictly military' - that is, non-political - history.252 The 
supplementary volume on finance and économies was only published in 1930; it was 
dedicated to the question of Germany's allegedly inadequate armaments in 
comparison to those of its enemies, and managed to express two of the army's main 
arguments about the war - that its launching had been against German interests and 
therefore Germany was not to be blamed for it; and that the décision to go to war had 
been solely a civilian one.253 Both the major operational visions debated in the army 
and in its officiai history of the World War indicate that for the high command, the 
tactical aspects of the operational level of warfare were, implicitly and explicitly, still 
the only ones that determined the outeome of wars, and while the general staff had 
recognized more comprehensive aspects of planning, these were, as always, of a lesser 
signifîcance.254 
The real essence of German 1 strategy' becomes clear when viewed in 
combination with the Reichswehr's approach to strategie planning and to the conduct 
of war in the broader sense. The Generalstab indeed understood the requirements of 
modem, 'total war', and the importance of economic and operational long-term 
planning and préparations.255 To accuse the Reichswehr leadership of indifférence to 
252 Pöhlmann, 'Yesterday's Battles', pp. 230-238. 
253 Ibid., pp. 233-234; among the more plausible accounts of the decisive army rôle in 
July-August 1914, see especially Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of 
the First World War (New York, 2001), and idem, ' A Reluctant Military Leader? Heimut von 
Moltke and the July Crisis of 1914'. War in History 6:4 (1999), pp. 417-446. 
254 As discussed both in the previous chapter and in the next, the intensity and 
centrality of the German high command's interest in tactics reflected and maintained its 
tactical frame of thought at the expense of strategie planning. Timothy Lupfer points out the 
marked discrepancy between German tactical flexibility and innovativeness on the one hand 
and 'flawed' strategie conduct on the other in his Dynamics of Doctrine, but he does not 
attempi to explain it. 
255 For a thorough investigation of the concept and practice of 'total war' in Germany, 
see the sériés of volumes on 'total war' edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, 
especially Afflerbach, 'Falkenhayn and the Battie of Verdun' and Wilhelm Deist, 'Strategy 
and Unlimited Warfare in Germany: Moltke, Falkenhayn and Ludendorff, in Chickering and 
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these subjects would be misguided. But strategie planning and strategie insight 
were treated de facto as less important and useful than the perceived crucial, central, 
and decisive operational - but in fact tactical - factors and framework. In that sense, 
none of the figures discussed in this chapter ever transgressed these conceptual 
boundaries: total warfare, rather than total war, constituted the focal point of Gennan 
perceptions. Non-operational aspects of war always came a distant second to 
operational demands.256 Reducing 'strategy' to only those aspects that directly and 
immediately served operational needs was the most natural tendency of German 
military planners. Yet to the best of their knowledge, they were not ignoring strategy 
but - entirely to the contrary - were motivated by the clearest strategie lesson of the 
World War: focusing on a swifter and stili more decisive Entscheidungsschlacht while 
assuring the maintenance of the population's Geist, dévotion, and endurance. That 
cultural pattern, as did others, persisted well into the 1930s and was further radicalised 
in the Second World War. 
It should of course be noted that alongside its inherited and persistent myopia, 
the Reichswehr1 s leadership also inherited - and further developed, under impossible 
conditions - the Imperial army ;s excellent tactical instincts, on which the 
Förster, eds., Great War, pp. 265-279, as well as Jürgen Förster, 'From "Blitzkrieg" to "Total 
War", Germany's War in Europe' in Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner, eds., 
A World at Total War, Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction 1937-1945 (Cambridge, 
2005), pp. 89-107. Förster mentions that the offïcer corps tended to equate strategy with 
opérations and was therefore ignorant of the strategie and 'total' aspects of war planning. 
Later it became hostile to the establishment of planning agencies designed to address such 
issues out of fear of organisational compétition (p. 92). While Chapter 3 will analyze this 
subject further, it is important to note here that the army's traditional understanding of the 
nature of war's demands upon civil society and upon the economy was inherently blinkered. 
256 Operationally (on the battlefield) ail German planning aimed at 'total war' - the 
total destruction and annihilation of the enemy armed forces and, as war escalated, significant 
parts of the enemy civil society as well. German planners therefore acknowledged the need to 
mobilise, rearm and prepare economically for that immense task, and were Willing to make ail 
necessary sacrifices. But they perceived the strategie aspects of total war in a simplifïed, 
shallow fashion, as secondary to the total warfare (Kriegführung) that constituted the very 
core of Gennan military practice. 
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Wehrmacht's record of success was later built: initiative at ail levels of command, 
extending downward to the individuai rifleman; relentless aggressiveness; extreme 
daring; and a deep understanding of the emptiness and chaos of the modem battlefîeld, 
and of its requirements. That tactical discernment, elusive and difficult to define, and 
the conceptions it engendered, eventually produced, as in the First World War, the 
most accomplished warriors and units, the most impressive tactical capabilities, and 
the most devastating war machine in Europe. That resuit was also a conséquence of 
the German army's long-standing 'organisational approvai' of discussion, of a climate 
tolerant and supportive of the developing and testing of new ideas, within the 
limitations of its own inherited conceptual boundaries. That German officers could not 
think, or were simply iminterested in thinking, outside their self-imposed box 
nevertheless indicates the extent to which perceptions can and often do supersede 
reality. 
The break with reality of the Reichswehr officer corps was, as described, a 
natural resuit of the unbearable tension caused by the conflict between reality and self-
image. The Reichswehr leadership could not possibly have accepted the army it 
commanded as it really was: a defeated army tumed into a police force, stripped of 
heavy weapons and past glory alike. The price for that departure from sober self-
assessment was heavy. It further encouraged the pre-existing inclination toward an 
operational discourse completely detached from operational reality, and provided a 
ground more fertile than ever for the continuity of the army's traditional analysis of 
strategy as limited, operational, combat-oriented planning alone. Worse was to come, 
since the traditionalist tendencies so ardently yet unselfconsciously preserved and 
nurtured were soon bound to collide with complex strategie and operational 
requirements that no one in the German officer corps was culturally capable or 
equipped to recognize, internalise and not least, to face successfully. In its attempt to 
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draw lessons from the World War experience and to conceptualise its new role and 
capabilities, the German army, despite its best efforts, learned almost nothing, and was 
thus unable to forget the truths and habits that it had to leave behind if it were again to 
seek to realise its dangerously unrealistic aspirations. 
Chapter 3 
The enigma of the 1930s: Transforming German military thought? 
Despite genuine attempts to offer new military solutions to the challenges of a novel 
strategie and military reality, the military leadership of the 1920s did not reformulate 
military thought in Germany, nor did it attempt to do so. Its most 'groundbreaking' or 
'radical' solutions still stemmed from and coincided with accepted wisdom, 
longstanding operational pattems, and an intentionally unrealistic analysis. The 
realities of the 1930s were however quite différent, and German military thought 
rapidly adjusted. Armament and force structure restrictions were soon to be lifted, 
long-meditated reannament plans realised, and financial and raw materials limitations 
loomed. The Reichswehr, and later the Wehnnacht, was about to expand 
exponentially and to bring into being entirely new air and armoured forces. 
Yet questions remain: what change or changes took place in Gennan thought 
about and practice of warfare in the 1930s? What paradigm, what set of explanations 
can best facilitate our understanding of the thought processes of the Gennan anny 
during the criticai decade thatpreceded the climactic campaigns of 1939-1941? A 
number of interprétations offer competing narratives, explanations, and emphases in 
detailing the process that created the most successful army of the opening phases of 
the Second World War. The most prevalent is that a 'revolution in military affairs' or 
'RMA' took place in Gennany during the interwar era. Most succinctly defined as 'a 
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revolutionary change in how war is fought',1 an RMA, for the purpose of this 
analysis, is a military phenomenon defined by radical changes and transformations of 
military doctrine, military organisations, and war-fighting.2 As will emerge shortly, 
the applicability of that explanation to the interwar German army lacks empirical 
grounding. It also rests on two common and interrelated logical fallacies, the notion 
that great consequences must have profound and even revolutionary causes, and the 
temptations of teleological 'backward-looking analysis' Researchers have almost 
inevitably sought - and have naturally found — the explanation for Germany's 
immense initial successes in a new doctrine and method developed to perfection in the 
1930s. 
The challenge nevertheless remains: what other than a well-managed 
technological and doctrinal revolution can explain German operational success, and 
who was responsible for the way in which new military technology affected, or was 
incorporated into, existing thought and practice? Scholars have suggested several 
possible sources and 'agents' of change: ideological ('fascist') or foreign (mainly 
British) influences, young (mostly mid-ranking) officers who were armour 
enthusiasts, and a small faction of 'armour experts' within the German officer corps. 
Many of the works that figure in the resulting passionate debate nevertheless risk 
1 Clifford J. Rogers, 'Military Revolutions' and 'Revolutions in Military affairs', in 
Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs? 
Defence and Security at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Westport, CT, 2000), p. 22. 
2 Historical analysis of change and continuity in military affairs benefits - or rather, 
suffers - from a plethora of competing RMA definitions and 'paradigms'. However, most fall 
into two main categories, which Rogers has described as MR ('Military Revolutions') and 
RMA ('Revolutions in Military Affairs'); a military revolution - a far-reaching strategic, 
political and social transformation - results directly from changes initially restricted to the 
military-technical and operational realms (Rogers, ibid., pp. 22-24). Williamson Murray and 
MacGregor Knox employ similar categories in 'Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare', The 
Dynamics of Military Revolutions, (Cambridge, New York, 2001), pp. 6-14. See also Andrew 
N. Liaropoulos, 'Revolutions in Warfare; Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence. The 
Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs', Journal of Military History 
70 (2006), pp. 363-384, proposing as paradigms the 'Social Wave' (corresponding to MR) and 
the 'Radical transformation' (corresponding to RMA). 
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falling into the 'backward-looking analysis' trap. The post-war exaggerations, 
omissions, and outright lies of the survivirig German générais and of military 
historians with a proprietary interest in a particular présentation of the history of the 
évolution of the Gennan annoured forces have added further complications.3 The 
putative 'agents of change', organisations such as the Inspectorate of Motor Transport 
Troops and key figures such as Oswald Lutz and Heinz Guderian, have consequently 
been habitually linked with British annour thought, writings, and experimental field 
exercises.4 These widespread claims and assmnptions raise further questions. First, 
what views did Gennan 'annour experts', annour enthusiasts, and the relevant 
sections of the high command actually hold on annour and mechanised warfare, and 
to what extent did those views originate from and faithfully reflect 'imported' foreign 
perceptions? Second and no less important, to what extent did 'annour experts' such 
as Lutz and his associâtes influence the Wehrmacht's overall mechanised and non-
mechanised operational doctrine, build-up character and pace, armaments planning, 
and operational patterns? In other words, what part of the Wehnnacht's overall 
performance in 1939-41 can be attributed to the influence of 'annour experts' and 
annour enthusiasts? 
3 Most famously B. H. Liddell Hart in his extensive post-war writings about and 
involvement in the historiography of German military affairs - to the point of coaching Heinz 
Guderian's memory (and memoirs) and seeking to manipulate RommeFs and Manstein's 
writings in order to emphasise his own putative prior influence on the German armour experts; 
see Gat, British Armour, pp. 1-18, 43-48; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill: 
Germany's Generals, Their Rise and Fall, and Their Own Account of Military Events, 1939-
1945 (London, 1951); John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight ofHistoiy (London, 
1988), pp. 33-48; and Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General (London, 1975), pp. 40-
42. The post-war writings of Guderian himself, like those of most other German générais, are 
highly self-interested and must be read with extreme care on both military and politicai issues. 
4 Among the many scholars who ascribe to British armour theorists and practitioners 
an indispensible role in the development of German mechanised doctrine, Azar Gat offers the 
most comprehensive and in-depth analysis: Gat, British Armour, pp. 43-95. 
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I. Technology and innovation: the clash of interprétations 
The subsections that follow will seek to elaborate the difficulties inherent in existing 
interprétations of German doctrinal development, and propose a further mechanism of 
transformation: 'evolutionary change' or 'culturally-constrained change'. Such a 
conceptualization allows reconsideration of the pace and dynamics of organisational 
transformation, of its human agents, and of the inter- and intra-organisational spread 
of ideas and practices. The later portions of this chapter will then supply the historical 
evidence that underpins the notion of evolutionary change. 
1. 'Blitzkrieg as RM A 
As already suggested, claims that the German 'Blitzkrieg" constituted an RMA benefit 
from what appears to be a self-evident logie inherent in an equally self-evident 
development of events: the Gennan anny embraced mechanised and armoured 
warfare sometime in the late 1920s and early 1930s, either through the adoption and 
application of a foreign, groundbreaking, and mostly British armour doctrine, or 
through the development of new and no less groundbreaking annour concepts of its 
own. The Wehnnacht then went into battle equipped with a perfectly matched 
winning combination of new technology, brilliant doctrine, andperfected training and 
warcraft. In effect, and as pointed out by historians, the 'Blitzlcrieg RMA' serves as 
the classic case of a technologically-induced RMA, as well as a benchmark example 
of a modem RMA.5 
5 Stephen Biddle, 'The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare', 
Security Studies 8:1 (1998), pp. 44-55, 61. For more examples of the prevalence of the notion 
of Blitzkrieg as the classic RMA case study see for instance Rogers, 'Military Révolutions', p. 
23, and Gray, Modem Strategy, p. 203; William J. Fanning 'The Origin of the Term 
'Blitzkrieg": Another View', Journal of Military History 61:2 (1997), pp. 283-302, offers 
fascinating semantic information. 
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Those who assume that a German RMA actually took place draw on the 
shocking and devastating operational conduci and outcomes of the Wehrmacht's 
1939-1941 campaigns. But even the most enthusiastic supporters of the notion of a 
'Gemían RMA3, or at least of a period of radical innovation, still concede the 
existence of strong traditional components within the Gemían anny's theories and 
conduct of war. And those who do not see developments in the 1930s Reichswehr as 
revolutionary have understandably also noted the persistence of traditional concepts.6 
Révolutions by their nature trample on traditions, and the very concept of 
RMA emphasises and demands great discontinuities.7 As this chapter demonstrates in 
detail, the German army did not in actuality conceive a new and revolutionaiy 
operational theory. The new technology of armour and mechanised warfare, long-
desired and at last within reach by the mid-1930s, in no sense inspired a similarly new 
and revolutionary military theory and practice. Moreover, German military leaders 
neither intended to create nor succeeded in producing revolutionary operational 
methods and organisational structures in order to support the novel concepts. Ample 
evidence, some of which will figure later in the chapter, suggests that the Gemían 
army's activities in the 1930s did not fit any of the commonly described 
characteristics of an RMA. 
6 For analysis of the issues of tradition, innovation, and revolution, see Williamson 
Murray, 'Armoured Warfare: the British, French and German experiences', in Williamson 
Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Militaiy Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, 
1996), pp. 17, 38, 40-45; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 37 
(1996), pp. 46-47; Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 203; Citino, German Way of War, pp. xvi-xvii, 
244-256, 267, and idem, Blitzkrieg, pp. 18-28 (while Citino titles his discussion 'Rebirth: the 
Interwar Military Revolution', he also argues that the German army mostly followed its 
traditions. It thus remains unclear what, apart from technology, was 'revolutionary' about 
German doctrine and practice in the interwar years. Nor does Citino explore the conceptual 
debates regarding the appropriate employment of the new technologies); see also Frieser, 
Blitzkrieg Legend, pp. 329-346, and Biddle, 'The Past as Prologue', pp. 44-55. 
7 Gray, Modem Strategy, p. 3. 
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Furthermore, the operational and tactical unfolding of Second World War, 
and the results of its campaigns, are readily explicable without ree ours e the RMA 
concept; innovations need not be revolutionary to be significant.8 As Thomas G. 
Manhken has suggested, a combined-arms revolution affected all the leading armies of 
Europe, as well as the United States, in the course of the 1920s, the 1930s, and -
following the stunning initial successes of the Wehnnacht - the early 1940s.9 But that 
general revolution, widespread and authentic as it was, and induced both by 
technology and by the lessons of the Great War, neither began nor was 'made'' in 
Geiinany, despite Germany's starring rôle from the late 1930s until 1941. Each army 
transformed itself through struggle within and against its own idiosyncratic 
organisational culture, doctrine, and constraints.10 In the final analysis, if a RMA took 
place in the early 1940s, it was a process shared by ali the major belligerents, and one 
that matured fully only in the heavily industrialised Allied nations and in their lavishly 
supplied armies. This chapter seeks rather to explain the dynamics of change within 
the Gei-man araiy in the 1930s (if either dynamics or change indeed existed), not the 
processes that spread armoured and mechanised warfare throughout the industrialised 
world during the Second World War. 
8 Emily O. Goldman and Andrew L. Ross, 'Conclusion: The Diffusion of Military 
Technology and Ideas - Theory and Practice', in Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, 
The Diffusion ofMilitajy Technology and Ideas (Stanford, 2003), p. 394. 
9 Thomas G. Mahnken, 'Beyond Blitzkrieg: Allied Responses to Combined-Arms 
Armoured Warfare during World War II', in ibid., pp. 243-266. Mahnken claims that 
'Germany's development of combined-arms armoured warfare has become the canonical case 
of peacetime military innovation', which then 'triggered a revolution in military affairs' (p. 
244). The Germans supposedly set the tone and direction of change for other armies, a 
proposition Mahnken does not fully confimi in his ensuing analysis of the notably diverse 
cultural and organisational interprétations of combined-arms warfare. While certainly 
providing an initial incentive for change, the Wehrmacht did not prescribe a formula for 
change in the early 1940s - just as it did not innovate by following any such formula 
prescribed by others in the early to mid-1930s. 
10 Ibid., p. 244. 
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2. 'Fascism': Cause or context? 
A second explanation of the seeming novelty of Gennan mechanised warfare doctrine 
and of the massive effort directed toward applying it in the 1930s emphasises the role 
that 'fascism' purportedly played in its advent.11 Fascism, according to this thesis, 
provided an ideological construct characterised by a fascination with modernity, 
attracted the political enthusiasms of officers who played a key role in drafting the 
Wehrmacht's doctrine, and above all provided a favourable political climate 
conducive to financing mechanisation and supportive of the free development of 
mechanised operational methods. Fascism thus allegedly stimulated and guaranteed 
the birth of groundbreaking mechanised and annoured concepts in 1930s Germany.12 
Fascism, or rather the National Socialist regime and Weltanschauung, indeed 
played a role in the evolution of Gennan military thought.13 But was that role ciuciai? 
Were the bearers of fascist visions within the anny - if their views can indeed be 
justly branded 'fascist' - central players in the quest for an annour employment 
doctrine described in this chapter? The two high-ranking officers nonnally considered 
fascists, or at the very least unusually fervent supporters of the Nazi regime, ideology, 
and cause, General Werner von Blomberg and Colonel Walter von Reichenau, were 
11 In view of the contested plausibility and doubtful historical usefulness of the generic 
(lower-case) concept of 'fascism' - both in general and above all in relation to military affairs 
- quotation marks around the term should henceforth be assumed. No adequate answers have 
emerged to the objections raised (to cite only two of many critiques) by Bernd Martin, 'Zur 
Tauglichkeit eines Übergreifenden Faschismus-Begriffs', Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 
29 (1981), pp. 48-73 and Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism Is Not: Notes on the Deflation of 
a Concept," American Historical Review 84:2 (1979), pp. 367-88. 
12 Gat's most elegant formulation runs as follows: 'Nazi political support and the 
orientation of right-wing radicals within the armed forces were a significant factor in directing 
German rearmament. , . toward modern means of war, revolutionary doctrines, and radical 
operational schemes': Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, pp. 3-6, 80-103. 
13 Just as the army's military culture - especially its paramount emphasis on the 
tactical virtues of boldness, initiative, ruthlessness, extreme violence, and escalation as the 
answer to any and all difficulties - was a formative influence on the National Socialists 
themselves. 
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hardly avid Nazis, fully-fledged fascists or, most importantly, social and 
organisational 'insiders* in the army circles that developed operational doctrine in the 
1930s. Blomberg was widely considered "somewhat strange', and Reichenau was if 
anything viewed as even more eccentric.14 Above ail, in his capacity as War Minister 
Blomberg - like Groener before him - exercised only limited influence over the 
anny's doctrinal évolution and operational planning.15 The contribution of Blomberg 
and Reichenau to the évolution of mechanised tliought in the Wehnnacht was thus not 
essential, regardless of the undeniable honesty of their faith in modemised fonns of 
warfare and originality of their ideas in that regard.16 Similarly, the dichotomy that 
Azar Gat suggests between 'political radicals' such as Blomberg and Guderian and far 
less radical figures such as Ludwig Beck (anny chief of staff, 1933-38), which 
inextricably links armour enthusiasm with political radicalism, cannot in itself explain 
the nature or course of doctrinal development or operational practice in Gennany, for 
the very same reasons: the group that actually created the doctrine, practice, and force 
structure of the post-1933 German anny was a cohort of général staff officers, not of 
14 In the succinct judgment of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (quoted in Richard 
R. Muller, 'Werner von Blomberg, Hitlers "idealistischer" Kriegsminister,' in Ronald Smelser 
and Enrico Syring, eds., Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches: 27 biographische Skizzen 
[Berlin, 1997]), p. 52; on Reichenau as outsider see for instance Bernd Boll, 
'Generalfeldmarschall Walter von Reichenau', in Gerd R. Überschär, ed., Hitlers militärische 
Elite, vol. 1, Von den Anfängen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn (Darmstadt, 1998), pp. 195-96. 
15 For details on Blomberg's estrangement from military circles see Gat, Fascist and 
Liberal Visions of War, pp. 90-100 and Macksey, Guderian, p. 53. 
16 In seeking to strengthen his claim of inextricable links between the putative fascist-
modernist inclinations of leading German officers and their support for mechanised warfare, 
Gat places Blomberg at the very centre of armaments decision-making and doctrinal 
development. Deist, on the basis of exhaustive archival knowledge, by contrast stresses 
Blomberg's 'modest success in imposing policy" upon the commanders-in-chief of the three 
services, which was 'especially true in the armament sector' (Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 
378). Macksey also notes that 'Blomberg, as Minister for War, was sympathetic but too 
remote within the military structure' from those involved in the formulation of armour 
concepts to have much influence (Guderian, pp. 57-8). The complex, often suspicion-ridden 
relationship between the German war ministry and the armed forces after the First World War 
(described in chapter 2) is often neglected in attempts to draw a map of the individuals and 
forces that most profoundly affected the evolution of German military practice. 
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'fascists'. These officers adhered mostly to their professional rather than political 
truths - both in general, and when dealing with operational thought in particular. 
Thus, many other ideational sources, far more widely and collectively shared than 
putative fascist inclinations, played the dominant role in shaping and influencing the 
operational ideas tested and eventually selected by the Wehrmacht's elite. 
Arguments that directly link 'fascism1 with 'mechanised warfare' do not 
merely fail when tested against the actual involvement and influence of supposedly 
'fascist' officers within the army. They fail even more starkly when applied to Hitler 
himself. For the national leader most identified with mechanised warfare rarely 
bothered himself until the late 1930s with details of armament plans, or with 
promoting those plans except through ever-increasing appropriations and fiery 
rhetoric. As Geyer has suggested, Hitler 'neither structured the process of rearmament, 
nor set the targets, which were still defined by the four-year programme of December 
1933'.17 In that respect it is important to note that claims that a regime was fascist do 
not necessarily apply to its army, and that the most mechanised armies of all were 
those of the western liberal democracies and of Soviet Russia, which owed their 
character not merely to their ideological settings but above all to modem industrial 
capacity and to the mass mobilisation of resources for war that their states 
successfully practiced; by the late 1930s, mechanisation was the order of the day 
regardless of the nature of the political regime. Here too, the two facts of 'fascist 
17 Geyer, 'Dynamics', p. 136; see also Deist, 'Ideological War', p. 379, who suggests 
that no evidence exists of Hitler's interest or detailed involvement in any armament 
programme before the summer of 1936 - by which time the army leadership was already fully 
engaged in a fundamental doctrinal debate over the operational meaning of 'mechanised 
warfare', as discussed in detail in this chapter. Finally, Macksey belittles Hitler's ostensible 
role and alleged deep interest in building tank forces, citing a post-war remark of General 
Georg Thomas, head of the Wehrmacht Economic and Armaments Branch, who claimed that 
'the great importance of the tank was not recognised [by Hitler] until the success in the Polish 
campaign"' (Macksey, Guderian, p. 58). 
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regime5 and 'mechanised warfare' call for a mediating variable to explain the 
relationship between them. 
The evidence hardly suggests simple, direct linkages between fascism as a 
style of politicai ideology and 'its' purported mechanised operational interprétations. 
The ideologically-driven fascination of fascisi leaders with up-to-date technology, and 
even their skilled abuse of its potentialities in areas such as the mass media and mass 
production, could not in itself guarantee the création of modera technologically-
oriented armies. A generous military budget and governmental commitment to rebuild 
armaments production and create super-modem aniied forces were simply not enough 
to build an army that thought and operated in mechanised terms. The connection 
between fascism and military thought is better understood if approached as foliows: 
was the Nazi regime, with its admiration of technology and its preeminent emphasis 
on war, indispensible to the development of German operational concepts? The Nazis 
were no doubt notably keen and excited about producing, equipping, maintaining, and 
ultimately using a mechanised army. But the demands for mechanisation and the 
doctrine developed to make it a reality were German army products that long preceded 
and existed independently from the inclinations and motivations of the politicai 
system. 
A more nuanced understanding of the connection between fascism and 
mechanised warfare might be possible through considération of the overlap between 
military culture and the social and politicai climate in which it evolves, and with 
which it maintains various forms of discourse. Gat is thus entirely correct in pointing 
out the technology-friendly 'climate' - or, better yet, the context, provided by the 
regime. Yet, as the Italian example shows, adoration of technology can serve as an 
important vector but cannot prescribe, much less force, technological or operational 
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change.18 Only pre-existing military-cultural inclinations, tolerance of and 
openness to technology already available can mediate and translate fascist intentions 
into modem, mechanised concepts and forces. Fascism can thus provide scholars with 
a context - indeed an indispensible context explaining strategic and political 
decisions.19 The National Socialist regime offered a comfortable setting hotbed for the 
development of armoured vehicles and of other novel military technologies, and it 
lavishly and increasingly allocated financial and manpower resources for rearmament. 
But the regime's predilections and efforts cannot account for the shape and 
employment of the resulting forces. And in the long run, even the National Socialist 
regime failed to develop the industrial foundations required to sustain in global war 
the shiny mechanised armies it enthusiastically promoted.20 Furthermore, even the 
world-views and political acts of fascists - or National Socialists - cannot be reduced 
to formulas such as 'mechanisation enthusiasts'; theirs was not a 'mechanised war' 
but a war dedicated to the realisation of a political vision to be achieved regardless of 
the exact nature of the means required. 'Polities wage war, they do not just wage land, 
18 For the military culture, doctrine, and armaments of the army of the first 'fascist' 
regime, see MacGregor Knox, Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, 
and the War of1940- 43 (Cambridge, 2000), especially Chapter 3. 
19 Murray and Knox suggest in 'The Future Behind Us', Dynamics, pp. 180-181, that 
in principle, national strategic concepts should determine the structure, composition and 
employment concept of the armed forces - and the German strategic concept of the late 1930s 
was without doubt a creation of its regime. Knox and Murray also emphasise that 'revolutions 
in military affairs always occur within the context of politics and strategy' Thus, regardless of 
whether a 'revolution' resulted, the connection between fascism and military thought in its 
German incarnation, in the Nazi regime's support for an army that would realise its strategic 
plans, played a significant role in the evolution of Gennan military thought. But that role took 
the shape of a contextual and indirect setting in which cultural factors and forces could thrive. 
20 A major theme of Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and 
Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London, 2006). 
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ground, mechanised, armoured or tank waifare'; the National Socialist regime 
waged race-war.21 
3. A decisive British influence? 
As with claims of the influence of fascism, a nuanced and detail-sensitive approach is 
likewise appropriate to the question of the alleged British influences on Germán 
military thought - a process usually assumed to be, or presented as, a simple, direct 
and unmediated Germán fascination with, and acceptance and assimilation of, a 
foreign armoured doctrine (or doctrines, if French and Russian influences are taken 
into account as well). The historical realities surrounding Germán doctrinal and 
operational production were however more complex. The evidence calis for a more 
sophisticated model of the spread or diffusion between armies of not only 
technologies and weapons systems but also of the concepts for their effective 
employment. As will emerge in the following pages, the wholesale adoption of 
imported operational concepts, especially if their implications are strategically far-
reaching, is highly improbable.22 
21 Gray, Modern Straíegy, p. 204; see Hitler's noteworthy remarks on this theme to 
mid-ranking army officers, 10 February 1939, in Jost Diilffer, Jochen Thies, and Josef Henke, 
Hitlers Städte. Baupolitik im Dritten Reich (Cologne, 1978), p. 303. 
22 Goldman and Ross, 'Conclusion', p. 372; the authors emphasise the role of culture 
as mediating any attempt to 'adopt, adapt or respond to innovations observed elsewhere'. Paul 
J. Dimaggio and Walter W. Powell provide a broader theoretical canvas: although they focus 
on corporations rather than military organisations, they stress the processes through which 
organisations become similar in their attempts to change ('institutional isomorphism'). The 
thesis of mimetic isomorphism fits the international spread of mechanised warfare in the 
interwar era, but historians might also note that 1930s armies, while becoming ever more 
similar in their interest in mechanised warfare and in the general structure of their armour and 
mechanised forces, did not engage in similar 'modelling' of other armies' operational 
concepts; such concepts were instead debated internally and shaped by idiosyncratic 
organisational cultural prisms and limitations (Dimaggio and Powell, 'The Iron Cage 
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organisational Fields', 
American Sociological Review 48:2 (1983), pp. 147-160). 
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It would naturally be unreasonable to assume that the Germans did not 
attempt to learn from British experiences, and intentionally or imconsciously avoided 
implementing British-developed lessons regarding armoured warfare. After all, the 
British Army was until the early 193 Os the most advanced of the major armies in 
testing and experimenting with araioured forces and doctrine.23 But Germán 'leaming' 
or 'assimilating' of British principies still obeyed Germán cultural assumptions and 
patterns; scholars who have researched the spread and diffusion of transformations or 
innovations in doctrinal and technological practice (often packaged as 'military style') 
emphasise that technology filters into any given military organisation in accordance 
with that organisation's own perceived institutional interests and purposes,24 and that, 
while the 'mimicking' of other institutions has been a significant factor in military 
development, 'external examples are filtered through the local context and the existing 
culture of each army'.25 
Germán doctrinal documents in the early and mid-1930s thus show very little 
indication of heavy British influence.26 In the second half of the 1920s the Reichswehr 
had no armour doctrine to speak of except its own traditional paramount emphasis on 
combined-arms battle - an emphasis that was to outlive any imported operational 
lesson. In the early 1930s, when actual experiments with armour became possible at 
23 Gat, British Armour, p. 92. 
24 Lynn, 'Evolution of Army Style', p. 509; see also Thompson, 'Co-Evolution in 
War', pp. 474, 484. 
25 Wilson, 'Defming Military Culture', pp. 33-34. Even in the most obvious cases of 
operational and theoretical leaming and cióse Cooperation among allies. In the case of 
American and German military Cooperation during the Cold War, agreement on doctrine was 
unlikely, and did not materialise. Both armies retained their distinct roles, goals, technologies, 
past operational patterns, organisational cultures, and obstacles to and limitations on change: 
see Ingo W. Trauschweizer, 'Leaming with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in 
the Cold War', Journal of Military History 72:2 (2008), pp. 477-508, a Cold War case study 
that indicates that even with 'unlimited' opportunities to assimilate foreign armies' patterns, 
leaming processes do not break free of organisational and cultural interpretation and 
constraints. See also Goldman and Ross, 'Conclusion', pp. 391-2. 
26 See this chapter, pp. 197-208,215-225 for detailed analysis. 
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the German base at Kazan in Soviet Russia, the Germans tested not only or even 
mainly British eoneepts and annour deployment praetiees, for the simple reason that 
the armour employment challenges they now faeed were virtually universal.27 
Moreover, an exaggerated emphasis on German leaming of British theories and 
exereises has often been justified by citations from works by far from impartial 
authors, from Liddell Hart to Guderian himself, but have also been based on German 
army intelligence reports and a large pool of articles on and translations of British 
thinkers and experience that appeared in the Militär-Wochenblatt.. It is however 
worth noting that alongside the files dedicated to the British forces, the German 
Military Archive contains impressive quantities of intelligence reports and operational 
analyses of other foreign armoured forces.29 Historiographical bias - the assumption 
of the centrality of British theory in German annour development - may well have 
caused scholars to focus on reports on Britain, and to neglect other potential foreign 
influences, especially the Red Anny. That Gennans and Soviets might have learned 
from one another was at the very least a plausible scenario, since the Gennan army's 
only concrete experience with annour before 1933 was gained at Kazan.30 
The challenge of accurately assessing British influence over Gennan military 
thought also raises two methodological and theoretical questions. The first is how to 
assess correctly the contribution of experts, enthusiasts and specialists in one 
27 The most detailed accounts of Soviet-German Cooperation are Manfred Zeidler's 
Reichswehr und Rote Armee 1920-1933. Wege und Stationen einer ungewöhlichen 
Zusammenarbeit (Munich, 1993), and Mary R. Habeck's Storm of Steel: The Development of 
Armour Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 (Ithaca, NY, 2003). Habeck 
describes how the German anny examined British, French, and Soviet armour organisational 
praetiees {Storm of Steel, pp. 207-208). 
28 See for instance Gat, British Armour, pp. 51-56. 
29 For details, see pp. 232-234. For analysis of the focus of the German intelligence 
files as well as the scope and scale of articles dedicated to British annour theories in the 
Militär-Wochenblatt, see Gat, British Armour, pp. 51-56. 
30 Habeck suggests that the thought of German armour enthusiasts such as Lutz and 
Guderian resembled the Soviet 'deep battle' concept {Storm of Steel, p. 237). 
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particular field - armour - to the general or overall doctrine and practice of an 
entire army. In other words, can historians proclaim that the 'German army' held 
revolutionary concepts of armoured warfare if only some of its armour experts -
retrospectively - claimed to have held them? Should scholars focus solely or even 
principally on the armour experts and their ideas, or rather emphasise the extent to 
which these ideas affected the German army's overall operational goals and conduct, 
and were directly incorporated into army-wide doctrine?31 
The second point to bear in mind in this connection is that different groups -
'general staff officers', 'specialists', 'German armour experts', or even 'British 
armour experts' might understand and perceive any given technological artefact -
tanks, of course, included - in inherently different ways. That technology is socially 
constructed means that different groups will, by definition, provide different 
interpretations of technological artefacts, of their significance and, above all, of their 
appropriate employment.32 The same follows for German armour enthusiasts and their 
purported British models; even assuming 'direct' emulation between the two groups, 
cultural factors most probably stood in the way of the clear-cut adoption and 
application of imported ideas, and affected the ways in which all such ideas could be 
understood, ways potentially very different from those of the originators of the 
concepts. Even avid admirers of British concepts 'Germanised' them, interpreting 
them in accordance with their own long-standing mindset. 
31 Habeck's work offers a salient example of the recurring projection of the armour 
specialists' views onto the more general doctrine of the German army, regardless of the actual 
degree to which those views gained wider acceptance and incorporation into the army's 
doctrine, manuals, and conduct in the second half of the 1930s (see for instance ibid., pp. 240-
241). 
32 Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, 'The Social Construction of Facts and 
Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit 
Each Other', in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of 
Technology (Cambridge, Mass. 1989), pp. 40-44. 
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4. Evolutionary change with culture as its mediator 
This chapter rejects both the claims of revolutionary change and suggestions of 
'fascisi' or British influences as the agents of the purportedly revolutionary 
developments in German armour theory, and tums to the manuals, officiai doctrinal 
documents, and correspondence generated during the German anny's 1930s force 
build-up in order to trace the conceptual structure that goveraed the perception and 
interprétation of modem, technologically-driven annoured warfare by the German 
military leadership. The theoretical point of departure of the analysis that follows is 
that no great conceptual changes took place in Gennany's army during most of the 
1930s, and that whatever change did occur in tactical practice was graduai, and 
appeared years later than previously assumed.33 Cultural mechanisms preserved the 
hard core of German military theory and practice untainted by and protected from 
change, while promoting a sériés of graduai tactical updates prompted by 
technological progress. 
Adopting new technology in itself does not necessitate change in the goals, 
means, patterns of actions, accepted heuristics, or mindsets of organisations. New 
weapons may appear to demand major modifications in existing practices, but armies 
are unlikely to adopt weapons that undermine embedded operational assumptions. 
Even if a new weapon can promote organisational transformation, its employment will 
most likely remain restricted, at least initially, by orthodox thought and perceptions. 
This is what happened in the Reichswehr and later the Wehrmacht when they planned 
33 See especially Biddle's eloquent réfutation of claims that a German RMA existed, 
and insistence that an 'essential continuity' provides the best explanation of the Wehrmacht's 
initial successes in the Second World War (Biddle, 'The Past as Prologue', pp. 44-55). Biddle, 
however, does not provide an explanation of the dynamics or mechanisms that maintained 
continuity in face of technological innovation. 
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and then established their armoured and mechanised forces and capabilities: an 
openness to new weapons created a false semblance of conceptual innovation. 
What was the German army's approach to technology and to its appropriate 
incorporation on the battlefíeld? The second paragraph of the Wehrmacht's 1933-1934 
field service manual, Trappenfiìhrung, reads: 'The conduci of war is subject to 
continuai development. New weapons díctate ever-changing forms. Their appearance 
must be anticipated and their influence evaluated. They then must be placed into 
service quickly'34 These were not new ideas: as discussed in Chapter 1, in the 
Prussian and German armies technology in the form of new weapons and means of 
communications had received careful scrutiny, and - if found useful - rapid 
introduction into service. Reichswehr and Wehrmacht had no inherent aversion to new 
weapons, on the contrary. But, as mentioned, technological novelties, however 
demanding and transformative they may seem in retrospect, rarely enforce changes in 
strategie conduct.35 In other words, for the Germans, new military technology served 
existing conceptual structures rather than changed them. As Dennis E. Showalter has 
noted, 'the German army considered new tools of war . . . in the context of their 
probable contribution to the army's 'macro systems' of making war.. . [that is. . . ] the 
legaey of seeking decisive battles to resolve limited wars in stable matrices'. And as 
described in the previous chapter, the faith in modem technology and in new weapons 
as the means to implement traditional concepts had been prevalent in the Reichswehr 
34 Bruce Condell, David Zabeclci, eds. and trans., On the Germán Art ofWar: 
Truppenführung (Boulder, CO, 2001), p. 17. 
35 In part because of their frequeney; see Howard E. Aldrich and Martin Ruef s 
analysis of frequent organisational changes (an army's adoption of new weapons constitutes 
such a change), leading to a short-lived momentum rather than comprehensive organisational 
transformations: Aldrich and Ruef, Organisations Evolving (London, 2006), p. 138. 
36 Dennis E. Showalter, 'More than Nuts and Bolts: Technology and the Germán 
Army, 1870-1945', The Historian 65:1 (2002), p. 125; see also Frieser, BlitzkriegLegend, pp. 
329-331. 
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since the early 1920s. No conceptual transformation - as expressed in the army's 
doctrinal documents - and surprisingly little organisational change thus accompanied 
the incorporation of the modem weapons that purportedly led to the birth of the new 
doctrine of ''Blitzkrieg' In a nutshell, the new technology did not alter the self-
understanding of Reichswehr, or, after 1935, of the Wehrmacht, as a fighting 
organisation in either theory or practice. 
The German military elite - or at least some of it - no doubt paid great 
attention to foreign military experience; it also enjoyed and exploited the new 
regime's enthusiasm for military technology and for the impressive new armaments 
that Hitler happily fmanced. But more than anything, it continued to see itself and to 
understand its surroundings with the conceptual tools that its culture had provided. 
German officers could not escape applying their heuristics, beliefs, assumptions, and 
habits to the new possibilities offered to them. More than 'learning' new doctrines, 
they interpreted them, and their interprétations, adjustments and emphases - as 
expressed in the weapons they developed, their doctrinal goals, and the organisational 
structure of their armoured divisions - stemmed from their military culture. Weapons 
systems such as the Wehrmacht's seemingly innovative radio-equipped tanks merely 
expressed the traditional German emphasis on communications and tactical flexibility, 
while the provision of a variety of tank models for various tasks reflected German 
understanding of the manifold ways in which tanks could and should co-operate with 
the other combat arms.37 Similarly, operational goals continued to emphasise shock as 
the means to annihilation.38 As Showalter has observed, tanks and motor vehicles 
37 Citino, German Way ofWar, pp. 253-256, and as succinctly described in Martin van 
Creveld, Technology and War, from 2000 B.C. to thePresent (London, 1991), p. 180; see also 
van Creveld's analysis of the structure of German army armoured divisions: idem, Fighting 
Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT, 1982), pp. 53-54. 
38 Citino, German Way ofWar, p. 254; van Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 28-30. 
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were added to existing doctrines and forcé structures, not the other way around.39 
In the final analysis, no great revolution in operational perception occurred in the 
193Os Germán army. New means of warfare emerged, and the army sought to devise 
appropriate methods of using them. But no great leap forward occurred, no great new 
visión of warfare materialised, no Gennan-made RMA ensued. 
II. From an imagined army to a real one: doctrinal changes? 
The tum of the decade did not mark a change in the intellectual inclinations of the 
Reichswehr's doctrinal experts. Ambitious reannament plans and an ever more 
robustly financed reannament drive inspired an unremitting interest in an updated and 
appropriate doctrine that would match the much larger army of the near future.40 The 
results, however, do not indicate substantial shifts in strategic and operational 
perceptions, but rather a continued and reverent adherence to precepts as ancient as 
the writings of Moltke the eider. 
1.1930: Yet another operations manual 
The doctrinal opening gun of the 193Os was yet another attempt to update or 
supersede the 1910 Grundzüge der hoheren Truppenführung. In a conscious effort to 
create a more up-to-date and applicable doctrinal document than the one Hierl had put 
forward in 1923, Generalmajor Richard Schünnann produced in the autumn of 1930 
his 'Considerations on War Leadership and Command [Gedanken über Krieg- and 
39 Showalter, 'Technology and the German Army', p. 136. 
40 For details on early and mid-1930s rearmament planning see Geyer, 'Dynamics', 
pp. 117-147; idem, 'German Strategy', pp. 568-572; Deist, 'Reichswehr and National 
Defence', pp. 383-386, 392-404; and idem, 'Ideological War', pp. 371-380. 
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TritppenfühnmgY.41 The différences and similarities between Hierl's and 
Schürmann's attempts to revamp the army's doctrine and adjust it to their own times 
point to the distinctive theoretical and practical emphases of the 1920s and the 1930s, 
and illustrate the development of the army's operational perceptions in the years that 
separated the two documents. 
Gedanken über Krieg- und Truppenßihrung opened with the acknowledgment 
that between the 1910 manual and the one proposed in 1930 lay the experience of a 
world war.42 Trivial and self-evident though that point of departure might sound, it 
prescribed - together with inherent respect for the old wisdom embodied in the earlier 
manual - a genuine attempi to analyse the lessons of the First World War experience, 
particularly in terms of command and control, and to try to implement those lessons in 
the changing realities of military power, technology and organisational structures of 
the 1930s.43 Such an approach stood in striking contrast to the fundamental 
assumptions evident both in Hierl's 'Guidelines for Higher Leadership in War' as well 
as in Seeckt's 'Command and Combat with Combined Arms', both of which treated 
the First World War as an unfortunate - and extraordinary - déviation from the 
German army's successful traditions of thought and practice, and consequently 
offered little from which to learn. As a resuit, the notably unrealistic elements of past 
strategies that both Hierl's and Seeckt's manuals had projected into the future now 
gave way to a level-headed discussion of the strategie challenges of the present, as 
they had been shaped by the recent past. 
41 BA-MA, RH2-2901; see also the cover letter, BA-MA, RH2-2901, pp. 149-150. 
42 Ibid., pp. 155-156. 
43 Schürmann explicitly outlined the relationship between the old wisdom and the new 
lessons of the World War in his manual: 'The Gedanken über Krieg- und Truppenführung 
1930 contains, as did the Grundzüge der höhern Truppenführung vom 1. Januar 1910, the 
theory of war [die Kriegslehren]. It shuns detail, which is the province of the fìeld service 
régulations, Command and Combat with Combined Arms' (ibid., p. 158); for the 1910 manual, 
see Ch. 1, note 92. 
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One resuit was an underlying and fundamental understanding of the need 
to strive for a shared framework of battlefield and campaign coordination between 
headquarters and forces in combat; the 1930 Gedanken offered a comprehensive and 
highly advanced discussion of the means of achieving a shared operational 
consciousness and goals among the différent fighting echelons. It first explained 
clearly the character of the différent levels of command and the appropriate 
relationship of the various levels to the operational rationale of any given campaign: 
Strategy means the art of command, the art of seeing, thinking, and 
leading militarily in order to defeat the enemy. Tactics is the theory of 
the employment of armed forces in the préparation and execution of 
battle. Operations are enterprises directed toward a military goal that 
correspond to the fundamental rules of strategy and tactics.44 
The draft manual then went on to explain how the différent units and levels of 
command work together toward a shared goal and stressed — paraphrasing and 
expanding the key sentence of Moltke the elder's 1888 infantry régulations - that 
' [ijindividual initiative that maintains a connection with its context, and subordinates 
itself to the operational concept of the responsible commander, is the foundation of 
great successes in war; when subordinates wait for orders, favourable opportunities 
inherent in a given situation cannot be exploited. '45 The upper echelons, for their part, 
should kalways feel the puise beat of their units . . . Higher Commanders should remain 
in personal contact with their immediate subordinates, and if possible with the fighting 
44 Ibid., p. 164. See also Naveh, In Pursuit, Ch. 2. The persistence of this foundation 
of systemic rationality is also evident in the post-war studies and reports written by German 
générais under the auspices of the US Army Historical Division, such as Günther 
Blumentritt's 'Die Gefahren operativer und taktischer "Systeme"' (Ms. 009) and 'Strategisch, 
operativ, taktisch' (Ms. 044), BA-MA, ZA-1/1210 and ZA-1/1246. 
45 BA-MA, RH2-2901, p. 172; Exerzir-Reglementfür die Infanterie (Berlin, 1888), p. 
109: 'Die in solchen Grenzen sich geltend machende Selbstthätigkeit ist die Grundlage der 
grossen Erfolge im Kriege.' 
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units, while cautiously evaluating [whatever] momentary impressions [they may 
receive].46 
Finally, the principal tools that were intended to keep all components of the 
system adhering to the lines of a systemic goal were the general staff officer, the 
liaison officer, and the war plan. The general staff officer 'interprets the concepts and 
the will of the commander to the executants; he must possess a lively fighting sprit 
and strong willpower, in order to permeate the manifold ramifications of the unit'.47 
The liaison officer was 'a means through which the commander can inform himself, 
independent of his own actual presence, through personal [telephonic] and written 
messages and reports through channels, or acquire information or [ask] questions 
about events, above all in battle, and to facilitate contact between commanders or to 
enhance the often excessively terse transmission of orders'.48 Still more impressive 
was the holistic and integrative role assigned to the war plan: its function was to 
combine and harmonize the political and the military goals of war, and it accordingly 
encapsulated the rationale of the entire war effort, while prescribing its conduct: 'It 
brings the concerns of statesmanship and economics into conformity with military 
considerations, determines the interaction of the conduct of war by land, sea, and air, 
establishes guiding principles for the economy and for industiy, and designates the 
objectives and methods of propaganda'.49 
The document that opened the Reichswehr's effort to renew and refine its core 
strategic and operational beliefs thus demonstrated the brilliant systemic framework 
the German military leadership - from generals to field commanders - enjoyed as 
46 BA-MA, RH2-2901, p. 172. 
47 Ibid., p. 173. 
48 Ibid., p. 174. 
49 Ibid., p. 175. 
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early as 1930. This system of Strategie and operational command suggests the 
direction lipon which, with time and suitable armament planning and resources, the 
Reichswehr could have rightfully regained its famous excellence in warfighting. Yet 
despite its more apt operational emphases, the fundamental framework of thought 
remained remarkably similar to the one displayed over the years in numerous 
Reichswehr studies, papers, and manuals. Schürmann incorporated the Strategie 
analyses of the 1920s and their virtually unanimous resulting focus on leadership, the 
German people, and the German spirit described in previous chapters. As a result, 
even the most advanced sparlcs of operational insight that Schurmann's Gedanken 
exhibited ultimately conformed to traditional modes of thought. 
2. Technology and armaments 
The 1930 Gedanken acknowledged the importance, potential, and - indeed -
inescapability of an ever more technological battlefield, and, as in the past, embraced 
it as a military norm.50 Yet the fundamental German army world-view - subjecting 
materiel even in the form of advanced weaponry to human will and effort - still set the 
tone, precluding excessive fascination with and over-reliance upon the power of 
machines, while encouraging inter-branch Cooperation and combined-arms tactical 
and operational patteras: 
Yet the machine invariably serves man51 . . . Man remains the leader 
[Führer], sustained by the qualities of the soul [Seele] that draw their 
power from the moral energies [,sittlichen Triebe] of the Volk.. . They 
50 Ibid., p. 173. 
51 A notion immanent in, if hardly exclusive to, German military culture, neatly 
summarised for contemporaries such as Schürmann by an eminent warrior and stylist: 'Denn 
den Kampf gewinnt nicht die Maschine, sondern er wird durch die Maschine gewonnen' 
(Emst Jünger, Das Wäldchen 125. Eine Chronik aus den Grabenkämpfen 1918 [Berlin,1926], 
p. 59) 
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empower him with valour and [self-]discipline and the will to victory as the 
preeonditions for definitive success.. . . No branch of sei-vice can claiin 
to be more valuable than another. Ali contribute, each in accordance 
with its character, to victory, [and] each depends upon the other. Only 
the most profound cooperation between arms leads to the objective; 
their reciprocai acquaintance and understanding is therefore 
indispensable.52 
The stress on combined-arms methods was perfectly justifiable - but scarcely novel. 
3. Civil and militarv leadership, statesman and Feldherr 
The question of leadership in time of war and the appropriate relations between the 
civil and military echelons is the one in which the Reichswehr fell victim most 
spectacularly to its own traditional outlook. The Wilhelmine army did not perceive its 
mission and role as serving the Kaiser; quite the contrary.53 Its approach toward the 
Republic was similar only more radically disconnected; its own interests and agenda 
were paramount. But the German army did need to fmd ways of conceptualising and 
explaining exactly what its prerogatives were, and how the national decision-making 
process should be structured during war. On that question more than others, the 
'lessons' of the World War played a decisive role in creating the veneer of pseudo-
subordination to civil authority that had in actuality grown out of the army's 
imperative institutional need to escape responsibility for the catastrophe of 1918-19. 
German officers always maintained that the government was ultimately responsible 
52 BA-MA, RH2-2902, pp. 182-83 (emphasis in original); 'Technik und Seele' figure 
among the points in Schürmann's immediately preceding heading. 
53 An attitude neatly summed up by a verse of Adalbert von Chamisso, who had 
served as a Prussian officer in the Napoleonic period: ' Und der König absolut / Wenn er 
unseren Willen tut.' 
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for wars - but 'military' décisions, defïned broadly and loosely indeed, were theirs 
alone. The offîcer corps was by and large indifferent to the elementary logicai fallacy 
hidden in their 'responsibility-free' strategie approach: 
War is thus the ultimate means of statecraft for the govemment of a 
nation, for the state leadership. It must accept responsibility for war.. . . 
The statesman cannot dispense . with the advisory judgment of the 
supreme commander [des Feldherren]. He must however have a clear 
perception of the essential nature of war, just as the commander must 
understand the necessities and potentialities of statecraft.54 
The central offence of past German govermnents of course regarded 'morale' — 
or lack thereof. Here, the Gedanken became particularly revealing of its creator's and 
readers' world-view: 'The state leadership must both in its actions and in its effects on 
morale place and maintain the Volk in a condition to offer the most extreme resistance 
as well as fulfilling its other military tasks. [The leadership] thus becomes the 
Supreme Command [Oberste Kriegsleitung].'55 Two immediate disclaimers followed 
this seemingly surprising déclaration. The first echoed deep aspirations within the 
Reichswehr, expressed in numerous researches, studies, and personal letters, for a 
strong and charismatic leader who would embody both civil and military authority.56 
54 BA-MA, RH2-2902, p. 160. 
55 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
56 See for instance Stülpnagel's variation on this theme, Chapter 2, p. 134. For 
Feldherr studies see especially BA-MA, RH62-270. The subject kept the army's research 
department busy during the entire decade of the 1930s, and continued into the early 1940s. In 
an attempt to understand the role and characteristics of the modern gcnius-Feldherr, numerous 
studies focused on figures such as Moltke, Schlieffen, Falkenhayn, Joffre, and Kitchener. The 
assumptions embodied in this research were similar to those of Schürmann. As one unsigned 
study from 1935-36 concluded,' [e]ven in purely military opérations [his task] involves more 
the allocation of forces, rôles, [and] tasks to [his] subordinate Commanders than [it does] 
implementation, although it is scarcely conceivable that in genuinely large decisive battles 
[iSchlacht-Entscheidungen] the supreme Führer would remain in the far rear at a central 
protected location, and there await the outcome.' 
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In 1930 - as in 1933 - the Reichswehr longed for a man who would unburden it of 
the need to obey, or even to take into account, the irritating constraints of democratic 
politics. If modera times made finding such a man impossible, then decision-making 
would have to be limited to the smallest possible number of individuáis: 
The uniting of state leadership and supreme military command in a 
single individual is thus the ideal, if [that individual] is equally blessed 
with statecraft and the talent of military command. That is a rare state 
of affairs. The Supreme Command will thus in present circumstances 
nonnally be a corporate body. The number of its members must be 
limited.57 
The second disclaimer merely repeated 1920s notions of the army's exclusive 
proprietary right to all military decisions, whether strategic or grand-strategic, thus in 
effect nullifying the authority of the goverament over the management and direction 
of war: 'In all military questions that touch upon the security of the Reich the military 
leadership is responsible to the state leadership.'58 
4. Operational ends and means 
In line with this notably traditional framework of civil-military relations, the 
Gedanken maintained that peace-time missions and conduct were completely 
separable from war-time ones. It opened with a remarkably modest, defensively-
oriented definition of its own fundamental mission: 'Defence of the national territory 
against enemy invasión and maintenance of armed neutrality in war in the midst of our 
neighbours are the principal missions of [the Gennan] armed forces [Wehrmachty 59 
57 BA-MA, RH2-2901, pp. 160-161. 
58 Ibid., p. 162. 
59 Ibid., p. 157. 
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However, and entirely naturally, when war breaks out and the military leadership 
takes the lead, the overall goal and the means to achieve it change. In order to present 
a unified national conduct of war, Gedanken meshed politicai goals with military 
ones, conveniently pointing to the only possible interprétation of 'goals' in war. 
Unsurprisingly, that goal was annihilation: 
With the commencement of hostilities the greatest measure of 
responsibility falls upon the supreme leader of the anned forces, the 
Feldheir, who must fit his campaign plan (plan of opérations) into the 
framework [established by] the state leadership toward the strategie 
goal, [which is] the overthrow of the enemy forces and the annihilation 
[ Vernichtung] of the enemy 's military resources . . . Thus are 
constituted the closely intertwined tasks of Statesman and Feldherr. 
The thinking and aspirations of statesman and Feldherr must 
reciprocally interpenetrate [sich gegenseitig durchdringen].60 
And if the approved operational goal remained the destruction of enemy 
forces, so too did the means of achieving that goal, expressed in the axioms of 
offensive warfighting and annihilation through decisive battle, reiterating and 
reinforcing for years to come the army's traditional and seemingly immutable tactical 
framework. If at ali possible, the attack is appropriate, even [when] on the defensive 
[auch in der Abwehr]; only the attack results in décision'.61 Likewise, 
Victory in decisive battle frees us from the most disagreeable 
situations. Battle thus exceeds in importance all other military 
undertakings. Victory in the decisive battle is the final goal [Endziel] of 
any opération. . . . In the war of movement battle as a rule develops 
60 Ibid., p. 162 (emphasis in originai). 
61 Ibid., p. 172. 
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directly from opérations. In the opérations leading to battle lie the seeds of 
victory or defeat. But only tactical victory on the battlefield can decide. 
Tactical inferiority can deprive promising opérations of victory; tactical 
superiority can free us from nasty operational situations.62 
Thus, alongside and superimposed over its new and highly developed 
'operational Cognition5, the army5s traditional tactical framework nevertheless 
prevailed, dictating tactical and operational pattems as well as subordinating the 
strategie plan - indeed the entire strategie mission - to its demands, successes, and 
failures.63 The brilliant theoretical structure of the strategie, operational and tactical 
levels smoothly discoursing and reconciling ends and means crumbled in face of all-
consuming tactical essentialism of Moltkean tradition: 'The unpredictable outcome of 
the first great decisive tactical engagement lays the foundations for further décisions; 
the plan of opérations thus cannot reach beyond the first decisive encounter with the 
main enemy force.'64 The tactical aspiration to a single decisive battle thus prescribed 
strategie axioms, rationales, and ultimately the initial deployment and war plan: 'In 
the power of the forces [employed] lies the first source of success; we can never be 
strong enough for the decisive battle . . ,'65 
5. Geist and Wille in a new kev 
The discussion of and the centrai place allotted to fighting spirit (Geist) did not 
diminish in importance; it remained a focal point of analysis and effort for the future 
German forces and people, and a means of conceptualising - and obliterating - enemy 
62 Ibid., p. 233 (emphasis in originai). 
63 Naveh, In Pursuit, Ch. 2; van Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 164. 
54 BA-MA, RH2-2901, p. 176 (emphasis in originai); similarly and famously, Moltke 
the eider, Chapter 1, p. 31 and note 45. 
65 Ibid., 171. 
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motivation.66 Yet the analysis of Geist and Wille and of their role in war that 
Schürmann presented in 1930 was more nuanced and less straightforward than the 
input-output simplicities of the army's traditional 'Ge/sMnust-prevail-over-materier 
style: 
In war all is uncertain and little is calculable . . . one's own will collides 
with the independent will of the enemy, and is constrained by frictions 
of all kinds . . . In the fog of uncertainty that dominâtes in war, at least 
one thing must be firm and definite: one's own will, which must be 
discernible in every situation and at all times. The firm will to victory 
of commander [Führer] and troops forms the moral foundation of 
victory . . . Great successes can rarely be achieved without great 
dangers. He who wills great things must take great risks.67 
Such assertions of the centrality of Wille focused on its effect on the fighting forces 
and on the role of the military leader; analysis of the role of Geist involved the 
relations between the fighting and non-fighting components of the war machine: 
The wars of our own age are national and ethnie wars [Volkskriege], 
The armed forces are not the sole combatants; even the unarmed part of 
the population is touched by w a r . . . The will of the enemy is directed 
not merely against the fighting forces, but also directly against the 
source of military strength, the people in the homeland. Pressure 
66 This distinetive emphasis on the role of the enemy''s fighting spirit and on the 
necessity of crushing it utterly was a fertile soil in which the brutal suppression of the Wille of 
the European peoples later invaded and occupied by Gennan forces flourished as both axiom 
and practice. 
67 BA-MA, RH2-2901, pp. 167-171 (emphasis in original); similarly, on willpower in 
the fog of war and the relationship between danger and success, Moltke the eider (1869), 
Militärische Werke, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 172, 211. For more on the power of the will in battle, 
'Gedanken', pp. 233-34, and especially 239: lIn borderline cases the stronger will to victory 
and the more inflexible faith [festere Glaube] in victory décidés [the issue] (emphasis in 
originai). 
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through economic warfare methods and the impact on the morale [Geist] of 
the Volk of psychological manipulation [seelische Beeinflussung] to 
cripple its energy and willpower take their place alongside anned 
conflict.68 
This notion of Geist and of its functions were also closely linlced to the macro-
management of the national war effort, as theorised during the 1920s. Following the 
assumptions deriving from its 1920s analyses of Gennany's failure in the First World 
War, and as previously discussed, the anny now held the state responsible for non-
military war préparations. Yet the ultimate authority to coordinate and prioritise ail 
such efforts was to remain fîrmly in the hands of the army. That was the almost-
elegant solution for the civil-military dilemma of a Reichswehr that was now fully 
aware of the prerequisite for effective and efficient mobilisation of the entire nation 
and of its economy, yet reluctant to repeat its own (unacknowledged) macro-
management debacle of 1916-1918. The Reichswehr opted instead to 'outsource' this 
task to the state, using the by-now standard tautological argument that the state 
expressed the will of the anny which in turn expressed the will of the state: 
A Volk cannot carry out such tasks without having prepared itself for 
them. These préparations of the Volk for war involve governmental, 
military, economic, and psychological [seelische] measures. These 
tasks, united in the hands of the state leadership, are to be resolved by 
the relevant organisations on their own responsibility. A unified will 
and a single goal must direct them. Pre-eminence among ali these 
measures belongs to those of the armed forces, as the exécutants of the 
will of the state. In conséquence, the state leadership has the duty to 
68 Ibid., p. 161. 
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create for the Volk a Wehnnacht able to confront the missions that will face 
it.69 
The 1930 Gedanken Uber Krieg und Truppenführung was markedly similar in 
spirit and concept to Truppenführung, the manual issued in 1933-34 that served as 
doctrinal foundation to the Wehnnacht that was soon to appear. As one of the links in 
the chain of doctrinal évolution stretching from Seeckt's 1921-24 'Command and 
Combat with Combined Anns1 to Truppenfiihntng in 1933-4, Gedanken highlights the 
direction, tone, and limits of the slow and nuanced process through which the German 
anny adapted itself to and discoursed with its changing environment, and seemingly 
rejuvenated its fundamental perceptions. 
III. The "when and how* of the development of German armour doctrine 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the process through which Reichswehr 
and Wehnnacht developed their operational methods to deliver what was later tenned 
'Blitzkrieg5 is of immense importance to any overall understanding of the évolution of 
Gennan military thought and practice. It is the prime example of what seemed to be 
the assimilation of new technology and the application to it of appropriate operational 
axioms - whether pre-existing, seemingly fresh and newly invented, or perhaps 
borrowed. As also mentioned, one of the methodological pitfalls awaiting scholars in 
any attempt to dissect the reorientation of military systems into technologically-
oriented (although not technologically-based) ones is the question of whose opinions 
should historians trust as 'representing1 the alleged 'shift'. In this case, was it the 
annour enthusiasts or the military leadership that shaped and directed the complex 
69 Ibid., pp. 161-162 (emphasis in original). 
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process of doctrinal change and adjustment to the new possibilities that tanks, 
aircraft, and radio communications offered? 
Self-inflating accounts of this process have usually depicted armour 
'enthusiasts' such as Blomberg, Werner von Fritsch (army commander-in-chief, 1934-
38), Lutz, Guderian, and others locked in struggle with an uninspired, conservative, 
and even hostile general staff - above all Beck.70 That this picture is at best inaccurate 
and crude is already accepted by many military historians, who are aware both of the 
unfeasible financial and industrial requirements that the early visions of armoured 
warfare posited, as well the doctrinal risks they would likewise involve.71 The theory 
and dynamics of military culture, however, highlights yet another facet of the German 
army's doctrinal and armaments decision-making. It was not merely a healthy and 
natural caution that dictated the pace and direction of German armour development, 
but also, and above all, the cultural axioms that established both the very goals that 
such operations were to serve and the best and most effective methods of serving 
them. 
A necessary first step to understanding the real nature of German armour 
thought would be to establish both when its core ideas expanded into clear operational 
perceptions and patterns, and the content of those core ideas, by scrutinising the texts 
and contexts surrounding the development of mechanised warfare in pre-193 9 
Germany. Scholarly judgments vary markedly regarding the moment at which 
German armour doctrine took on its final pre-war shape - and decisions about that 
70 See for instance Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York, 1952), and Macksey, 
Guderian, pp. 37-79. 
71 For instance Murray, 'Armoured Warfare', pp. 41-42; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, The 
Army, Politics and Society in Germany 1933-1945. Studies in the Army's Relation to Nazism 
(New York, 1987), p. 85; Bernhard R. Kroener, Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm. Der starke 
Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet: eine Biographie (Paderborn, 2005), p. 245; and Gat, British 
Armour, p. 74; and the discussion on pp. 209-243. 
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chronology depend in part on the historian's view of who or what affected the 
proeess most.72 The most reeent detailed analysis of the development of German 
armoured warfare suggests that the overall doctrinal concept that eventually enabled 
the Wehrmacht's panzer forces to overrun Europe was for ail practical purposes 
already perfected between 1923 and 1933.73 It rested on advanced concepts and 
expressed fresh operational ideas: that armoured forces would dominate the future 
batti efield, fighting independently, yet in a coordinated effort with slower forces. 
Annoured forces, as the army5s principal combat arm and the core of its striking 
forces, would employ speed, mobility and range to achieve décision. 'Decisive' 
results, however, would not take the form of fighting and winning "ordinary' battles; 
rather, well-timed opérations, launched by surprise deep into the enemy rear, would 
produce the collapse of the enemy 's entire armed résistance.74 
Two factors cast doubts on this impressi ve picture of early 1930s German 
annoured doctrine. First, at least some of the assumptions mentioned were shared only 
by the most radical spokesmen of mechanised warfare; and second, as will shortly 
emerge, even the most enthusiastic armour supporters did not break radically with 
mainstream Gennan operational thought. And in any case, if allegedly groundbreaking 
ideas were the property only of the small group of Gennan officers involved with 
72 Thus the supporters of the theory that British influence was paramount have placed 
heavier emphasis on the years 1927-1934, while those who credit Hitler with a pivotai rôle in 
the proeess point to 1933-1936. 
73 Habeck, Storm of Steel, pp. 159-161, 194, 206. Such assertions coexist uneasily with 
Habeck's récognition of the fact that 'the German army as a whole' lacked the Red Army's 
confidence that machines would dominate 'modem warfare'. Yet according to Habeck, 
German doctrinal disagreements of later years (discussed in detail in the following pages) 
focused on questions of organisation, which Habeck assumes to be of secondary importance 
(ibid., pp. 188,194). 
74 Ibid., pp. 163-164, 192-194, and Gat, British Armour, pp. 84-85. Habeck claims that 
Lutz's views (which she quotes extensively to create the doctrinal picture described above), 
when taken together with the ideas expressed in Truppenführung, demonstrate that as early as 
1933 the high command had achieved unanimity on a highly advanced and even radical 
armour doctrine (Storm of Steel, p. 194). 
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experimental armoured forces, the picture of pre-war German doctrine as an 
exercise in radicalism is difficult to sustain. An amiy's doctrine is not confined to 
small carefully-selected leadership groups or to experimental forces. By its very 
nature, it must be shared by all arms, and serve both as the 'brain' and the 'central 
nervous system1 of the fighting body, coordinating the functioning and coopération of 
all its organs. Whatever operational wisdom the armour experts may have developed 
independently but did not manage to disseminate further is irrelevant when examining 
the doctrinal and operational 'nervous system' of the Wehrmacht as a whole. Shared 
axioms and modes of action were the ones that eventually determined the conduci of 
the German army, and they are therefore the ones on which scholars should focus in 
their efforts to decode the Wehrmacht's operational script. The analysis that follows 
will thus focus on the extent to which unorthodox ideas, especially those that directly 
challenged received operational truths, did or did not spread or diciate the 
Wehrmacht's armaments and force build-up, doctrinal developments, and operational 
concepts, as well as the cultural dynamics that shaped this process. 
1.1930-1933: Shaping armour doctrine in the mould and service of greater 
truths 
The inextricable link between German armoured operational concepts and the more 
general German operational perceptions reflected in the 1930 draft manual, is 
immediately apparent. Conspicuously, at a time when the Reichswehr, still deprived 
of tanks, aircraft, and means to experiment with or construct its own guidelines for the 
operational use of super-modern weapons, and/or when it was allegedly enthusiastic 
about learning from the British experience, showed no such tendencies in its internai 
studies. Instead, German military discussions demónstrate an idiosyncratic 
understanding of how to use modem technology's potential for mobility, movement, 
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fìrepower, coordinateci action, and the resulting shock effects. Internalisation of 
the character, pace and dynamics that modem weapons systems diciated was, 
however, still restricted; the absence of advanced weapons in German hands indeed 
prevented any other outcome. The resuit was a still stronger emphasis on traditional 
notions such as the centrality of infantry in fulfilling the axiomatic goal of 'decisive' 
blows against enemy forces. Thus, although it emerged after the groundbreaking 
British armoured experiments of 1927-28 that are often cited by scholars as proving 
the British Anny's pivotai rôle in the development of German concepts, the 1930 draft 
manual does not support any such claims: 
In armies that wholly lack or have only a small establishment of 
armoured fighting vehicles, the infantry is in the final analysis the 
combat arm that must win the battle, [even] against an opponent that is 
so equipped. The essence of infantry combat is fire and movement.. 
Only the assault [Sfoss] brings décision. The situation of the infantry is 
the best guide to the overall combat situation.75 
The traditional emphasis on the combined-arms approach and the centrality of the 
infantry likewise still stood at the very core of German operational concepts: 
Ali arms compete to carry the infantry up to the enemy and into the 
assault. Through its equipment with light and heavy infantry weapons 
[and] the provision of heavy mortars, [infantry] cannon, and 
communications gear, it possesses a fighting power that makes it 
independent in many situations of artillery, tank, and air support. The 
76 mobility of the infantry is increased through [motor] transport. 
75 Gedanken, 'Das Heer', BA-MA RH2-2901, p. 183 (emphasis in original). 
76 Ibid. As part of its emphasis on the combined-arms approach, ' Gedanken ' also 
stressed the rôles of cavalry, artillery, air forces, transport units, communications, and 
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These foundational precepts predetermined the German approach to armoured 
operations and the extent to which future German armoured formations were to 
operate independently from the other components of the fighting forces. The German 
army saw tanks, from its initial attempts to define their battlefield roles, both as a 
weapons system that should operate independently (especially heavy tanks, given their 
unprecedented mobility and armour), and as yet another component, however 
important, of a larger infantry-centred operational effort geared toward the goal of 
shock, annihilation, and - thereby - decision. The Germans could thus simply ignore, 
at least during their first doctrinal steps with armour, the agonies and obsessions 
regarding the issue of subordination of the tanks to the infantry, and vice versa, that 
attended the evolution of British armour doctrine: 
The most effective assault forces of modern armies are armoured 
fighting vehicles (maj or armoured formations [Panzerverbande]). They 
enter the scene as independently operating formations and support the 
other arms through reconnaissance and [flank] security, as well as in 
battle. Speed and heavy armour allow them to penetrate deeply into 
enemy [positions]. Their heavy armament enables them to strike 
effectively at most ground targets.. .77 
The 1930 draft manual did not in the least reflect the final decision purportedly 
achieved in 1929-1930 regarding the future employment of armour. Nor did it suggest 
that 'enthusiasts' had 'lost' a 'battle' against 'conservatives'. And it did not preclude 
changes to German operational concepts in the mid- or late-1930s. But it does attest to 
the power of cultural assumptions that themselves channelled or narrowed down what 
logistical units in combination in delivering the ultimate shared goal of 
'Schlachtentscheidung' (ibid., pp. 184-187). 
77 Ibid. 
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the military leadership would assume to be its operational possibilités, 
preferences, and priorities. Claims that 'moderates' willingly chose or forcefully 
accepted the 'middle way' are incomplete, The 'middle way' was, to begin with, the 
'naturai' outcome of any collision between German military culture, new technology, 
and production and flnancial constraints. 
The decisive moments of transition within long-term trends and processes are 
difficult to define with précision. But if German military thought had one such 
moment in the 1930s, it certainly did not take place in 1930 or 1931. But when, if at 
all, did such a decisive moment occur? The next major doctrinal pronouncement that 
can shed light on German military perceptions and operational évolution is the 
Wehrmacht's officiai field service manual of 1933-34, written by Ludwig Beck: H.Dv 
[.Heeresdienstvorschrift] 300: Truppenföhrung — a title most succinctly translated as 
'Army Service Regulation 300: Command'. 
2. 1933-1934: Heeresdienstvorschrift 300: Truppenführung 
As many scholars have observed, Truppenführung ( 'TF ' ) offers very few if any novel 
ideas, intellectual frameworks, or operational concepts; its purpose was to reconcile 
traditional perceptions with new technology and with that technology's battlefield 
implications.78 
fi") The discourse of decisiveness: decisive actions and decisive factors 
78 See James Corum, Bruce Condell, and David Zabecki's forward and introductoiy 
notes, Truppenführung, pp. viii-xiii, 1-12. Corum points out the traditional character of the 
document as a faithfiil expression of the 'German way of war', as well as its effective 
incorporation of new arms into existing concepts. Condell and Zabecki specifically link 
Truppenführung to Seeclct's Fu G in concepts and even in phrasing: 'entire paragraphs and 
sections were carried over into Truppenführung 
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Truppenfiìhrung further accentuateci the high traditional value attached to 
'decisive' conduct and 'decisive' outcomes, and not only stressed 'decisive' actions 
but also offered a clear hierarchy of decisive factors. 'Decisiveness' thus became 
simultaneously a value, a practice and a requirement - and, synergistically, the 
multiple manifestations of decisiveness purportedly decided operational success. 
Unsurprisingly, none of these manifestations were unprecedented: 
The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry, is the value of the 
individuai soldier... the calibre of a leader and of the man determines the 
combat power [Kampjb'aft] of a unit, which is augmented by the quantity, 
care and maintenance of their weapons and equipment. Superior combat 
power can compensate for inferior numbers. The greater the quality, the 
greater the force and mobility in war . . . the first criterion in war remains 
decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to the 
youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that the inaction and neglect 
incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.79 
fii> Operational ends and preferred means 
'Decisiveness' ne ver lost its centrality because the archetypal operational goal, that is, 
the annihilation of enemy forces, in itself virtually the définition of 'decisiveness', 
required that characteristic to be present in both ends and means. Beck's translation of 
the value of decisiveness into the practice of decisiveness was disarmingly simple: 
One can never be strong enough at the decisive point. The commander 
who tries to be secure eveiywhere, or who wastes his forces on secondary 
missions, acts contrary to this basic rule . . . Pursuit [ Verfolgung] 
guarantees the culmination of victory. The purpose is to annihilate the 
79 Truppenführung, Introduction, pp. 18-19. 
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enemy wken such action was not possible in the preceding engagement. 
A decisive vie tory can only be achieved through judicious resumption of 
the offensive . . .80 
Which could be achieved in several ways, some (traditionally) better than others: 
. . . the attack is executed along its base direction by movement, frre and 
shock. The attack can be launched from a single direction against the 
enemy front, where the greatest strength usually lies. Normally, however, 
the attack is directed against the flank or the rear of the enemy.. . a 
flanking attack is more effective than a frontal attack. The simultaneous 
attack against both enemy flanks requires great superiority. The 
envelopment of one or both enemy flanks, reaching deep into his rear, can 
result in the destruction of the enemy.81 
The omnipotence of the axiom of annihilation thus remained as central as ever 
to the évolution of Gennan military thought, campaign planning, and operational 
patterns. Nothing whatsoever transcended Vernichtung as a principle, a guide, a state 
of mind, and of course a practice. Annihilation stood as a self-understood truth, 
beyond explanation; any attempi to diminish it as the raison d'être of battle in the 
eyes of German doctrine and of its bearers (or to claim that it was not, after all, the 
operational goal of German annoured forces) must first explore why annihilation was 
considered so vital, and why the paramount doctrinal document of the Wehrmacht 
demanded that every conceivable effort, energy, and resource be spent in the attempi 
to achieve it: 
Enemy forces not destroyed in the pénétration and the succeeding 
envelopment must be pursued . . the victor pursues on a broad front, 
80 Ibid., pp. 22-24. 
81 Ibid., p. 88. 
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always intending to outflank the enemy, to overtake him, to take positions in 
his rear, or to eut him off from his rearward communications . . . fighter 
aircraft and bomhers will operate against the retreating enemy main body, 
even at the expense of other targets . . . From the very moment the enemy 
begins to retreat, the subordinate commanders who are closest to the 
enemy initiate the pursuit, immediately and without waiting for orders. 
They must act boldly and independently . . . coordination with adjacent 
units is essential . . . every effort must be made to close with the enemy 
main force. 
So important was the effort to destroy the enemy that the ultimate motivator was 
needed to propel it: the senior commander must 'inject his subordinate commanders 
with the will to victory [Siegeswille], He orders ali available forces to move in the 
direction of decisive pursuit, and as soon as possible he advances reformed or newly 
formed pursuit forces. . .'82 
The second central cultural characteristic that served as both a value and 
practice was coopération and combined-anns opérations: Truppenfiihrung stressed it 
at every opportunity. True, by the very nature of annihilation as a goal - a goal only 
the infantry could definitively accomplish by closing with the enemy - some combat 
arms were more equal than others.83 However, the principle of coopération as the 
means to achieve the full potential of annihilation persisted throughout lTF': 
The objective of combined-arms elements in an attack is to support the 
decisive action of the infantry with sufficient firepower and shock effect 
against the enemy. This allows the infantry to break through deeply and to 
82 Ibid., pp. 104,116-118. 
83 'The infantry assures the complete defeat of the enemy through fire and intensive 
pursuit. When necessary, it engages the enemy with hand grenades and bayonets.. '. (ibid., 
P- 117). 
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break the enemy résistance decisively. The first step in this goal is achieved 
when the enemy artillery is overrun or forced to withdraw. Ali amns 
committed to an attack must know each other's mutuai capabilities and 
limitations. They must maintain close and continuous communications 
with each other.84 
And the manual provided ample and detailed discussions on coopération between the 
différent arms - infantry, artillery, cavalry, armour, and air forces.85 
A key derivative of coopération as a value and combined arms as a practice 
was the inherent demand for ever-improved communications technology, to facilitate 
effective combined action. The German army has often been praised for insisting on 
equipping tanks and tank units with voice radio communications and enciphered 
teletype networks, thus providing for the superb tactical and operational employment 
of armour. But the Germans did not accidently stumble upon the idea that 
communications might be vital; theirs was a culturally-induced instinct apparent long 
before tank units were fully introduced.86 Truppenführung repeated several times that 
. . .both the infantry and the artillery are responsible to ensure their 
coordination by close and continuous communications. The relationship 
must be maintained not only between Commanders, but also between the 
forward infantry elements . . . and the artillery observers . the infantry 
must support the artillery liaison team. This is accomplished by direct 
84 Ibid., 'Execution of the Attack and Combined Arms Coordination5, p. 92. 
85 Ibid., pp. 90, 92-98, 100-105, 182-205. 
86 See Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storni, pp. 21-28; Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, pp. 
339-341; and Macksey, Guderian, pp. 50-51. 
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communication between the artillery observation posts, the forward 
observers, and the most advanced infantry elements.87 
fiii) Armour and mechanised warfare: serving the fighting system, not the infantry 
Unlike the FuG, written when Germany's army possessed no tanks, Truppenfiihrung 
was able to offer a concept based on actual testing, however limited in nature. Still, it 
is important to note that in 1933 the Wehrmacht had yet to establish armoured 
divisions, which eventually came into being in 1935 and became operational in 1937. 
Truppenfiihrung thus offers the reader a glimpse into an evolutionary stage of Gemían 
armour doctrine, one that is closer to its untested values and therefore more prone to 
reveal basic assumptions regarding new technology in general and tanks in particular, 
and also - since the organisational platform for the independent employment of tanks 
had yet to appear - the army's natural inclination toward the support role for tanks in 
battle. By providing a window into the mental framework that prescribed the ways in 
which tanks should be employed — at the very the beginning of armour development -
Truppenfiihrung clarifies not only the origins but also the later development of 
German armour doctrine and practice, as is also evident from the documentation that 
preceded and accompanied the establishment of the armoured divisions. Faithful to the 
value and practice of coopération, Truppenführung stated that: 
At a focal point of a battle, where ail available forces should be 
concentrated, the commitment of a particular arm should correspond to 
its relevance to the decisive situation . . . combat elements may 
sometimes be committed against the enemy's forward positions or 
87 Truppenfiihrung, pp. 94-95; see also the similar emphasis on close communication 
between armoured forces and supporting artillery, p. 97. 
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against an enemy putting up a determined resistance . . . [or] a 
counterattack through friendly positions.88 
At the very core of German operational perception stood the assumption that 
each and every component of the fighting machine was to serve the shared purpose of 
battle - which, preferably and by définition, was the annihilation of enemy forces. 
Thus the Wehrmacht's fundamental assumptions took the sting out of the question of 
armour employment from the veiy beginning. The question was not, and could not 
have been, formulated simply as 'should tanks be subordinated to infantry, or should 
tanks operate independently? ' Such conceptualisation was meaningless when the 
paramount importance of the operational goal, and the effective coopération that -
axiomatically - must be dedicated to achieving it moulded the options and content of 
German operational choices. Tanks should be used - of course — in every possible 
way that would assist or facilitate success. Like the other combat arms, they could 
operate in and of themselves, but only as part of a system. 
Early German conceptualisations of the rôle of tanks therefore rested on a 
technological understanding - that tanks enjoy 'speed, extensive operational ranges, 
limited cross-country capability', and its cultural translation into a 'naturai' 
operational axiom: that they could thus execute 'various missions'. They could 
support infantry forces during breakthrough; they could assist in the pursuit; they 
could fighi enemy tanks - and they could and would do ali that, and more.89 That 
assumption did not negate a deeper understanding of armour capabilities and possible 
range of employment - considering, of course, overall operational requirements: 
88 Ibid., 'Tanks', p. 193. 
89 Ibid., pp. 194-196. The sanie approach is evident in the chapter 'Air Forces', which 
emphasises above ali the coordinated action of air and ground forces, and the shared 
knowledge required of each regarding the other"s operational capabilities and needs. The 
authors dedicate the lion's share of the discussion that follows to the 'Communications and 
Ground Installations' that are to facilitate their coopération (Ibid., pp. 197-205). 
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An attack by armoured vehicles either proceeds in the same direction as the 
infantry, or comes from a different direction . . . too close a contact 
with the infantry reduces the advantage of the speed of the armoured 
vehicles and may put them at a disadvantage with respect to the 
enemy's defence. They should be manoeuvred in such a way that they 
either eliminate the enemy weapons that impede the infantry attack . . 
or that they break into the enemy positions simultaneously with the 
infantry . . . the deployment of the other anns should conform to the 
operational requirements of the armoured vehicles.90 
(iv) The Wehrmacht grand strategy, and politics: a farewell 
The discerning reader may notice one noteworthy omission in Truppenfuhrung 
compared to previous manuals, and its neglect of the subject was not in the least 
unintentional. Truppenfuhrung offers no discussion, insights, or assumptions 
regarding the political level of war-fighting and war-management. The German 
military leadership of course did not in 1933-34 foresee the political limitations that it 
would eventually accept or even impose upon itself. Nor did it assume that Germany 
would become the kind of dictatorship it became soon after the publication of 
Truppenfuhrung. Rather the lack of discussion of what had formerly been jealously 
guarded as a natural if threatened prerogative of the army - its right to determine 
when, where and how should Germany wage war, regardless of the political and 
grand-strategic implications of such decisions - indicates that the German army had 
90 Ibid., p. 96. 
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fmally, silently and unobtrusively, decided to forego that prerogative, assuming 
that the much longed-for 'man of outstandirig qualities' would Shoulder the task 
himself91 
The laek of any discussion of the place of politics and grand strategy in war in 
a manual mostly drafted by one of the ariny's leading strategists, Ludwig Beck, might 
seem ironie. However, Beckes réputation as a strategist - a resuit of his sensible 
aversion to Hitler's efforts to provoke a war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 - derived 
merely from his grim operational calculations and low estimate of Germany's chances 
of military success, if tested.92 When the odds looked better, Beck took a différent 
view: he was one of the leading supporters of the reoccupation of the Rhineland and 
of the illegal, rapid, unilateral rearmament of the early and mid-1930s, a line of 
radically irresponsable military policy that compromised Gennan security no less than 
did the Czech crisis.93 On the question of civil-military relations, Beck fmnly and 
unsurprisingly believed in the army's natural right to a central place in the German 
state and its decision-making. But he also idealised the authoritative leader who could 
combine both civil and military authority. And as part of the conservative elite's effort 
91 See Stülpnagel's aspiration in 1924 (Chapter 2, p. 134); see also the editors' note on 
the absence of the 'political and Strategie levels of war' in the manual ('Truppenführung, p. 9). 
92 Beck, 'Bemerkungen zu den Ausführungen des Führers am 28.5.38', 29 May 1938, 
and his resulting letter to Brauchitsch 3 June 1938, in General Ludwig Beck. Studien und 
Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs 
des deutschen Heeres, 1933-1938 (Boppard am Rhein, 1980), pp. 521-37. 
93 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, 'The Military and Diplomacy in France and Germany in the 
Inter-War Period' in Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ed., The Militaiy in Politics and Society in France 
and Germany in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1995), pp. 114-119. Beck's stance on the 
issue of rearmament seems even less responsible if we recognise that he understood - unlike 
most of his ilk - the drastic international implications of rapid German rearmament. But like 
his colleagues, Beck nevertheless demanded that the foreign office comply with and serve 
military requirements: ibid.; idem, TheArmy, pp. 81-83, 89; and idem, Beck, pp. 142-225; 
Geyer, Aufrüstung, likewise offers an outstanding overview of the Strategie and international 
context and consequences of Beck's policies. 
224 
to promote the vision they in part shared with the Nazi party, Beck welcomed and 
facilitated Hitler's consolidation of power.94 
The great irony - and also great tragedy - of the evolving fashion in which the 
German army perceived the ideal relationship with Germany's civil goverament is 
that the Wehrmacht finally surmounted its long-delayed leaming curve, and 
subordinated itself to the guidance and authority of 'politics' at the least appropriate 
moment, and to the least appropriate 'politics'. That was, of course, no historical 
coincidence; only when the military aspiration to discover a leader who embodied 
both the qualities of Feldherr and of authoritative head of state had been fulfilled, 
albeit in the form of a man whom some within the military leadership secretly 
despised, could the German army finally submit itself to a higher authority. Hitler 
himself was wise enough to make that submission decidedly pleasant and resistance to 
it inconceivable by giving the military elite exactly what it wanted. Beyond the 
usually-emphasised disappearance of the loathed Republic, the lavish and ever-
growing armament budgets, the introduction of conscription and the création of a new 
mass army, the unprecedented promotion prospects, and - soon enough - the 
opportunities for battlefield revenge and glory, Hitler cleverly offered an even brighter 
future: he spared the générais the nitty-gritty of grand-strategie planning and 
responsibility. That, more than any other, was a selling point that German military 
practitioners could not resisi95 
94 Müller, The Army, pp. 59-65. For more on Beck's views on civil-military relations 
see his study 'Der Anführer im Kriege', in Ludwig Beck, Studien (Stuttgart, 1995), pp. 23-45, 
and his further notes on the subject in N28-2, pp. 105-108. 
95 See also Showalter's comment that Hitler appealed to the German generals as a 
leader capable of synergising the 'craft of war' with the 'art of policy', taking on the role of 
Bismarck in establishing the 'political and diplomatic matrices' while the Wehrmacht itself 
focused happily on fighting and winning the war (Showalter, 'Technology and the German 
Army', p. 137). And in early 1939 Hitler himself cited none other than Clausewitz, in 
confidentially enlightening an audience of mid-ranking army officers about his mission to 
achieve Germany's goals by political means, and if those means failed, by their continuation -
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3. 1935-1938: From doctrine to operational concept. What should armoured and 
mechanised divisions do, and how shouid thev do it? 
On the spécifiés of armour deployment and tactical and operational employment, Beck 
— and most of Germany's military leadership - maintained a rational and entirely 
predictable stance. They interpreted the options that the new technology offered in 
accordance with the axioms of traditional German operational wisdom.96 They did not 
ask what they could do for tanks, but rather what tanks could do for them. Far from 
being 'against' or 'in favour' of tanks, Germany's military brains busied themselves 
with applying this new factor to their old équations. The one goal to which they 
aspired was the résurrection of a perfected war of movement, aimed at bigger, better 
and technologically-enhanced battles of annihilation. Ail levels of command realised 
that fast armoured forces could better realise their dominant and longstanding value 
and practice of envelopment and annihilation - a récognition reflected in the 
concluding reports of virtually every exercise that the Kriegsakademie held between 
1930 and 1935.97 Discussing the general staff trainees' solutions to the 1932 exercise 
- war against Poland - the then chief of staff, Generaloberst Wilhelm Adam, 
repeatedly emphasised to the future Commanders the importance of decisive, rapid 
attacks, executed as a joint effort by all forces available 98 
thus fulfilling the army's long-held ideal of a leader who could Shoulder the burdens of 
German politics, strategy, and war-management in the service of a nationalist political vision 
(Hitler's Kroll Opera House speech, 10 February 1939, in Dülffer et al., Hitlers Städte, pp. 
311-312). 
96 Showalter, 'Technology and the German Army', pp. 125, 135-136. 
97 BA-MA RH2-102,103, 104, 105,106, 107. 
98 Adam, 'Besprechung der 1. operativen Aufgabe 1932', BA-MA RH2-104, pp. 23-
24; see also Adam's emphasis to Commanders on the importance of 'thinking in 
"Kampfwagen-Zeiten"' in every Operation that included tank formations, since halting them 
or restricting them to the pace of the other forces would most likely result in disastrous delays 
in the attack. Adam's waming - alongside his insistence the centrality of speed - attests to the 
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The method that promised the smooth achievement of the operational goal 
was, predietably, close and effective combined-arms coopération — a fundamental 
axiorn that, however successfully applied in the past, dictated self-imposed limits on 
the Wehraiacht's exploration of armoured and mechanised warfare potential 
throughout the 1930s." The general s taf fs 1935 perceptions of tank employment, 
missions, and preferred techniques naturally continued to reflect the ones expressed in 
the 1933-1934 manual and in the exercises and studies of the early 1930s.100 In his 
July 1935 'Rétrospective considérations on the opérations of the armoured corps in the 
situation posed for the army staff ride of 13 June 1935', Beck observed that 
assignment of tank units to infantry or artillery Commanders would be beneficiai in 
some situations, since it will allow the combined forces to achieve shared goals that 
neither could achieve on its own: 
The tanks thus increase the fighting power of the inf[antry] divisions at 
the beginning of the attack. Only combined action by the tanks and the 
combat echelons of the infantry divisions can open a road into and 
through a previously unshaken adversary; only then can the advance of 
the remaining echelons of the armoured divisions be contemplated. 
Command of the [initial] assault must therefore be assigned to the 
infantry divisions, and to them the armoured divisions - or at least the 
[tank] echelons taking part in the initial phase of the attack - must be 
awareness of the Gemian military leadership that armoured warfare was about to impose 
fundamental changes on the battlefield of the immediate future. That awareness, evidenced in 
numerous reports and studies, réfutés the post-war claims of the armoured experts that the 
high command was ignorant of and obtuse about the requirements and implications of 
armoured warfare (BA-MA RH2-2968, p. 10). 
99 On the importance of the value and practice of combined-arms opérations see also 
Murray, 'Armoured Warfare', pp. 40-42; and Habeck's discussion on the army's early 1930s 
search for well-coordinated combined-arms battles (Habeck, Storni of Steel, pp. 139-143). 
100 For a detailed discussion of Beck's early and mid-1930s rearmament plans, 
including his views on mechanised warfare, see Müller, Beck, pp. 198-199, 206-214, 218-221. 
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subordinateci. Only thus can it be guaranteed that ali préparations for a 
combined attack - especially for the assignment of targets to the 
artillery and heavy weapons, for blinding the enemy with smoke, for 
coopération [of tanks] with the infantry, etc. - will be correctly 
implemented. Only later, once the armoured divisions must detach 
themselves from the slower inf[antry] divisions in order to exploit the 
common victory, can operational control [by the infantry over the 
armoured divisions] be lifted.101 
Beck was thus not, as some have sought to portray him, a narrow-minded 
conservative who could not grasp the capabilities of armour, and sought only to 
subordinate and limit tanks to infantry-support tasks.102 He understood all too well 
what tanks could do, and was delighted to free the tanks to perform their own 
independent missions once a successful breakthrough had opened the road for 
exploitation in depth. He was not, however, Willing to permit the new instrument run 
the show on its own in ways wholly detached from the tenets of successful 
campaigning as he understood them. Beck, like most German générais, resented 
yielding to 'what the tank could do'; he wanted armour capabilities to serve what the 
army should do, in accordance with its longstanding goals and its long-established 
ways to achieve them, namely, concentrated decisive battles of annihilation. Panzer 
101 Beck, 'Nachträgliche Betrachtungen zu dem Einsatz des Panzerkorps in der Lage 
der Truppenamtsreise von 13.6.35', 25 July 1936, BA-MA, RH2-134, pp. 81-83 (emphasis in 
original). 
102 See for instance the analysis of Beck's armour concept by Condeil and Zabecki, 
who claim that Beck 'apparently wanted to follow French doctrine and tie the tanks down to 
close support of the infantry'' (Truppenführung, p. 7). Yet the documents described or quoted 
in the following pages make clear that Beck not only acknowledged and, to a certain extent, 
supported independent missions for armour, but also had no intention of following any foreign 
doctrine - be it French, British, Russian or any other. His role was to formulate a German 
doctrine that would suit German perceptions, assumptions, and capabilities (see also Habeck, 
Storm of Steel, pp. 212, 221-225, and this Chapter, pp. 230-236). 
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divisions, awesome instruments though they might be, amounted to no more than a 
means to that end - much like ail other components of the military machine: 
. .it is probably the case that infantry divisions committed against a 
strong enemy [force] cannot do without the precious assistance of the 
tank arm. For that purpose small tank units [Kampfwageneinheiten] 
rather than major armoured fonnations [Panzerverbände] are 
necessary. For that same reason tank regiments are likewise urgently 
needed as army-level reserves, in order to produce décision at the 
criticai point [Schwerpunlri] of the battle.103 
Beck and the high command were not kstubborn\ They merely continued to 
follow the traditions of German military thought, as had virtually ail their 
predecessors. So powerful was the impact of the past on operational patteras that its 
effect lasted for the better part of the mid-1930s. Long after the Wehrmacht had 
supposedly formed 'revolutionary' operational concepts that allegedly imitated British 
ideas, its leadership still conceptualised armoured striking power and its contribution 
to modem military campaigns in accordance with notions and convictions that can 
only be described as traditional: combined-anns breakthroughs and exploitations that 
ultimately served the infantry's mission of carrying out successful flanking 
movements and annihilating the enemy forces.104 Thus, in January 1936, the general 
staff affirmed the hierarchy of rôles assigned to the Panzerverbände, defîning their 
tasks as: 
1. a) Frontal attack in coopération with other major formations; 
103 Beck, 'Nachträgliche Betrachtungen', p. 84. 
104 See for example Beck's notes, undated, but probably 1935, on the immediate need 
to résumé large-scale all-arms field exercises in order to practice combined-arms techniques 
(N28-2, pp. 32-33). 
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b) Conversion of break-in into [a] breakthrough, in coopération with other 
mot[orised] forces. 
c) Attack on wings and flanks, in coopération with other mot[orised] 
forces. 
d) large-scale counterattack. 
2. For the accomplishment of the above-mentioned missions the 
suitability of major armoured formations both for combat against 
enemy infantry . . . and artillery, and also against enemy tanks is a 
precondition. In that connection it must be assumed that combat against 
enemy tanks, which will be unavoidable - and should not be avoided -
in the course of the modes of employment noted in 1. a-c above, will be 
the rule rather than the exception. These combat missions incumbent 
upon tank will frequently blend into one another, or will have to be 
fought through simultaneously.105 
The general staff fully acknowledged and anticipated that tank fonnations 
would be assigned detached missions and conduci independent battles. But these were 
to dovetail and coincide with the central task of achieving the traditional systemic goal 
prescribed by the logie of other forces, a goal that did not correspond or even 
acknowledge the logie of 'paralysis* of the enemy's system but fully subscribed to the 
traditional aspiration to Vernichtung. Whether operating under the control of the 
infantry or operating independently, German armoured formations served the 
traditional operational goal.106 
105 'Organisation und Ausstattung der Panzerverbände', 21 January 1936, BA-MA, 
RH2-1135, pp. 257-260. 
106 See Habeck on the doctrinal distinetion between tank brigades, tied to the infantiy, 
and armoured divisions, for the operational independence of which the armour enthusiasts 
fought long and hard. Habeck describes the tank brigades' doctrinal emphasis on 'high speed, 
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4. Force structure, composition, and build-up: the projection of future 
operational requirements 
That by January 1936 - and even later - the Wehrmacht still did not possess a final, 
agreed core of armour operational doctrine, and certainly not a revolutionary 
perception of armour employment inherently different than its fundamental 
perceptions of the early 1930s is obvious. Naturally, this state of affairs reflected 
mostly upon organisational and force structure issues: the pace and priorities accorded 
to lighter or heavier tanks, the number and make-up of armour formations, the army's 
over-all structure and organisation, and the speed and logistical underpinnings of its 
build-up. Efforts to bring into harmony strategic threats (especially that of a multi-
front war) and the operational requirements consequent on those threats with 
considerations of doctrine, organisation, production, raw materials, and costs, and to 
frame coherent long-term plans continued throughout the winter of 1935-1936 in the 
course of a lengthy discussion of 'increasing the striking power of the army' 107 
loose connection with the infantry, and combined-arms operations' as a victory for the 
supporters of armour over 'skeptics . . . [who] . . . had no influence' (Habeck, Storm of Steel, 
pp. 239-241). The doctrinal concepts described were however mainstream practices accepted 
by all. If anything, they indicate the reaffimiation of traditional patterns even by the armour 
enthusiasts, whose own operational aspirations evidenced the paramount role of German amiy 
tradition. 
107 A very partial list of the studies and documents reflecting this effort, focusing on 
surviving correspondence between the chief of the general staff, his subordinate staff sections, 
the army's central logistical and ordnance authorities, and the Inspekteur der Kraftfahrtiuppen 
from the second half of 1935 onward, must include Beck, 'Erwägungen über die Erhöhung 
des Angriffskraft des Heeres', 30 December 1935, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 129-143 (see also 
174-225); 2. Abteilung (the general staff section dealing with force structure and unit 
organisation), 'Heeresaufbau 1937', January 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1010,pp. 178-180; Beck, 
'Ausstattung und Organisation der Panzerverbände', 9 January 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 
273-278; Allgemeine Heeresamt (henceforth AHA), 'Organisation und Ausstattung der 
Panzerverbände', 15 January 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 269-272; Beck, 'Organisation und 
Ausstattung der Panzerverbände', 21 January 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 257-260;, AHA, 
'Erhöhung der Angriffskraft des Heeres', 22 January 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 115-126; 
AHA, 'Pz.-Verbände' (production of heavy tanks), 28 January 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 
254-256; Heereswaffenamt (henceforth Wa A), 'Panzerverbände' (including detailed 
production data for different tank types and future production plans and estimates), BA-MA 
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The fundamental question that troubled the general staff was how to 
improve and strengthen the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities despite financial 
constraints and a tight schedule, given that in all probability the next war the German 
army would fight would once again be a multi-front war that required rapid strategie 
décision.108 As al ways, the military leadership kept its operational axioms finnly in 
mind when prioritising possible alternative solutions to the objective of greater 
Angriffskraft. Those solutions were - simply put - either to create additional armoured 
formations, or to focus efforts on the motorisation of more infantry units.109 Both 
options were tested against their possible contribution to the overall goal, a more 
effective offensive, and in the end the general staff deemed both options necessary and 
appropriate. Howe ver, the very définition of 'effective offensive' in German 
operational thought, namely, creating the most promising opportunities for 
annihilation, still assumed that the infantry was the combat ami that the other arms 
supported, and shaped the manner in which the entire 'increase in striking power" 
RH2-1135, pp. 261-268; 'Panzerverbände', February 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 252-253; 
Wa A, 'Entwicklung von Pz.Kpf.Wg.', 23 March 1936', BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 241-249; 2. 
Abteilung, 'Vortragsnotizen zur Übersicht der Inspection d. Kraftfahrkampftruppen', 2 June 
1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 285-288; 2. Abteilung, 'Vortragsnotiz' (tank armament), 13 
August 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 23-25. 
Other studies that shed light on the operational concerns of the high command in the 
second half of the 1930s are 'Operative Studie Polen', undated, unsigned, probably 1935, BA-
MA, RH2-383, pp. 28-31; andRH2-1146, pp. 116, 122-124, 126-127; the 1930-1935 
Kriegsakademie exercises all reached similar conclusions, reiterating the requirement for 
mobile and armoured capabilities and support, in the service of the offensive and the goal of 
annihilation: BA-MA RH2-102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107. Finally, on the enormous gap (often 
of substantially more than 50 percent) between tanks ordered and tanks supplied as of October 
1936, which highlights the setbacks and limitations of production with which Beck was 
rightly concerned at the beginning of that year, see 'Stand der Tankfertigung', 8 October 
1936, BA-MA RH2-1015, p. 80. 
108 The winter of 1935/6 marked a shift from stratégie defence as the centre of military 
attention to stratégie offensive capabilities in the Wehrmacht's operational planning and 
thought. It is important to note that the renewed focus on offensive capabilities and methods 
was initiated by Beck in person, and not forced upon him by internal professional or external 
political pressure: Beck, 'Erwägungen über die Erhöhung der Angriffskraft des Heeres', 30 
December 1935, BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 129. 
109 See also Gat, British Armour, p. 94. 
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discussion took place. The axiomatic indispensability of rapid infantry movement 
initially prompted the German military leadership to understand and present their 
choices in an infantry-oriented manner: 
2) In the course of scrutiny of the current plan for increasing the 
offensive power of our army, the following possible improvements 
have emerged: 
a) Raising the hitherto planned number of army-level tank foraiations. 
. in order to ensure that the war-strength army has the necessary 
striking power; 
b) Conversion of inf[antry] divisions into p[artially] mot[orised] 
divisions in order to increase operational and tactical mobility. 
3) Beyond those steps, considération appears necessary: 
a) about raising the prospects of success of pure tank formations 
through the possibility of temporary attachment of fast-moving 
infantry formations (for example mot[orised] inffantry] regiments); 
b) about the organisation of the infantry'.110 
Moreover, the fact that the général staff perceived its options as mutually exclusive 
alternatives inclined it toward the infantry, and the armyvs frame of analysis thus 
dictated the hierarchy of solutions: 
The fitness for purpose of the present organisation and equipment 
[Zusammensetzung] of the armoured division must be confïrmed through 
practical experience. So long as the [present] limitation of the army to 
thirty-six divisions prevents the further establishment of armoured 
divisions except by sacrificing inf|antry] divisions, it will be necessary to 
110 Beck, 'Erwägungen über die Erhöhung der Angriffskraft des Heeres', 30 December 
1935, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 129-130. 
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set [any] such major formations up as supplementary [to the army's 
organisation plan]. In that connection, as a first step, only mot[orised] 
inf[antry] formations come into question as the necessary augmentation to 
the purely armoured formations.111 
These central doctrinal questions and their operational implications, as well as 
financial and other constraints, far from being decided, had still required that 'further 
practical data . . . be awaited' as of January 1936.112 And during the rest of 1936 the 
general staff produced a sériés of documents examining the operational logie of tank 
deployment, combat, and organisation along the spirit of its January conclusions. In 
March 1936 Section 2 (Organisation) of the general staff and the Heereswaffenamt 
concurred, during the ongoing "striking power' délibérations, that the three main tasks 
of the panzer forces were 'a) Support of inf[antry] attacks, b) anti-tank defence, c) 
independent operational employment in company with other mot[orised] anns', and 
accordingly suggested production of further tank models and additional development 
and armament plans as well as suitable tank gun calibres, with no hint of 
dissatisfaction with the content or prioritisation of the armour tasks under 
» 113 
considération. Likewise, in accordance with the principle of coopération toward the 
shared operational goals that technology was welcome to serve but never to 
overshadow, the general staff throughout the sumrner of 1936 lent a friendly ear to 
111 Ibid., p. 134. 
112 Beck, 'Organisation und Ausstattung der Panzerverbände', 21 January 1936, BA-
MA, RH2-1135, pp. 257-260. 
113 2. Abteilung, 'Vortragsnotiz', 23 March 1936, BA-MARH2-1135, pp. 287-289. 
The only reservation expressed regarded over-produetion of too-lightly armoured vehicles 
vulnerable to heavy machine-gun fire. See also Wa A, 'Entwicklung von Pz.Kpf.Wg.', 23 
March 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp.241-250, outlining the production offour different types 
of tanks to cover the different types of agreed missions (the three tasks assigned here to tank 
forces reappear in most of the documents dealing with tank formations, doctrine, armaments, 
and development throughout 1936). 
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calls coming from its Section 2 and from the infantry divisions for 'no more 
panzer divisions for now' 114 
In October 1936 Section 2 reaffirmed once again that 'The infantry remains the 
principal combat arm, despite the existence of major armoured formations - the arm 
for favourable opportunities, dependent for its effectiveness on surprise and on 
[suitable] terrain, and which, if committed in masses without regard for losses, can 
decide the battle).'115 Yet again, neither technophobia nor intellectual backwardness 
inspired such views. On the contrary: the remainder of the document was dedicated to 
the need for advanced 'infantry tanks . . . equipped with machine guns and cannon, for 
the assault'.116 The attitude of the military leadership toward tank employment derived 
not from an aversion to armour, but from the greater operational goal tanks were to 
assist in achieving. 
It was not until January 1938 that the German army leadership at last embraced 
an operational concept that emphasised tanks as an independent ann. Yet machines 
nevertheless remained part of an effort to achieve the traditional customary 
operational goal - in a faster, smoother, and more efficient manner. The insight that 'it 
is unsound [falsch] . . to tie the armour to the speed of the infantry; that gives the 
enemy time to reinforce his defence and gives the [enemy] artillery considerable time 
to fire; tanks will be destroyed' was merely one element in the broader canvas of the 
campaign and its goals.117 The opening of the document still explained somewhat 
apologetically that 'Large-scale attacks without armour have as yet failed due to two 
114 2. Abteilung, 'Besprechung: Oberstlt. Buhle, Major Schell, In 6', 22 July 1936, 
BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 27. 
115 2. Abteilung, 12 October 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 6. 
116 Ibid., pp. 6-9; see also 2. Abteilung, 'Gedanken über den Infanterie-Kampfwagen', 
5 October 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 10-11. 
117 Generalkommando VII Armeekorps, 'Verwendung von Panzereinheiten im Kampf 
der verbundenen Waffen', 5 January 1938, BA-MA RH53-7/108, p. 200. 
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things . . .The break-in frequently succeeds.. . [but] the attacks proceed so slowly 
that in general the defender has time to take countermeasures'. And the author went 
on to put any possible contribution of the armoured forces in its correct place and 
context: 'Tanks will however help [us] to break in so swiftly and deeply that the 
enemy has no time in which to stop the hole.. . Tanks alone cannot decide a battle; a 
battle is won only when the infantry is victorious. Thus tank attacks must enable the 
infantry to advance swiftly' 118 
That was no mere lip-service. The immanent value as well as the well-tested 
effectivemss of combined-arms opérations prescribed detailed examination of several 
competing options, of ali variants available through the careful orchestration of tanks, 
infantry, and artillery in coopération, as the 'break-in with the infantry' versus 
'following up the infantry assault [Nachstoss] ' discussion regarding armour 
employment exemplifies: . . precise coopération is most fruitful when ali preparatory 
actions are precisely organised. That works best when ali offensive weapons systems 
[Angriffsmittel\ are employed simultaneously.119 The 'Nachstoss' option by contrast 
would be necessary only when: 
. . . terrain and/or mines do not permit the simultaneous commitment of 
tanks, inffantry], and so on, [and] the infantiy must first have 
conquered the terrain in [the course of] its attack. Then only can the 
armour be brought up and committed. Conséquences: the commander 
must rely almost exclusively on the armour commander . . . All-arms 
coopération is more difficult, since precise agreements between the 
commanders [of each echelon] is more difficult. . . The [success of the] 
attack is . . . dépendent on the prior success of the infantry, and [the 
118 Ibid., p. 201. 
119 Ibid., p. 203. 
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commander] will have difficulty in seizing the right moment [for the 
armour attack]. 
That less promising outcome stood in sharp contrast to a triumphant summing up of 
the ideal option: 'Simultaneous attack by armour together with infantry pennits 
detailed préparation and guarantees positive teamwork in the execution of the attack; 
it allows us to hope for a swift and sweeping success'.120 Although the inévitable 
organisational compétition between amis for missions, budgets, and prestige remained 
heated, the upper echelons of the Wehrmacht exhibited a consistent commitment to 
the interprétation that their military culture imposed upon any new military 
technology and on its possible battlefield employment. 
IV. Revolutionaries? German armour experts, enthusiasts, supporters -- and 
their 'rivais' 
The discussions of operational effectiveness so far examined make clear that 
'advanced' and/or foreign concepts of 'independent' tank forces uncommitted to the 
goal of annihilation never managed to break the anny's powerful cultural pattems, 
simply because such notions were inherently foreign to German goals and practice. 
But did they ever have a serious chance of gaining the decision-makers' attention? If 
the general staff, led by Beck - and the majority of Germany's military leadership -
followed the well-trodden path of previous German operational thought when 
conceptualizing and debating annoured warfare, did the armour enthusiasts follow a 
substantially différent path? 
120 Ibid., pp. 203-204. 
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Naturally, not all who took part in the 1935-36 discussions on increasing 
the army1 s 'striking power' agreed fully with Beck on the means by which to réalisé 
that goal. However, despite the 'deficiencies' in Beck's early 1935 suggestions, the 
analysis and suggestions of the general staffs organisation experts and opérations 
offïcers revealed the extent to which most of those who took part in the discussions 
shared the same frame of reference. Section 2 and the opérations department 
(Oberquartiermeister I.) insisted that a more salient rôle to be given to armoured and 
mechanised formations in ail calculations of and planning for offensive capabilities, 
for the sake of the shared operational goal and in order to enhance the contribution of 
ail forces taking part in the offensive: 
3. (Operational and tactical mobility).. . decisive attaclcs are possible 
only with difficulty — or are simply no longer possible — without the 
commitment of powerful tank formations. If that view is accepted, then 
the resuit is the demand for major units, that - in coopération with 
armoured formations — can follow the armour swiftly in order to hold or 
fully exploit the gains of the armoured units. In that case only complete 
ail-terrain motorisation of the major infantry formations that come into 
question can accomplish the objective. Normal infantry divisions [will] 
arrive too late, and lose all chance of surprise.121 
Contrary to the picture common to many post-war accounts, 'armour 
enthusiasts' and 'non-enthusiasts' did not stand on opposite banks of the river of 
military technology; nor did they ever need to reconcile wholly différent approaches 
toward technology and operational goals, and toward the vital question of which was 
to determine which. At no stage of German operational évolution did they represent or 
121 0. Qu.L/2. Abt.,, 'Erhöhung der Angriffskraft des Heeres', December 1935, BA-
MA RH2-1135, p. 185. 
238 
promote concepts completely antithetical to the operational rationale and logie that 
prescribed the subordination of technology - tanks included - to the greater 
operational goal of decisive battle. For that reason, virtually ali the sections and 
offices involved in the general staff discussions on 'increasing the striking power of 
the army' accepted the centrality of the infantry as the main force responsible for 
realizing the successici battle of annihilation - with some expressing this view more 
vehemently than others: 
The principal mission of the tank is and will remain the support of the 
inf[antry] attack, regardless of whether the infantry attacks frontally or 
in an enveloping movement, and whether it advances on foot or by 
motor vehicle. Correspondingly, the attack on live targets has priority. 
Only when the enemy for his part seeks to support those targets with 
tanks will tank combat against enemy tanks come into question. That 
will only rarely be the case, for if the enemy can employ this weapon to 
any great extent, then it might seem obvious that the particular attack 
location has been especially poorly chosen. A deliberate tank-against-
tank battle, however, seems most improbable . . . 122 
From the perspective of both the armour and mechanisation 'enthusiasts' and 
of those less subscribed to armoured warfare, infantry was thus not a competitor but 
122 Friedrich Fromm, chief of the Allgemeine Heeresamt, 'Erhöhung der Angriffskraft 
des Heeres', 22 January 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 115. Fromm harboured a particularly 
radical disdain for armoured warfare, and aspired to employ tanks, if at all, only in infantry 
support missions. His rationale was above all economic and logistical, but his stance 
ultimately derived from his deep conviction of the centrality of direct, old-fashioned 
annihilation through infantry frontal assault: 'in this occasion a previously unresolved issue 
should nevertheless be dealt with briefly: how do I help the infantry surmount the last three 
hundred metres in the assault? Repeated efforts have been made to solve this problem through 
new and improved weaponry, but until now without success. The excessive refmement of 
armaments and the fear of bloodshed [die Blutscheu] lead to tactical degeneration! (ibid, p. 
121). For detailed discussion of Fromm's views see Kroener, Generaloberst Friedrich 
Fromm, pp. 238-254; also Gat, British Armour, p. 72. 
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rather an important 'client' with particular needs that required their attention and 
the army's and the state's financial and productive resources, which however might be 
exhausted in the process of mechanising the infantry to the greatest extent possible.123 
Other offices and sections that took part in the discussions presented similar points of 
departure that constrained their suggestions of the most suitable and effective ways of 
using mechanised and armoured vehicles to enhance German offensive power. Most 
supported the motorisation of infantry units alongside the separate development and 
deployment of several types of tank, each suited to different missions, from infantry 
support to tank-against-tank combat.124 Conceptual frameworks of that kind were 
widespread precisely because they stemmed from a shared attempt to abide by 
acceptable operational axioms. Naturally, not everyone was pleased with the 
operational direction or the expected results. But it is important to realise that 
disagreements derived from different conceptions of the best ways in which new 
123 The correspondents included Lutz's inspectorate, the AHA [Allgemeine 
Heeresamt], and Sections I, II and III of the general staff, as well as Beck as chief of staff 
(ibid., p. 121). As a faithful opponent of mechanisation and of armour (even in direct support 
of the infantry), Fromm's AHA did not fail to stress the economic strain that motorising or 
mechanising some of the army's infantry divisions would inflict, or the likely delays inherent 
in the realisation of any such vision: 'It must be pointed out that the new vehicles that may 
come into question will never be obtainable in sufficient numbers from the [civilian] economy 
in the event of mobilisation, [and] the necessary peacetime production will require some time' 
(ibid., p. 122). In facing the AHA's conservative analysis, reluctance to mechanise, and view 
of tanks as - at best - an infantry support weapon on one side, and the calls of the armour 
enthusiasts for comprehensive mechanisation and 'independent tank divisions' on the other, 
Beck (and the majority of the general staff) strove to implement his 'a bit of everything' 
solution. The central point here is that all those who took part in the debate aspired to serve 
the same uncontested operational goal and rationale - Vernichtung - albeit through very 
different methods. 
124 Wa A, 'Entwicklung von Pz.Kpf.Wg4, 23 March 1936, BA-MA RH-1135, p. 246; 
pp. 241-49 contain a detailed description of and discussion on the different kinds of tanks and 
their missions; see also Wa A, 'Offensive Abwehr von Panzerwagen', 30 October 1935, BA-
MA RH2-1146, pp. 30-49. An AHA memorandum of January 1936 however insisted that the 
production of four different types of tanks, each for a limited number of missions, was 
financially unfeasible, and suggested instead the focusing of production on tanks equipped 
with the 37mm anti-tank gun and with machine guns, which could accomplish a variety of 
missions in cooperation with infantry, fight armour, and contribute to the defence (AHA 
'Organisation und Ausstattung der Panzerverbände', January 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 
269-272). 
240 
technologies could serve time-honoured operational goals, not from dis agreement 
over the operational goals themselves. As the Army Ordnance Department, 
responsible for actually developing Germany's armoured fighting vehicles, put it: 
The call for new weaponry in order to increase the striking power of the 
army will become ever-stronger as the equipping of the infantiy with 
ever-greater masses of m[achine] g[uns] threatens to choke off all free 
movement on the battlefield. The corresponding progressive decrease 
in the combat power of the cavalry and on the other side the massive 
boom in motor transport lead directly to the demand for speedy 
motorised and armoured mobile formations with superior combat 
power.125 
Virtually ali members of the German high command ('enthusiasts' or 
otherwise), thus considered araiour and mechanisation development not as 
compétition with but as enhancements of and suppléments to the infantry's 
capabilities. Section 2 expressed an even greater dévotion to traditional operational 
patteras in its explicit suggestions that mechanised formations act 'in the manner of 
the former army-level cavalry [units]', emphasising their rôle in attacking, 
outflanking, and sealing envelopments (a concept already suggested in December 
193 5).126 Later army high command correspondence on the issue reiterated these 
views in describing the operational rôle of light mechanised formations, and made 
plain the agreement in conceptual and operational planning alike between the 
125 Wa A, 131/36 g.Kdos., 13 March 1936, BA-MA RH-1135, p. 246. 
126 For a discussion of the role and deployment of light mechanised formations that 
was firmly centred on enhancing their 'battle-deciding' characteristics and their possible 
contribution to flank attacks, see O.Qu.I./2. Abt., 'Erhöhung der Angriffskraft des Heeres', 
December 1935, BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 186, and 2. Abteilung, 'Mechanisierte Verbände', 6 
February 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 229-233; also Beck, 'Aufstellung der leichten 
Divisionen', 15 June 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 27-28. 
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allegedly alienated armour and mechanisation experts and the rest of the 
Wehrmacht high command.127 Section 2 drew an even more explicit connection 
between cavalry forces and missions and the new mechanised forces in May 1936: 
After the abandonment of army-level cavalry and taking into consideration 
the development of offensive forces in modern armies, two principal areas 
for the employment of mechanised formations come into question that 
form the basis for [deciding the] organisation and armament of these 
formations: a) employment as decisive [sc h lachten tscheidender] attack 
and breakthrough formations . . . b) employment in the manner of the 
army-level cavalry formations of the past.128 
The unwavering commitment to the goal of annihilation through movement as 
the very heart of mechanised warfare — which by definition departed from British 
'expanding torrent' concepts involving shock and paralysis of the opponent's 'nervous 
system' and consequently of his fighting capabilities - was a central cultural focus 
that predetermined the ways in which German armour experts approached the 
limitations of their instrument and the discrepancies between their mechanised vision 
and its realisation. As Lutz put it in autumn 1935: 
. . with motorisation as well it is a question of establishing priorities 
[iSchwerpunktbildung] : motorisation there where it is unconditionally 
necessary in order to raise mobility and striking power, in other words 
in the logistical echelons and in fully motorised major combat 
formations, [and] no motorisation of parts of those major formations 
127 2. Abteilung, 'Leichte Verbände', August 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 16-17. 
The only addition to the reply was the request of Section 2 for a professional opinion on 
smooth cooperation between the different components of the light division - another focal 
point of interest shared by every German officer involved with the mechanisation of the army. 
128 2. Abteilung, 'Mechanisierte Verbände', May 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 58 
(emphasis in original). 
242 
that in the main march on foot or are horse-drawn, [parts] that would have 
to be ineorporated in the line of march of those forinations.129 
Section 2 likewise naturally rejected horse-drawn components within the otherwise 
fully motorised elements of motorised divisions. But since its members laiew well that 
abandoning horses altogether, although desirable, was as yet wholly unrealistic, they 
did not advocate or seriously draft plans to that end: 
By autumn 1937 we will seek to motorise the four [infantry] divisions 
as extensively as the supply of motor vehicles will permit. In that 
connection we must expect that [some] individual infantry or artillery 
battalions will have to remain horse-drawn. In the event of mobilisation 
these horse-drawn components will transfer to the reserve infantry 
divisions, while the motorised divisions will be lacking the components 
that have not already been motorized in peacetime.130 
The coexistence of horses with motor vehicles - whether annoured or unarmoured -
was simply unalterable German military reality; promoting mobilisation did not 
necessarily mean sacrificing other, albeit dated, contributions toward movement, but 
rather determining their appropriate employment.131 
The practical approach toward horses and the natural acceptance of the crucial 
role they would still play in any forthcoming war stemmed from the cultural 
perception of technology that 'annour experts'' and 'non experts' shared. Neither 
129 Lutz, 'Neuaufstellung motorisierter Panzer-Abwehr Kompanien der Infanterie', 5 
October 1935, BA-MA RH2-1146, p. 76. 
130 2. Abteilung, 'Vortragnotizen zur Aufstellung der 4 motorisierten Divisionen', 6 
May 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, p. 56. See also Gruppe III (of Section 2),'Motorisierung von 4 
Divisionen', 30 April 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 77-79. For discussion of the employment 
of horses in motorised divisions see Gruppe III's memorandum of 5 September 1936, BA-MA 
RH2-1135, pp. 18-19. 
131 For AHA views on the optimal combination of horses in motorised and partially-
motorised formations, see AHA, 'Erhöhung der Angriffskraft des Heeres', 22 January 1936, 
BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 117-118. 
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conceptualised the coming of the tank as an 'ali or nothing' proposition that 
necessitated a complete organisational, doctrinal, operational and financial 
restructuring, as did the armour enthusiasts in Britain.132 This is why the German 
cavalry's slow incorporation (and finally almost complete makeover) into mechanised 
and/or armoured forces was relatively the least painful such transition in any major 
European army.133 
Most of the officers who took part in the 1935-1936 deliberations were, 
undoubtedly, armour, mechanisation, and motorisation enthusiasts. Their plans and 
aspirations for heavier annour formations, mechanised assault infantry, and motorised 
annies were no less comprehensive or advanced than those of their French, British, 
and Soviet counterparts.134 But their enthusiasm and dedication did not serve armour, 
mechanisation, or motorisation as means in themselves. Ultimately, they toiled to 
resolve questions that they shared with the rest of the Wehrmacht's planners and 
practitioners: how could technology best serve operational goals, rather than what new 
operational goals technology might prescribe. 'Armour enthusiasts' thus did not hold 
substantially different views than their 'non-enthusiast' colleagues, and the two 
groups' professional disagreements were far less acute than in other European armies. 
132 Gat, British Armour, pp. 1-18. 
133 Macksey, Guderian, pp. 61-62 and Habeck, Storm of Steel, pp. 164-165, 208-209. 
134 See for instance 2. Abteilung, 'Bildung einer Mot. Armee', 20 June 1936, BA-MA 
RH2-1135, pp. 99-100; 2. Abteilung, 'Vortragnotiz (Bildung einer Mot. Armee)', 3 August 
1936, BA-MA RH2-1015, pp. 88-89; 2. Abteilung, 'Vortragsnotizen zur Übersicht der 
Inspektion d. Kraftfahrkampftruppen', 2 June 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 285-288; AHA, 
'Pz.-Verbände', 28 January 1936, BA-MA, RH2-1135, pp. 254-256; 2. Abteilung, 
'Vortragsnotiz', August 1936, BA-MA RH2-1135; 2. Abt., 'Mechanisierte Verbände', 6 
February 1936, BA-MARH2-1135, 229-233; 2. Abteilung, 'Leichte Verbände', August 1936, 
BA-MA RH2-1135, pp. 16-17; 2. Abteilung, 'Mechanisierte Verbände', May 1936, BA-MA 
RH2-1135, p. 58; Gruppe III, 'Motorisierung von 4 Divisionen', 30 April 1936, BA-MA 
RH2-1135, pp. 77-79. 
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V. Disciples of the British 'school'? The German armv and British armoured 
warfare expérimentation 
Yet another difficulty attending efforts to trace the évolution of German armour 
doctrine and practice is, as described at the beginning of this chapter, the question of 
putative foreign and especially British influence over German ideas and development. 
The most eloquent advocates of extensive, early, and long-lasting British influence 
cite as a vital example a 1927 memorandum by Fritsch, according to which fast tanks 
'most probably5 will become 'the operationally decisive offensive weapon . . . most 
effective if concentrated in independent units like tank brigades'.135 Even assuming -
for the sake of argument — that this recommendation stemmed solely from the British 
experience and lessons, it is far from clear that the very meaning of 'operationally 
effective' was the same either for German armour enthusiasts or general staff offlcers 
as it was for British armour theorists and practitioners. In other words, did Germans 
and British have the same operational goal in mind when they envisaged a particular 
method of employment of armoured forces? 
As the previous pages demónstrate, the operational concepts relating to 
annoured warfare that Germany's military leadership thoroughly re-examined in the 
early 1930s were most heavily influenced by previous German operational habits, 
concepts, and values. Foreign notions such as paralysing the enemy 'nervous system' 
(rather than annihilating large chunks of his fighting body) or Soviet notions of 'deep 
battle' that clashed with or merely failed to coincide with German tenets simply did 
not register in the Reichswehr's doctrinal consciousness.136 'British influence5 as a 
135 Gat, British Armour, p. 54. 
136 For a concise analysis of B. H. Liddell Hart's concepts (the 'indirect approach' and 
paralysing of the enemy5 s nervous system rather than physically destroying him in battle) see 
Gat, British Armour, pp. 1-18. German understanding of and willingness to learn from the 
Soviet 'deep battle' concept is disputed. While researches agree that German armour experts 
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whole therefore deserves a careful second look. Gemían observers did not in 
practice simply understand and apply British (and other) operational experiences 
exclusively from within their own existing framework. They rather made a conscious 
attempi to create an operational code far différent than that of other armies, a code that 
moulded the focus, scope, goal, and appropriate organisation and forces for armoured 
opérations. 
A number of studies and planning documents attest to the nature of the 
German approach. Adam's analysis of the British 1932 exercises opened with the 
observation that for objective reasons connected with political and operational goals 
and methods, the British summer fíeld exercises were of relatively small relevance to 
the German army: 
In the tactical unit training of the English (sic) army, the guiding 
conceptions of which have until now rested on the experience gained in 
the World War, a fundamental change has begun to emerge. The 
colonial missions of the anny have once again assumed a central place 
and are to be decisive [massgebend] for the army's training 
[programme].. . annual training will close with a tactical command-
enjoyed access to Soviet doctrine and ideas through the shared school in Kazan, Soviet 
military literature, and German intelligence sources, they differ over German judgment of 
these ideas. Habeck suggests that armour enthusiasts and experts such as Guderian and Lutz 
shared doctrinal and organisational ideas similar to those of their Soviet counterparts [Habeck, 
Storm of Steel, p. 237]; Gat claims that German experts' approach was far différent, since they 
sought to avoid the Soviet 'division of roles' for tanks into three types of armoured unit, and 
instead followed the 'British model' of an independent tank role, exclusively concentrated in 
armoured divisions [Gat, British Armour, pp. 74-76]; and, although he does not address the 
subject directly, Naveh présents the German and Soviet logie of operational and systemic 
approach as antithetical, thus not merely suggesting that the Germans lacked a full 
understanding of the 'deep battle' concept in its general operational context, but also implying 
that any German attempi to emulate Soviet concept - if ever existed - would have been a 
futile exercise [Naveh, In Pursuit, pp. 105-208]. 
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post exercise on mountain warfare based upon the lessons learned during 
Indian [north-west frontier] punitive expéditions.137 
What the German high command was truly interested in and what it could (and 
wanted to) conceptually and vicariously test emerged from Adam5s concluding 
remarks: 
Concluding assessment: An exercise designed and conducted with a 
particular purpose in mind must not lead to false tactical conclusions. 
Even if the left wing of [British Array] 3rd Division was seriously 
shaken and in part annihilated, annihilation or rolling up of the entire 
division [by the tanks] could not have resulted without a simultaneous 
infantry attack.138 
Adam dedicated a considérable part of his general analysis to questions such as 
coopération between motorised and non-motorised forces, and to the perfonnance of 
tank units that possessed radio communications.139 But he allowed very little room -
in effect, one paragraph - for the lessons the British Array itself had drawn from the 
manoeuvres. Adam5s analysis, in effect, persistently sought to understand the British 
summer exercises through German 'lenses', and to read British actions and décisions 
and their implications from within the conceptual pattern the Wehrmacht was in the 
process of establishing.140 
137 Adam, 'England. Die Manöver der Kampfwagentruppen. Sommer 1932', May 
1933, BA-MA RH2-2968, p. 2. 
138 Ibid., p. 9. Habeck relates this conclusion of Adam to his alleged 'prejudices' 
against tank-only assaults; however, given his interest in annihilation, those 'prejudices' were 
merely the culturally-founded operational views shared throughout the German amiy elite 
(Habeck, Storm of Steel, p. 190). 
139 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
140 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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That whatever lessons the Germans could extract from British experience 
inherently reflected their own military cultùre is also evident in the conclusions that 
Beck drew from the 1934 British manoeuvres. In criticising the conduci of British 
Commanders, Beck noted that: 'The keyword for the mission [Auftrag] must be: attack 
straightaway, and search out and crush the enemy. Each hour lost tells against the 
attacker'.141 His specific references to the lessons that the army should draw from the 
British exercises made it absolutely clear that nothing could be taken from the British 
at face value, or embraced regardless of the German army"s idiosyncratic values, 
considérations and constraints, much less mindlessly copied. On the contraiy: he 
exhibited a notable awareness of the danger of too enthusiastic 'learning', as well as a 
conscious willingness to derive only operational lessons that could serve longstanding 
German doctrinal priorities: 
I cannot escape the feeling that we have somewhat exaggerated the 
effectiveness of independent armoured formations in [the course of] our 
theoretical délibérations. I also have the impression that in the present 
state of [the] technology, the fast tank intended for independent 
opérations is far less capable of fulfilling its missions than is its slower 
brother, designed for combat in the ranks of the attacking infantry. For 
this view the experience gained in the French field exercises, in which 
only infantry tanlcs were employed, pro vides authoritative support.142 
Moreover, the high command's January 1936 discussions on the organisation 
of panzer formations referred to French armour experience and formations as valuable 
sources from which to learn, and a natural enemy to talee into considération when 
141 'England. Manöver des Panzerverbandes 18. bis 21.9.1934', December 1934, U.S. 
National Archives, College Park, MD, Microcopy T-79, roll 16, frame 817. 
142 Ibid., pp. 823-824. 
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building a German counterpart.143 Especially revealing of the doctrinal interest 
that French armour elicited is the high command's January 1936 discussion of 
equipping and organising its own armoured formations in order to create smaller yet 
heavier tank units. The army leadership was still frustrated by its lack of actual field 
experience to guide its way, but it was not British lessons that the army leaders 
deemed most relevant. Instead, they chose to highlight yet again the colonial nature of 
British military requirements and practices: 
Atpresent, [our] délibérations over the equipment and organisation of 
major armoured formations as yet rest merely on theoretical 
foundations, since the necessary practical experience is not yet 
available to us. It therefore seems ali the more expedient to take into 
account the measures [adopted] in those countries that in the fìfteen 
years since the War have been able to amass practical experience 
without [the impediment of disarmament] restrictions. In this 
connection the study of French organisation and equipment seems 
especially worthwhile, since English [sz'c] tank formations appear, in 
their organisation and equipment, to be at least in part adapted to the 
requirements and demands of colonial warfare.144 
Likewise, the surviving body of German studies of foreign armour forces írom 
the 1930s is not limited to or even mainly focused on the British experience. Previous 
scholarship has suggested the existence of a process of examination of différent 
approaches that the German army 'translated' or filtered through German axioms and 
143 Beck, 'Organisation und Ausstattung der Panzerverbände', 21 January 1936, BA-
MA, RH2-1135, pp. 258-260, and Wa A, 'Offensive Abwehr von Panzerwagen', 30 October 
1935, BA-MA RH2-1146, pp. 30, 35-38, 41-42. 
144 Beck, 'Ausstattung und Organisation der Panzerverbände', 9 January 1936, BA-
MA, RH2-1135, p. 273. 
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limitations, with special emphasis on Soviet ideas - a natural development 
resulting from the sharing of annour development expertise since the 1920s.145 The 
files indeed suggest that the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht intentionally considered a 
wide spectrum of leaming sources and operational examples, a spectrum that grew 
continuously in breadth throughout the 1930s, as more and more foreign armies joined 
the British in testing and developing armoured warfare concepts and foiraations. In 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, the reports on foreign armies focused on doctrinal and 
practical lessons, but as time passed and the Wehnnacht's self-confidence and 
experience grew, the annour forces of foreign armies became above ail a field for 
intelligence-gathering. Thus, alongside the 1924-1925 reports on the British 
manoeuvres, the Gennans carefully studied the French 1922, 1923 and 1924 
manoeuvres, and in 1928-29 examined the status of motorisation and annour in the 
American and Soviet annies.146 Booklets produced between 1925 and 1928 on foreign 
armies examined the composition and numbers of their motorised units analysed the 
French, Czechoslovak, Polish, and British annies.147 A study from late 1928 compared 
the 'extreme wing' of the 'English school', referring to the theories of J. F. C. Fuller 
and Basil H. Liddell Hart, with French annour doctrine, and criticized the British 'all 
mechanised, all annoured, no infantry' approach while favouring French views, albeit 
interpreted in Gennan cultural terms: 
145 See for instance Habeck, Storni of Steel. 
146 'Bemerkungen zu den Englischen Manövern 1924 sowie Übersichten Britisches 
Reich Sep. 1924 bis März 1925', BA-MA RH2-1603; 'Die Französischen Herbstmanöver 
1922, 1923 und 1924', BA-MA RH2-1547; '1928-1929. Bewaffnung, Motorisierung und 
Panzerausstattung des amerikanischen Heeres', BA-MA RH2-1822; 'Verwendung des Etats 
M. (Flugzeug und Motorenentwicklung in der Sowjetunion)', 1929, BA-MA R43 1-745. 
147 BA-MA RH2-2285. See also BA-MA files RH2-1438, 1439, 1440,1441, 1442, 
1443, 1444, none of which focused on the British army. By 1937 the foreign armies reports 
also included the technical progress of American and Italian forces, and other 1936-7 reports 
were dedicated to the motorisation of the Italian, Polish, Russian and Czechoslovak armies 
(BA-MA RH2-1587 and RH2-1604). 
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The tank apparently serves as an indispensable supporting arm for attacks 
that ahn at a decision, but [it] can in no way replace infantry.. The 
usefulness of mass armies [remains] unaltered.. The internal 
combustion engine is likely merely to make the mass of divisions of the 
traditional kind more mobile, by lightening the loads of the infantry and 
by easing logistical constraints.148 
The interest in various foreign annies continued throughout the early 1930s, 
with France as the subject of more reports than Britain.149 By the mid- and late-1930s 
the Gennan anny was giving equal attention to the French as well as the British, a fact 
reflected in correspondence, in high-echelon discussions, and in the official studies 
that the Wehnnacht' s leadership produced and fed upon. A 1938 analysis mentioned 
the contrasting 'English' and 'French' concepts of armour employment, and referred 
to 'Gennan, English, French, Russian' organisational structures for annoured 
fonnations that stemmed from the various armies' diverse operational concepts.150 
Finally, a 1938 examination of efficient Cooperation between tanks and other 
offensive anns in foreign annies confinned the Wehnnacht the validity of its own 
course: 
Development of tactical thought on annoured formations after the [First 
World] War: free independent employment (England) — Distribution to 
the Inf[antry units] (France). Gradual convergence of these views. Now 
ahnost everywhere notably similar: (a) mixed fonnations. . for 
148 'Zukunftsheere und Mechanisierung. Englische und französische Anschauungen', 
BA-MA N46-148, p. 76. 
149 'Heeresmechanisierung und Motorisierung in England, Frankreich und Polen', 
1931-1932, BA-MA RH12-6/V.22; 'Veröffentlichungen der ausländischen Militärliteratur\ 
1927-1931 (focused heavily on France), BA-MA RH12-1/V.87 and RH2-1489, RH2-1442, 
RH2-1443. 
130 Generalkommando VII Armeekorps, 'Verwendung von Panzereinheiten im Kampf 
der verbundenen Waffen', 5 January 1938, BA-MA RH53-7/108, p. 200. 
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independent operational and tactical employment. (b) Purely armoured 
units [reinrassige Panzereinheiten] for combined-arms combat.151 
It would of course be inappropriate to ignore the fact that British armour 
thought and experience did indeed affect German armour experts - a fact of which the 
German officers involved in armour made no secret before the war.152 Yet the exact 
nature of British influence was far from the simple, straightforward German copying 
or emulatìng of British wisdom as it appeared in Liddell Hart's Daily Telegraph 
columns or in the translations found in the pages of the Militär-Wochenblatt. Heinz 
Guderian, for instance, aspired to emulate British armour thought and practice, and as 
late as August 1936 referred in print both to J. F. C. Fuller's writings and to the British 
1935 field exercises, in an essay entitled 'Armoured Units and their Cooperation with 
other Arms'.153 Scholars' Claims that the writings of Füller and Liddell Hart had a 
comprehensive effect on Guderian's thought, although manipulatively presented after 
the Second World War, are in all probability correct. Guderian did seek to promote a 
substantially unorthodox perception of the appropriate effect that armour technology 
should have on German operational practice, and indeed believed that the very nature 
of armoured warfare - the combination of speed and armour - required a wholly new 
orientation toward the technology and its logie. Under no circumstances should tanks 
wait for the infantry; if the infantry forces were not mechanised, tanks must deploy 
and operate separately in order to maximise the effect of their fighting qualities - a 
viewpoint that sounds notably 'British', tank-oriented, and 'early Fuller'.154 
151 Ibid. 
152 Gat, British Annour, pp. 67, 78-79. 
153 Heinz Guderian, 'Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit den anderen 
Waffen', Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, August 1936, pp. 607-626; for Guderian's 
analysis of British views and experience, see pp. 614-615. 
154 Guderian, Achtung - Panzer! The Development of Armoured Forces, their Tactics 
and Operational Potential (London, 1992), pp. 200-207. 
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Yet in many ways even Giiderian the 'radical' still expressed the traditional 
cultural logie in his very demands for a new approach to mechanised warfare. The 
quantitative methods upon which most of the arguments supporting the 'British 
influence' rest, if applied to Guderian's 1936 article, establish that - as promised by 
his title - the lion's share of his text dealt with the issue that bothered him no less than 
it bothered the high command, namely, coopération with other arais; however 
radically eccentric his stance may seem, it was nevertheless by and large a produci of 
German military culture. Non-mechanised infantry, explained Guderian, is always too 
late. But what is it that it is too late for? 
In his Achtung - Panzer/, published in 1937, as well as in his post-war 
writings, Guderian gave a notably fuzzy impression of the operational goal the tanks 
were to serve: was their general mission to facilitate swift-moving large-scale battles 
of annihilation - or were they to bring shock, confusion, and fìnally the collapse of the 
enemy's 'nervous system'? Although the answer to that theoretical question did not 
necessarily prescribe any specific employaient or organisational pattern for armoured 
formations, to pose it clarifies the tangible limits of 'British influence' over German 
armour theory. For these two contradictory operational goals embodied entirely 
différent, uncompromising, and eventually unbridgeable military world-views. In that 
signifìcant respect, Guderian's pre-war and post-war writings showed his readers two 
entirely différent pictures.155 
In Achtung — Panzer!, in his discussion of striking power, Guderian hailed 
tanks as having such power to 'the highest degree' Striking power, according to 
155 See also Macksey, Guderian, pp. 45-72. Gat offers a surprisingly short discussion 
of the question of'paralysis vs. annihilation' goal, simply stating that 'Panzer leaders, most 
notably Guderian . . . saw the role of the mechanised forces [as] .. . bringing about a total 
collapse of the armed resistance . . . '. Guderian, however, as his writings make amply clear, 
was not always so definite about the tanks' ultimate goal (Gat, British Armour, pp. 82-85). 
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Guderian, was 'the power that enables combatants to get close enough to destroy 
the enemy' Other comments further reveäl his repertoire of military axioms: 'it would 
be a grave mistake to commit tanks to areas where you do not wish to stage a decisive 
battle . . . ' Tanks, in effect, if used correctly, were simply the way to bring about the 
desired and culturally required decisive results: 
Great Commanders always strive for decisive - and thus mobile -
warfare, and seek to this end to maintain the numbers of their mobile 
units [schnellen Truppen] in a favourable relationship to those of their 
slower formations. [And] even today mobile forces can only secure a 
decisive success if they are string enough in relation to the [size of the] 
army as a whole.156 
But Guderian subscribed mostly saliently to his own military culture when actually 
linking shock with annihilation: 'you must bring fire to bear on the enemy by closing 
to close range, identifying the targets that pose the greatest hindrance to the attack, 
and annihilating them by direct fire'.157 'Destroying the command system' was, for 
him, not a goal but an instrument to ensure decisive battle - or so he wished to present 
• « 15R 
the tank and its possible contribution to the army's campaigns. 
In Panzer Leader, written after the war and, as mentioned, to a considérable 
extent under Liddell Hart's thuinb, Guderian was less clear, and offered ahnost no 
reference to wider operational goals. While discussing the importance of movement, 
for instance, he suggested that the most important contribution of tanks would 
probably be their ability to 'keep moving once a break-through has been made', and 
failed even to mention any post-breakthrough mission. Elsewhere he maintained that 
156 Guderian, 'Die Panzertruppen', p. 625. 
157 Guderian, Achtung- Panzer!, pp. 202-204. 
158 Ibid., p. 202. 
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the sources of hostile fire should be 'either destroyed or made inoperative', 
suggesting that he regarded both options ás similar.159 Guderian thus demonstrated not 
only the Germán indifference to the nuances and complexities of Liddell Hart's 
'indirect approaeh' to warfare or to operational goals sueh as 'paralysis' — rather than 
'annihilation'- as the looked-for eonsequence of shock. The seareity of Guderian5 s 
postwar referenees to the strategie goal of the campaign derives from the general lack 
of interest in sueh matters among Germán annour experts, who joyfully busied 
themselves exelusively with tactical detail. Indeed strategie analysis is diffieult to find 
in either Guderian's pre-war 01* post- war writings; faithful to his own cultural limits, 
Guderian's thoughts on mechanised warfare were confíned essentially to the realm of 
operations and tactics, and strayed toward the higher goals they were meant to serve. 
Conclusión 
The archival evidence offers little support for the assumption that the Germán military 
leadership willingly restricted its foreign sources of doctrinal and practical military 
knowledge solely or primarily to the British experience. That untenable thesis appears 
to stem from two sources: the distorted post-war picture provided by British scholars 
and surviving Gennan generáis, and the world primacy of British annour experiments 
in the mid- and late-1920s, which generated a general interest in their fíndings and 
outcomes, and no doubt created what seemed to be a noteworthy Gennan interest in 
159 Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 41-42. Nevertheless, in his other referenees to the 
role of panzers in Cooperation with infantry, it was obvious that the two options were not 
similar - and equally obvious which option Guderian preferred: 'regarding the Cooperation of 
tanks with infantry, it can be said that it is the mission of the armoured units to break enemy 
resistance swiftly and defínitively [rasch und gründlich], and indeed not through temporary 
paralysis [Lähmen] resulting from the moral effect of armoured attack, or through attempts to 
roll the enemy flat [under the tank treads], but through the annihilation by fire of the enemy 
encountered in the battle zone1 (Guderian, 'Die Panzertruppen1, p. 618). 
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the British armour experts. Yet when the time at last came for independent and 
non-theoretical German experiments, the German army swiftly and effortlessly 
moulded its armour formations in its own cultural shape.160 Far more than the tables of 
organisation and equipment of the armoured formations themselves, it was the 
substantial différence between the overall operational goals that tanks were to serve in 
the two visions of armour warfare that made direct 'émulation' virtually impossible. 
The goal of annihilation on the one hand and the goal of 'paralysis' on the other 
expressed fundamental perceptual différences, and prescribed operational methods 
that were inherently foreign to one other. 
By and large, as late as January 1938, the German army remained firmly loyal 
to its own well-rooted principies andpractices of war-fìghting, whether mechanised or 
otherwise. Its armour enthusiasts did not successfully - or in most cases, at ali -
spread imported ideas of advanced armoured opérations, and no such ideas reached 
the level of comprehensive and accepted doctrine. That outcome was not the 
conséquence of an outmoded and conservative mindset, but rather derived from the 
natural processes through which military culture sifts and filters new ideas, adjusts 
them to its time-honoured and trustworthy moulds, and defends its own operational 
code from too hazardous experiments and risky changes. It was only when traditional 
demands for further change were fulfilled, and German forces themselves 'tested' the 
combination of new technology and traditional doctrine and operational goals in 
action in 1939 and after, that significant adjustments and improvements to its doctrine 
could be introduced. 
What then did happen, doctrinally and practically, in the Wehrmacht of the 
1930s? A new technology was rightly identified as facilitating old concepts, further 
160 See also Corum, German Way ofWar, pp. 253-267. 
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enhancing ancient operational axioms and long-prized values - speed, combined 
arms, initiative, and shock - as well as plàcing within reach the time-honoured 
operational gaols of decisive battle and swift and total Vernichtung. The resuit was not 
an RMA, for new technology did not induce a radical change in military concepts, in 
the organisation of forces, and in the character of war. While the German army 
underwent a signifïcant évolution in the course of its experiments with and 
incorporation of new technology into existing perceptions and an existing 
organisational culture, it was only when armoured warfare spread to other armies that 
enjoyed a far better chance to develop innovative organisational thought, stronger 
industriai systems, and ahnost unlimited resources, that mechanised warfare could 
métamorphosé itself into a genuine RMA: 'the application of new technologies into a 
signifïcant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts 
and organisational adaptations in a way that fnndamentally alters the character and 
conduci of conflict' 161 The process that took place before the Second World War in 
the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, despite its intrinsic interest and the impressive - and 
fatal - fruits it bore in the immediately following years, was nothing more than the 
natural évolution of a brilliant and deeply entrenched organisational culture. 
161 Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer', p. 30. 
Conclusion 
Military culture: Necessity, contingency, and choice 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, 
under circumstances they themselves choose, but rather under 
circumstances directly found in, given by, and transmitted from the 
past. 
- Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon 
Bonaparte (1852). 
The story of German operational thought and practice and their development in the 
interwar years is not unexplored. The Wehrmacht's successes in the first years of the 
Second World War have led scholars to devote considerable attention to the sources of 
German battlefield primacy, of the annies that prevailed despite inferiority in numbers 
and materiel through superior doctrine, operational brilliance, and tactical excellence. 
This thesis has attempted to examine well-known narcatives, well-known (and 
less well-known) archival documents, and well-known figures involved in this oft-told 
tale from a perhaps novel angle. Its purpose has been to provide a clear overall 
explanation of what happened in German military thought in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
to understand how the Gennan anny marched into the Second World War as it did. 
Cultural theory and the set of explanations that it provides, as described earlier in this 
thesis, help to clarify both the mechanisms and the context of a number of issues that 
historians of Gennan military affairs have faced with some bafflement. Why and how 
did a military organisation act repeatedly against the security interests of its own 
country, as well as its own institutional interests? What were the origins and further 
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évolution of the unique dynamics of Gennan military practice, and what formative 
world-view produced and reinforced the araiy's conceptual ossification? Most 
curiously, for what reasons did both contemporary and later spectators see these 
processes as constituting a striking record of innovation? 
In itself, the claim that a powerful dynamics of continuity was the most 
influential force behind the initial Gennan successes in the Second World War is not a 
new one.' But the mechanisms that explain the persistence of tradition, the 
incorporation of new technology into long-standing patterns, and the gentle, 
unselfconscious ways in which members of military (and other) organisations align 
their individuai analyses and frames of thought with their shared organisational 
assumptions is rarely explained or tested in detail against the historical evidence. 
However powerful and persuasive the cultural explanation may seem, it is not 
without flaws. The most common among them, as already described, is the theoretical 
pitfall that awaits those who ascribe every opinion, development, and analysis to a 
simplistic set of cultural constraints, and ignore the complexity of human reality and 
its inherent variety of choices - as well as objective and culturally-constructed 
limitations. Even more tempting is the assumption that, given an extreme 
organisational culture and an environment that encouraged that culture's further 
radical évolution, its bearers - Gennany's military leadership and officer corps - were 
not merely predisposed to create the operational doctrine and practices on show 
throughout the Second World War, but actually predestined to follow that course. That 
could not be further from the truth. Military culture is not and should not be 
understood as some sort of stealthy deforming disease. However immanent and 
unreflective they may be, cultural constructs can only rarely completely block all 
1 See especially Corum, German Way ofWar, and Biddle, 'The Past as Prologue'. 
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other possibilities and interprétations but those 'natural' to the world-view from 
which they derive. And even if a military-cultural mindset is inescapable, it can never 
be monolithic: it cannotmould its subjects into cultural 'clones'. In other words, both 
in military organisations and in other social organisms, alternative choices of thought 
and practice - which the current organisational culture will not discard as too 
illegitimate to explore - always exist. Military culture is merely constraining, not 
deterministic. 
An ample body of evidence suggests that even those most devoted to the 
infallibility of core Gennan operational 'truths' could interpret those same 'truths' 
along competing lines and acknowledge the plausibility of alternative interprétations 
and courses of action. The post-war analyses by Wilhehn Groener - sharp as always -
of Falkenhayn's strategie planning demonstrate how culturally-constructed 
perceptions are not immune to self-reflection and unorthodox insights: 
Nor do I believe that even the most brutal will to annihilate [der 
brutalste Vern ich tungSMÙl le] in summer 1915 would ha ve caii'ied a 
great Gennan offensive in the West to decisive victory, since we lacked 
the forces [required] to move from tactical breakthrough to operational 
envelopment.2 
Groener never rejected, of course, the pillars of the Gennan operational thought - the 
human will and its rôle in the axiomatic decisive battle of annihilation. But he did 
acknowledge the possibility that even if ail the demands of Gennan military culture 
were met, victoiy might still be denied - a récognition that later opened the way for a 
long-overdue revision of his entire military world-view. Groener was not alone in his 
ability to see and conceptualise beyond the limits of the traditions and tenets that he 
2 Groener, BA-MA N46-41, p. 238. 
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himself endorsed; the Forschimgsamt 's comprehensive effort to research and 
study the Feldherr, his qualities and his art, from the second half of the 1930s onward 
offers other examples. The Feldherr discussion, which naturally raised the question of 
civil-military relations, provoked statements such as 'The military Ieader must also be 
an outstanding statesman and diplomat; and he must also raise the immense sums of 
money that war devours . . .', and gave rise to calls for a 'total Feldherr5 as well as for 
'total war'.3 Yet another Reichswehr study of the art of war called for adherence to 
Clausewitz's insistence that war was not an isolated phenomenon, rather than simpiy 
following his 'prescriptions for war', as had been prevalent before the World War.4 
Military culture thus does not and cannot prescribe a given series of reactions 
to external and internal challenges and decisions. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, radicai 
practitioners though they were, admitted military defeat in September 1918, before a 
total military collapse occurred, even though they could have continued to refuse to 
admit it in the expectation of miracles through German Geist, as they were culturally 
prone to do - a stance to which Ludendorff briefly returaed in October.5 And when 
defeat was finally on the table, military culture was not solely responsible for the 
almost unanimous post-1919 refusal of military circles to aclcnowledge it. After all, 
the German army had in the past proven its ability to use a devastating defeat to learn 
and reform, if it so wished. Rather, in a political climate that threatened its very 
existence, the military leadership was left with little choice of how to justify its past 
(and thus also present) plight to itself, to the Republic, and to the German people. The 
3 'Wandlungen des Feldherrn-Begriffs von der Zeit Moltke bis zum Ende des Ersten 
Weltkrieges', BA-MA W10-50138. See also W10-50137, 'Das Bild der modernen Feldherrn', 
the author of which quotes from a Feldherr study by Dr. W. Solger, director of the 
Kriegsgeschichtlichen Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, p. 37. 
4 Unsigned, undated studies (probably from 1935-36), 'Erörterungen über Clausewitz', 
and 'Auffassungen zum "Totalen Krieg" und "Absoluten Krieg"', BA-MA W10-50123. 
5 See Hull, Absolute Destruction, pp. 304-309. One of the officers who persuaded 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff to admit military defeat was Joachim von Stülpnagel. 
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ossification of the army 's 'infallible' operational concepts that followed was thus 
- although unfortunate for the Reichswehr - an outcome determined less by German 
military culture than by the acute political pressures that the army faced in 1919. It is 
also important to emphasise that military culture does not necessarily impair its 
subjects' capacity for rational decision-making: although deeply immersed in their 
organisational culture, both Seeckt and Stülpnagel were capable clear-sighted and 
sharp analysis. Both were indeed driven by their willingness to 'look the situation in 
the face', and never doubted that Germany and its army had suffered military as well 
as political defeat: 'we must never forget that we lost the war'.6 Despite the severe 
limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, both attempted to address the causes 
of that defeat. It was only from that stage onward that German military culture 'kicked 
in', and shaped the scope and content of the concepts developed in the course of their 
efforts. Seeckt's and Stiilpnagel's writings thus demonstrate that military culture does 
not blind its subjects to objective constraints, nor does it force a single 'natural' 
solution to the challenges that harsh realities impose. 
That the power of any military culture is limited seems to be obvious from the 
fact that it cannot force 'predicted' outcomes and organisational reactions, even when 
an existential crisis looms. As described throughout this thesis, armies - including the 
German army - are constantly negotiating their status, freedom of action, and 
relationship with their civilian authorities. On two occasions after the collapse of the 
Kaiserreich the German army faced severe external pressures to serve as the 
indispensible pillar of the civilian government - pressures that touched upon its very 
self-definition and self-understanding as a fighting organisation. However, the cultural 
conditioning that demanded complete freedom from civilian control, essential as it 
6 Seeckt, 'Ansprache', 10 July 1920, BA-MA N247-75, pp. 23-27; Stülpnagel, 
'Gedanken', BA-MA N5-10, p. 4. 
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was to the army's self-definition, did not prescribe its reaction to political 
pressures in 1919-24 and 1930-33; the nature and extent ofthose pressures, and the 
preferences and affiliations of the officer corps turned out to be as strong as or even 
stronger than cultural imperatives. Whereas the newly-bom Republic ostensibly 
offered subordination to civil authority but in actuality conceded quasi-independence, 
the Nazi regime offered the reverse - and the army rejected the Republic and chose 
Hitler. In 1933 and after the Wehrmacht acted in part against its cultural template, and 
sacrificed its independence for other rewards.7 
Discussion of change and continuity raises yet another important question. Did 
German military culture suffer complete stagnation throughout the interwar years? 
The answer is 'no'. As already pointed out, especially during the early 1930s, it 
regenerated and updated itself in response to new and challenging realities, and 
especially in response to new technologies. But none of these often subtle and 
ultimately limited changes ever breached existing conceptual boundaries. None stands 
as a shining novelty that could rightly be termed a 'revolution' in German military 
affairs. Yet the German army's interwar record was not necessarily lacking in merit. 
Its military culture was, after all, an effective one, wonderfully (if unintentionally) 
suited to new technologies and to their effective incorporation into existing 
operational modes, and providing and reinforcing the exemplary operational and 
tactical practices that in the end proved self-defeating. 
Germany's military failure in the Second World War had many sources - but 
the évolution of its military culture was one of the most central and crucial of all. In its 
subtle, non-conscious power of narrowing perceived possibilities, choices, actions and 
7 Most notably, as described, freedom from strategie planning, but also the loan of 
Nazi ideology as a tool to steel the Geist of the troops and the population, and rearmament and 
force structure expansion limited only by the resources of German society, and of Germany's 
eventual conquests. 
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reactions, it provided both a climate and a powerful dynamics conducive to a 
limited, superficial examination of past mistakes. It lured German military thinkers 
into the trap of attempting to achieve old goals with new means instead of re-thinking 
those goals in the light of new technological possibilities. Most of ail, it allowed them 
to cling to old operational concepts even while — or even through - 'adopting' or 
'developing' seemingly new ideas. 
That German military thought could have developed in far différent directions 
is evident from the words of its founding father, who offered his successors a highly 
complex, non-reductionist analysis of their profession and of its requirements: 
The only question, therefore, is whether, when war is being planned, 
the politicai point of view should give way to the purely military . . . 
that is, should it disappear completely or subordinate itself, or should 
the politicai point of view remain dominant and the military be 
subordinate to it? . . . Subordinating the politicai point of view to the 
military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the 
guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No 
other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of 
view to the politicai. . . 
Yet it was Clausewitz's Kantian vision of the conceptual 'purity' of limitless violence 
that bedazzled the naive military readers of subséquent générations: 
If for the moment we consider the pure concept of war, we should have 
to say that politicai purpose of war had no connection with war itself; 
for if war is an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will 
its aims would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy 
8 Clausewitz, On War, Book VIII, 6, p. 607. 
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and disarai him. That aim is derived from the theoretical concepì of war....9 
Ironically, the very richness of possible interpretations and readings of Clausewitz's 
highly complex point of departure allowed Geraian military thought to evolve 
legitimately if fatally into the narrow-minded and extremist vision dominant 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and most notably in the event-filled 
years between the two World Wars. 
9 Ibid., Book I, 2, p. 90. 
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